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Preface 
'Psycho-Analysis and Textual Production' 
As its title suggests, this study is divided into two separate but related parts. Each part of the 
thesis is then sub-divided into sections. Part I is evolutionary in nature, building its argument 
in a more linear and expository style than those sections which comprise Part 11 which stand in 
a more dialogical relation to each other and are self-sufficient in form. The title of the thesis 
uses the term 'psycho-analysis' as it was first introduced by Freud with reference to a systemic 
methodology. It should be noted that the 'textual production' to which I refer in the title 
should not suggest a Marxist-based analysis. Instead, it refers to the activation of the text in 
conjunction with its encounter with the reading subject. As such, it does not refer to the 
creation of an author, nor to the material production via institutions in the strict historical 
sense. It does, however, refer to a material affect of the signifier in its interpretative rendering 
by emphasizing its bodily interlinking with the imaginary of the reader in a scene which is 
analogous to that of hysterical symptomatology. Part I is entitled 'Psycho-Analysis' and 
consists of three sections which explore the beginnings of psychoanalysis, its main theories on 
hysteria and the relationship between Josef Breuer and Sigmund Freud. The theoretical base 
of hysteria is considered to be illuminating to analyses of critical procedures such as those 
employed in literary criticism. Part 11 is entitled 'Textual Production' and is comprised of six 
sections of textual readings. These readings are presented as discrete in themselves yet of an 
interlocking character. This study of psycho-analysis and textual production has attempted to 
examine the mechanisms of critical encounter in relation to the psychoanalytical text and the 
literary text. Theories offered by psycho-analysis formulated wkh reference to hysteria are 
considered to offer an illuminating parallel to those processes which occur in critical practice. 
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INTRODUCTION 
'Psycho-An*sis and Textual Production' 
INTRODUCTION 
As its title suggests, this study is divided into two separate but related parts. Each part of the 
thesis is then sub-divided into sections. Part I is evolutionary in nature, building its argument 
in a more linear and expository style than those sections which comprise Part 11 which stand in 
a more dialogical relation to each other and are self-sufficient in form. 
The title of the thesis uses the term 'psycho-analysis' as it was first introduced by 
Freud with reference to a systemic methodology. ' Its hyphenated form here draws attention to 
the interest of the thesis in the historical evolution and aetiological beginnings of 
psychoanalysis as we now term it. In its divided form, it is also suggestive/redolent of the 
analyses and analytical procedures devised and employed by literary critical encounters. This 
thereby draws attention to the shared linguistic base of both disciplines and the active 
dimension of written and spoken textuality in both domains. At other times in the thesis, I 
employ the term 'psychoanalysis' to refer to the present-day discipline in its application. The 
collapsible nature of the earlier term into the later synthesis allows a distinction to be made 
between a system based upon linguistic distinction and its subsequent methodological 
application which has facilitated a new terminology and vocabulary established within its own 
domains. This transmutation therefore might suggest that any discipline is systemic to itself, 
allowing its thoughts and textual production to be shaped and determined by its own 
methodologies. 
It should be noted that the 'textual production' to which I refer in the title should not 
suggest a Marxist-based analysis. Instead, it refers to the activation of the text in conjunction 
with its encounter with the reading subject which provides an arena of virtual space. As such, 
it does not refer to the creation of ar-author, nor to the material production via institutions in 
the strict historical sense. It does, however, refer to a material affect of the signifier in its 
interpretative rendering by emphasizing its bodily interlinking with the imaginary of the 
reader in a scene which is analogous to that of hysterical symptomatology where the latent 
text finds its 'inscription' in the living flesh, a symbol made manifest in the body of the 
hysteric. In this way, it may be seen to link with the living history assumed by the 
reading/writing subject engaged in the signifying act for, according to Lacan, "[i]t is certainly 
the assumption of his history by the subject, in so far as it is constituted by the speech 
addressed to the other, that constitutes the ground of the new method that Freud called 
psychoanalysis" (Lacan: 1977,48). 
Part I: 'Psycho-Analysis' 
Part I consists of three sections which explore the beginnings of psychoanalysis, its main 
theories on hysteria and the relationship between Josef Breuer and Sigmund Freud. Texts of 
early psychoanalysis are examined in relation to theories formulated on hysteria. This is not a 
static or purely historical exploration but one which seeks to utilize concepts and negletted 
theoretical strata from Breuer and Freud's Studies on Hysteria (1895) to comment upon 
critical practice. Studies on Hysteria is given close attention in order to explore the theoretical 
base of hysteria represented there as one which may prove illuminating to analyses of critical 
procedures employed in the younger academic application of literary criticism. As the 
springboard of all later psychoanalytical theorization, the phenomenon of hysteria - precisely 
because it was not regarded as a clearly defined clinical entity by Breuer and Freud - must be 
understood as offering an aetiological cross-section of all subsequently classified neuroses. 
More pertinent to the premise of this thesis, it also offers a clinical scenario of an intense 
serniotic encounter. 
Because the psychoanalytical texts selected are of an early character in the history of 
psychoanalysis, through their discussion of the aetiology of hysteria the aetiology of 
psychoanalysis itself may be displayed. It is interesting to note the close attention paid to 
language in the establishment of psyclioanalytical theory and practice. It may be seen to exist 
as an application of a system of serniotics in which the lived affects of the signifying practices 
may be traced through the symptomatology with which it is presented. It is also through and 
by the same signifying practice that psychoanalysis offers both its therapy and analysis. In 
other words, its therapeutic application is subject to the same linguistic mechanisms as the 
object of its scrutiny: its object is most manifestly its subject. The same observation may be 
made regarding the critical encounter with the literary or indeed any other text. The means by 
which critical interpretation presents itself shares the same linguistic base and may use the 
same figurations as the text with which it is engaging. It would seem therefore that there is an 
argument for an hysterical splitting of scenes in both psychoanalysis and literary criticism. 
Historically, the mythical dimension of the aetiology of psychoanalysis is explored as 
an area of investment for subsequent critics by which their own criteria are displayed for all to 
see. Anglo-American feminist interpretation of the history of hysteria, even when it engages 
with psychoanalytical theory, often misrepresents aspects of its therapy and perpetuates myths 
with regard to its practitioners (Hunter: 1983, Price Herndl: 1988, Gallop: 1985). French 
feminist theorization in this area has often sought to claim the hysteric as a feminist heroine, a 
talking subversive in the face of Herr Doctor (Cixous and ClEment: 1996 [1975]). The figure 
who has suffered most in such accounts and analyses has been Dr. Josef Breuer and the first 
section of Part I concentrates upon him as a medical practitioner. Whilst his name has been, 
for the most part, forgotten as an original thinker integral to the beginnings of psychoanalysis, 
it is often cited in feminist critiques as an easy by-word for the repressive machinations of the 
patriarchal apparatus instilled in medical science. It is therefore an interest of these first three 
sections to recuperate the work of Breuer and to install his figure as central to 
psychoanalytical theorization. Although his biographical details are commented upon, and in 
this area the thesis is endebted to the investigative scholarship of Albrecht Hirschmuller, it is 
not the intention here to establish a truer life story but to highlight how subjectivity itself is 
textualized and how textual distortion may become systemic within a given discipline so that 
it may maintain its tenets. It is with a sense of irony that the figure of Dr. Breuer also 
provides us with a figure of mastery within the confines of the thesis. 
Breuer's 'Theoretical' contribution to Studies on Hysteria is examined in the second 
section in order to draw out neglected areas of his theory in relation to later psychoanalytical 
theorization by Freud. It is also considered that Jacques Lacan, in his reformulation of 
Fieudian theory, inherited some of Breuer's theoretical and stylistic constructs. The reading 
of 'Theoretical' concentrates upon Breuer's theoretical metaphors, his textual reflexivity, and 
his formulation of symptomatology. His extensive electrical analogies are given thorough 
attention as it is considered that they provide an illuminating model of the psychical 
mechanism of the organism. The last section of Part I concentrates upon the case history of 
'Frýulein Anna 0. ' and is used to comment upon p! esent-day formulations of gender. It 
considers the role of bodily topology in the constitution of the ego and argues that gender may 
be understood as the inhabitation of a phantasy, a lived metaphor. The subsequent work of 
Freud on ego configuration and Lacan on the imaginary and bodily topology are drawn upon 
to develop this argument in conjunction with the research of Paul Schilder on the image of the 
human body. 
Although the sections which comprise Part I make use of clinical scenario and 
theoretical observations, they also constitute a responsive textual arena in which the 
psychoanalytical text is subjected to a theoretical scrutiny consistent with its own postulations. 
The psychoanalytical text is then placed in a co-existent relation with other texts so that an 
intertextual interplay may be seen to operate within the confines of the section itself in order 
to accentuate the overdetermined structural dynamic at play in the topology of theoretical 
writing itself as a practice. I argue later that the position occupied by the hysterical subject 
offers a correlative to the position taken up in writing and reading and is therefore inherent to 
critical practice. This says less that the critic is an hysteric per se than that he/she occupies an 
hysterical postioning. It points to a base shared by psychoanalysis and literary analysis which 
is split in its theoretical application between its application and its means, i. e. that it is 
dependent for its production upon the same material out of which the textual product is 
wrought so that its existence is produced by its means of production. This points to an 
inherent materialism at the base of the signifying practice so that within its production it 
carries absolutely the means of its reproduction. 
Part 11 : 'Textual Production' 
Each section of Part 11 comprises a textual reading. These textual readings are presented as 
discrete in themselves yet of an interlocking character. It is hoped that Part II will be seen to 
consist of a construct of moveable sections which interlink in stylistic and thematic terms and 
in their theoretical suggestibility. By 'suggestiblity', I mean an openness to suggestion 
existing in the text understood as an organic unit. Although dependent upon being read for 
activation, the text gathers an agency as it is engaged in a reciprocal activation of the reading 
subject as text. The texts selected for analysis are treated strictly as texts rather than aesthetic 
or 'literary' forms. Their differences are sewn together by the common thread of the thesis 
which posits hysterical structuration as being central to critical process. Some of the texts 
examined are not strictly 'literary', such as the contentious Stoly of 0 or the life story of 
Princess Diana. 
The textual productions of Part 11 range in focus from children's fiction, twentieth- 
century pastiche of the Victorian ghost story, pornography/erotica, contemporary 'women's 
fiction' and biographical/cultural texts to the pattern-verse of the last great mythical 'poet 
figure' of the twentieth century. All of these texts are run through, I would argue, by a post- 
modern awareness of the machinations of their textual existence, displaying self-reflexivity in 
form, style and subject. The texts may be seen to interlink in their interests in the temporal 
elements of narrativity, the affects of haunting, topological inter-dimensionality, processes of 
grief/mourning, virtuality, hysterical positioning, workings of power, desire and critical 
engagement, and a challenge to the liminal boundaries of textual production. A strong 
element of inter-textual cross-reference constitutes an area of haunting within these texts and 
is brolight to bear from outside or extra-textually. These ghostly reverberations in textuality 
may be said to constitute an area of haunting in which the textual is revenant to itself, drawing 
attention to the temporal and topological aspects of textual representation and production. 
The textual analyses here represented constitute areas where some of the textual 
affects of what has been technically presented in Part I will be seen to operate. In this way the 
consideration of the symptom as a virtual dimension is related to the metaphoric space of the 
textual body. Hysterical actiology is referred to in order to critique the critical endeavour and 
to comment upon the manifest text and its condition seconde. Freud's concept of 
Machirdglichkeit, or 'afterwardsness' is employed to comment on the backward completion 
principle operative in the reading process and in literary form as a tensile aestheticism 
dependent upon the workings of memory and recollection. The phenomenon of transference 
is viewed as contiguous with the textual virtuality whilst liminal challenge represented in and 
by the textual body is tied to the Lacanian concept ofjouissance. The readings themselves are 
considered to be texts produced in response to other texts and in this way seek to open up and 
display the dynamic of textual production itself, a working illumination of a scheme in which 
theory and text interact within a textual arena made specific to the discourse of 
psychoanalysis. 
Because mechanisms described by psychoanalysis are activated in the reading/writing 
process, there is more attention to clinical detail and practice than to 'set' complexes and 
notions in the readings offered in the thesis. The text is regarded as a structure which comes 
into contact with the living structuration of the reading-writing subject by which it is 
mobilized and energized. This contact takes place in a third space which exists between text 
and subject. This scenario is analogous to Wolfgang Iser's exploration of the reading process 
when he states that, 
The literary text activates our own faculties, enabling us to recreate the world it presents. 
The product of this creative activity is what we might call the virtual dimension of the 
text, which endows it with its reality. This virtual dimension is not the text itself, nor is it 
the imagination of the reader: it is the coming together of text and imagination. 
(Iser: 1988,215) 
This is not to suggest that reader response is wholly responsible for the affects of its 
energizing response because this would waive the textual intrusion into the space of the 
subject. The third space is analogous to the 'place' of transference and as such constitutes an 
active virtuality. It is the place of a two-way haunting. This proposition of a third place or an 
arena of constructivity that exists as a coalition between textual structure and subject structure 
posits a virtual space as a locus of inter-projection. The subject, engaged in the reading 
process, enters the dimension of the text to be inhabited by the textual structure itself in a 
reciprocal exchange. In a complex of intertextual mechanics, it must also be considered that 
the reading subject exists as an area of receptivity inhabited by the cross-referential haunting 
operative in the text itself. 
PsyCho-Analytical Practice: The spoken text 
it is in the very movement of speaking that the hysteric constitutes her desire. 
(Lacan: 1994,12) 
Because the'linguistic arena of psycho-analysis consists solely in the arena of speech in terms 
of its 'Llherapeutic efficacy, it must be stressed that the thesis draws as much upon the 
mechanisms of its clinical practice which are based upon the trajectory of speech as its written 
theoretical aspects. The spoken performance of the linguistic crossed through by its written 
counterpart is a constant presence in the work of Jacques Lacan who states that "my recourse 
(in rewriting) to the movement of the (spoken) discourse, restored to its vitality" marks its 
function in its very scriptibility (Lacan: 1977,147). 
Psychoanalysis as a practice concentrates upon the linguistic dimension between 
subjectivities which exists as a virtual dimension. All it has to work on are the words thrown 
into space between analyst and analysand: the arena which constitutes the dimension of 'full 
speech'. "Its means are those of speech, " according to Lacan (Lacan: 1977,49). Freud, in his 
Introducto[y Lectures, states that "[ijn psycho-analytic treatment nothing happens but an 
exchange of words between the patient and the physician" (Freud: 1968,13). Lacan considers 
that the psychoanalyst's "whole experience must find in speech alone its instrument, its 
context, its material, and even the background noise of its uncertainties" (Lacan: 1977,147). 
Directed as a trajectory to an other as the affirming destination, speech becomes an 
irresistible urge and response to organic excitation. Somatic and psychic disturbance is 
thereby linked to cathartic release via linguistic presentation. Bertha Pappenheim remarked in 
the 1920s that "[p]sychoanalysis is in the hands of the physician what the confessional is in 
the hands of the Catholic clergy" (Edinger: 1963,12 cited by Sulloway: 1992,57). Breuer 
writes that "[flhere is a normal, appropriate reaction to excitation caused by very vivid and 
irreconcilable ideas, namely to communicate them by speech" (Breuer & Freud: 1991,288). 
Here Breuer communicates a precedent for linguistic trajectory as transmissable carrier of 
affect in an arena between one and other, although the concept of transference is not yet 
developed, of course, as third space. It is through the projection to the other by which 'P am 
constituted in the dimensions of self. That there is an agency assumed in telling is the basic 
premise of psychoanalytic therapy. That this telling must be matched by an interpretation 
based upon auditory sensibility is a mechanism which is analogous to that existing between 
the reader and the literary text. Reading, that most silent cerebral act, is subject to an 
innermost imaginary voice projection. Its machinations have an auditory performative element 
which is projected inwards in the imagined dimensions of the subject. This sensory/bodily 
foundation of reading - and writing - is often overlooked by its intellectual status. Reading is 
then passed through by speech, textual activation implicates the voice. 
The cathartic imperative of telling is linked to its performative status. Yet the 
therapeutic performative is not so straightforward for, in its act of utterance, the sentence is 
transmissive of a meaning which is not always represented there. It sometimes 'does' just 
what it doesn't say. This performative element of the 'talking cure' is one which is implicitly 
related to critical reception as the third space becomes a region in which transference takes 
place, not as an exchange but an embodiment and 'fullness'. J. L. Austin writes that, "Once 
we realize that what we have to study is not the sentence but the issuing of an utterance in a 
speech situation, there can hardly be any longer a possibility of not seeing that stating is 
performing an act" (Austin: 1975 [1955], 139 - emphasis as original). The analysand does not 
simply throw words into an empty air-space between one and other but those words constitute 
a locutionary act which is itself a dimension, a wished-for performative fullness. Here 
language may be linked to substitution for a lost object which points to a mourning base of the 
signing subject. (The thesis offers a textual reading of Philippa Pearce's Tom's Midnigh 
Garden which explicitly explores this dimension of subjectivity, loss and signing. Its readings 
of Dylan Thomas and Diana are offered as examinations of the habitations of a performative 
'F which hves1the lies of true fiction which is the stuff of subjectivity. ) In its relation to dis- 
covery and uncovering, academic endeavour may be considered as implicitly related to 
deathliness as it wishes to submit its revelation to the scrutiny of 'the real'. 
In textual hysterics: Body and text 
The thesis will assume a continuity between Breuer, Freud and Lacan in its exploration of the 
textualized body as a somatic conception of the mind and body traditionally separated by 
western metaphysics. In its formulations, it considers that Lacan does not ignore the bodily, 
biological aspects of the signifier as has been suggested by those post-structuralists who wish 
to present Lacan as metaphorical Freud minus the biology. Instead, it may be seen that Lacan 
pays great attention to biological detail in order to present the imaginary bodily image in 
conjunction with anatomical dimensionality of the organism. In'The subversion of the subject 
and the dialectic of desire' (1960), Lacan speaks of the movement of the signifier in relation to 
desire. Its trajectory is formulated in relation to corporeal limits represented by "the rim of the 
anus, the tip of the penis, the vagina, the slit formed by the eyelids". Even "[flespiratory 
erogeneity" plays a part integral to the desiring and signifying subject which forms its ego in 
complicity with body image (Lacan: 1977,314-5). The body image is considered as essential 
to the human imaginary as the sight of another member of the species is for the maturation of 
the gonad of the female pigeon (Lacan: 1977,3). The "constitutive presence" of the subject is 
governed by "his movement, his grip, his muscular and viscetal emotion" (Lacan: 1994,71). 
This bodily linguistics explored by Lacan is implicitly-tied to Breuer and Freud's theorization 
in Studies on Hysteria. 
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In the hysterical re-covery of the past, the analysand presents an arena of speech 
through which the past is represented by present means. It is by interpellating into that place, 
passing through the past to displace the historically constituted 'F, that the hysteric may 
recover. The 'staging' of the affects of the past may be traced in the hysterical 
symptornatology as a biological constructivity where signifiers lodged in the flesh offer 
themselves for interpretation as metaphors. This body text which is constitutive in the 
interpretative act may be considered as congruent with the positionality of the critical body as 
it is rendered hysterical by its habitation of a second scene. This is because in negotiation 
with the textual, the critic enters a condition seconde. In his Seminar XVIII, Lacan presents 
us with his 'four discourses' which geometric model offers the discourse of the hysteric as 
being but one turn from that of the university and that of the master. In this scenario, the critic 
allied with the discourse of the university treads a knife-edge between the postures of mastery 
and hysteria. Because interpretation of the written word is highly dependent upon an 
imagined auditory sensation existing within the confines of the subject, it might be seen that 
readerly response is written through the skin in a reciprocally constitutive relation with the 
text. In this model, it is the text which is made symptomatic via the critical presence. 
My use of Lacan assumes a distinct absorption of Freudian 'biologism' as an extra- 
textual dimension and constituting an area of intimate co-relation with the flesh. In Critical 
Practic , Catherine Belsey states that Lacan's reading of Freud is tantamount to a Copernican 
revolution for liberal humanism because "Lacan consistently rejects a concept of humanity 
based on a quasi-biological theory of instincts and insists that the subject is constructed in the 
symbolic order" (Belsey: 1980,131). Contrary to this view, I would seek to argue that 
Lacan's presentation of bodily configuration is quite consistent with Freud's and that the 
'Copernican revolution' had already taken place for liberal-humanist thought in Freud's own 
writing. ýTor it is a question of grasping more precisely what Freud in his doctrine himself 
articulates as constituting a 'Copernican' step" (Lacan: 1977,295). Belsey's wished-for 
rejection of the "quasi-biological" is based on a failure to recognise the textuality of biology 
(or the biological base of metaphor) and furthermore that a Copernican revolution can only be 
the result of liberal humanism itself. This correlates with Foucault's conception of resistance 
as a result of and inherent in power. Subversion is therefore a construct dependent notion. 
Belsey's reading then relegates Freud to liberal humanism and sidelines the textuality of 
bodily configuration of which both Breuer and Freud were well aware in the Studies. This 
points to the liberal-humanist grip on all critical endeavour and recognizes that post-modernist 
challenge is implicit to liberal-humanism itself. (The tension existing between post- 
modernism and liberal humanism is examined in relation to identity in the section below 
relating to Diana, Princess of Wales. ) 
Analysis & Power: Positions of mastery and postures of knowledge 
How was it that the author arrived at the same knowledge as the doctor - or at least behaved as though he possessed the same knowledge? (Freud, 1907 [1906] 'Jenson's 
Gradiva'. PFL 14: 79) 
In analysing a text, the critic-reader places himself in the same position in relation to the text 
as the doctor to the patient, so playing analyst to the textual analysand. In this scheme in 
which the agency of the analysand is dependent upon the activating pressure of the analyst, 
the analytical situation may be described as one of feedback where the critical function meets 
head-on the ghosts inhabiting its own ego structuration as they, in turn, become activated by 
the text. It is into the text that the critic looks for confirmation of himself as master of the 
situation until it is quite clear that in the moment of apparent mastery (i. e. interpretation), the 
critic is quite undone by a series of symbols and marks. The text may be said to be quiescent 
until 'triggered'. Once triggered, however, it is set loose to haunt the critic, entering his 
configuration and running through subsequent acts of reading/writing consciously or 
unconsciously. It becomes constituent to a critical topology reverberating through future acts 
of reading, inhabiting textual structures as yet unread. 
In a functional role, the critic as a writing authority might be said to occupy a position 
parallel to the doctor presumed to know, i. e. critical functionality is dependent upon the 
masquerade of knowing with which the reading subject may be embroiled in varying degrees. 
Yet within this relation of engagement is a reciprocity between the reading subject and the 
read object for it relies wholly upon the dynamic of seduction. It is necessary that the critic be 
seduced by what is inanimate in order that it may be animated by passing through and indeed 
altering the dimensions of the critical body itself. In this mechanical exchange, the critical 
venture mirrors the psychoanalytical therapeutic promise which relies upon this phantasied 
relation between analyst and analysand. The critical posture is indeed an imposture. Its 
analytical power is reduced to nothing more than a submissive reading which inhabits a 
postural phantasy of knowing. Such positions of mastery are dependent upon the phantasy of 
the subject operating as that subject's fixation on the Other in which the fascination must be 
instilled. It might be argued that this relation follows the logic of a sado-masochistic 
mechanism where a fetishization of 'authorial' intentionality is made operative in the space of 
the text. It is important to note that this reverential homage paid to the master-author occurs at 
the same time as the critic seeks to establish him/herself in the place of master of the text, 
mastering the master as if to usurp the template of its impositional knowing. The critic, 
engaged in ana! ysis, is therefore seeking to over-top the authorial function through a wished- 
for displacement of the writing 'I' which occurs in the place of the critical reading/writing 'I' 
as it projects itself in a textual response to the stimulus text. The subject is indeed pleasurably 
incarcerated in signifying chains. (In order to explore the narrative affects of such a 
theoretical scenario, Part 11 offers a textual reading of Pauline R6age's infamous text Story o 
0 in conjunction with Lacanian theory on subject construction in relation to signification. By 
isolating the power relation implicit to the signifying act, this reading considers how the 
subject is made subject by being made subject and accepts the pre-condition of a 
transcendental signified as central to any production of meaning. ) 
The thesis as a whole accepts that subversion can only take place in the place of 
power, that it is a construction-dependent position. The phallus must therefore be integral to 
any displacement or slippage which may occur in the anchorage of the signified meaning, 
however illusory, as any movement must always be definitively relational. Lacanian theory 
offers us points de capilon by which to understand that glissement may be buttoned, these 
occasional 'catches' between signifier and signified result in a quilting of the linguistic 
effects. (This is examined as a linguistic affect in the reading of Philippa Pearce's Tom's 
Midnight Garden). This is contrary to and diametrically opposed to the Derridean position of 
free play for it considers rather thatjouir can only occur in the hinge of the structure itself, i. e. 
that it is constituted in and by rigidity. 
Critical Practices & Hysteria : Hysteria of interpretative acts 
The 'hypnoid state' of hysteria described by Breuer in his 'Theoretical' is one which accords 
closely with the relation between writing and abstraction. With reference to the creative 
writer, Freud writes that "[hle creates a world of phantasy which he takes very seriously- that 
is, he invests it with large amounts of emotion - while separating it sharply from reality" 
(Freud, 1990 [1908]: 132). Furthermore, it may be seen that the reading body, suspended in 
its state of phantasy, enters a second state which might be described as auto-hypnotic where 
the subject may become anaesthetic and openly suggestible to the movements of the text as 
object of attention. The critical process may then be described as one of shunt or by-pass in 
the critical body. I refer here to the electrical phenomenon of the shunt circuit which I 
describe in detail in Section 2 of Part I with reference to the work of Josef Breuer. It is also 
clear that the retention theory of hysteria is also characteristic of the reading/writing act which 
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draws upon those mnernic traces which are lodged within the signing subject like foreign 
bodies. 
The interpretative act is one which is analogous to a hypnoid state in which there is an 
intense concentration upon an object. The greater the stress laid upon the text, the more 
associative mnemic ideas are employed. These mnemic aspects/traces are often the residual 
after-effects of preceding texts so that the past prefigures the present, intercepting the critical 
relation like a ghost from an interpretative futurity. Interpretation thereby becomes 
'overdetermined' and the critical ego off-centred in direct relation to the amount of intensity 
upon the object of scrutiny. This off-centring of subjectivity in reading is such that the reader 
interacts with the text so that his interpretative organism is invaded or modified by that of an 
other which is operative in the arena of text. (This process is explored via the performatic 
dynamic of textual presentation in the section below which offers a reading of Dylan Thomas' 
'Vision and Prayer'. ) Reading is an uncovering procedure which draws us on and in and 
forward whilst reaching back through the text to mnemic images which inform our forward 
trajectory. It is important Jo note that these mnemic images lie dormant like foreign bodies 
which are passive or\inert until their significance becomes apparent in relation to later 
narrative events, i. e. they become retroactivated. The recuperative element of the trajectory of 
analysis presents a theoretical base of symptomatology which is itself contiguous with 
linguistic functioning and semiotic presentation whilst retroactivity is the mnemic dynamic of 
textuality. As a mechanism described 
2 
by psychoanalysis, retroactivity brings temporal and 
topological alteration in the organism. The act of reading, placed under pressure by the 
critical imperative, causes mnemic modification in the reading apparatus as it is traversed not 
just by the present text but by past textual encounters as they are retroactivated in what 
becomes a state of intermutability. As the activation of a secondary scene in the critical 
process, the retroactive recovery of textual mnemic bodies occurs only in the virtual 
dimensionality into which the critical body is projected. 
The text acts as projected object to which the reader directs his/her desire but in direct 
proportion to this projection, the reader is subject to the recompensing revenant of their 
investment when they become 'haunted' by the text. The reader then becomes a dimension 
entered by the text in an interactivity of colliding structure. The reader-critic is inhabited by 
the vicissitudes of a text which then haunts. Far from possessing the text, the reader is 
possessed by the text. The extent of this possession is in correlative proportion to the critical 
investment brought to bear upon the text, i. e. in relation to the amount of desire to which it is 
the object - or, in Lacanian terms, the objet a. It is important to note, however, that the 
activating ingredient - desire - does not occur independently but is itself agitated by the text. 
Desire is produced in accordance with the textual structure which is itself based upon drawing 
attention to the elusive, the absent, the fictitious 'missing component' which would render the 
text 'whole' and provide the impetus to a perfect interpretation, spelling death to critical 
endcavour and dismissing the critic from his/her post via the movements of their own practice. 
In this, critical capacity is an implicitly death-related function. 
Aesthetic By-pass: "Pater patter" 
As this thesis offers a strategy of writing and reading intermixed with theory, it is itself 
inscribed within the dimensions of an analytical amalgam. In what is posited as a clash of 
texts in whilch arena theory is offered as text and text as theory, it would seem that questions 
of literary aesthetics become matters of recognizable style within a field of established 
parameters. Is theory itself an aesthetic pursuit? What could be more stylistically suggestive 
than Lacan's virtuoso writing which is not writing? Lacan's declaration at the entry point of 
his text entitled 'The agency of the letter' that "this will not be writing" seems to point to 
areas normally considered the domain of the aesthete (Lacan: 1977,146). His text is written 
through by the "formative effect[s]" of the spoken, situating itself as "half-way between" 
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writing and speech, thereby leaving the analytical reader in the role of the analysand by 
inverting the 'normal' object of critical scrutiny (Lacan: 1977,146). Through such 
modification, the reader finds himself caught in the cross-fire of a hybrid trajectory which 
challenges him to recognize that his position as analyst is wholly dependent upon the 
trajectory by which he is traversed, thereby cancelling through any postulated security of 
functional role in relation to the text by asking the reader to meet himself within its 
dimensions. This indeed "leaves the reader no other way out than the way in" by asking him 
to pass through the strait gate of its own aestheticism as text (Lacan: 1977,146). 
The aesthetic pursuit, it might be said, has an inherent dependence upon the long 
shadow of theory. The aesthete's object is crossed through by deathliness without which it 
may have no meaning and no strictness of form. There is a tension in the aesthetic object 
between its 'beauty' and wholeness/complete state and its vulnerability to destruction. 
Aesthetics gives way to literary postures and critical imposture, in which the aesthetic is 
postured as that by which the literary critic 'guarantees' hislher own place, underwriting it by 
an appeal to higher logic. Literary criticism posits itself as a practice which seeks to eschew 
any methodological roots by hiding its head beneath the veil of beauty and 'literariness'. 
There is an anti-theoretical stance which places theory in the same place as terrorism. Literary 
criticism, as a practice, prizes the inestimable quality of the 'well written' yet this is the very 
same practice which throws up its hands at what some critics deem the mystery and 
impenetrable impasse that is presented by the discourse of psychoanalysis. 
Writing Practice and Psychoanalysis 
Both psycho- and literary analysis apply language to language in their practice. It is clear that, 
just as psychoanalysis is a science which applies itself to what produces it so that its 
diagnostic tool is also its object, the responsive dimension of literary criticism must be present 
itself as inscribed in and circumscribed by the dimensions of the very same signifying 
practices as those it is examining so that its means too is systemic to its ends. In 'An Outline 
of Psycho-Analysis', Freud writes "[e]very science is based on observations and experiences 
arrived at through the medium of our psychical apparatus. But since our science has as its 
subject that apparatus itself, the analogy ends here" (Freud: SE XXIII, 159). This creates a 
feed-back situation for the ego in transaction with the object as it is crossed through by the 
parameters set by linguistic systems by and through which it approaches the textual object of 
its scrutiny. The following sections examine the retroactive aspects of signing, the temporal 
and topological models of textuality, the haunting affects of the intertextual, and the virtual 
dimension entered by the reader. By regarding Breuer and Freud's theories on hysteria as the 
bedrock of psycho-analysis, they seek to explore the transferential alliance between the 
literary analytical and psycho-analytical practice as it exists today by returning to this early 
theoretical study. It is this which enables an exploration of the relationship between the 
hysterical mechanism and critical practice. 
It must also be recognized that this thesis is written through by a fascination with the 
constructs and mechanisms it describes and engages with and as such is itself a virtual 
dimension in which the desires of the writer are installed. 
Words and magic were -in the beginning one and the same thing, and even to-day 
words retain much of their magical power. By words one of us can give to another the 
greatest happiness or bring about utter despair. (Freud, 1968,13) 
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PART 1: Psycho-Analysis 
The Parameters of Interpretation: "[Flulfilling the law of the pendulum" 
The Parameters of Interpretation: "[Flulfilling the law of the pendulum" 
Josef Breuer and the strange case of Trýulein Anna 0.1 
.. anything that goes beyond [experience] is merely fulfilling the law of the 
pendulum, which governs all development. 
Breuer, Letter to Auguste Fore]. 21 November 1907. (Cranefield: 1958,319) 
The famous first case history of psychoanalysis needs almost no introduction as it has been 
incessantly examined by feminist scholars and historians of science. Described by Josef 
Breuer as "the germ-cell of the whole of psycho-analysis", it draws attention to the 
philosophical positioning of medical theory in the early twentieth century and the working 
through and reasoning behind its new science of psycho-analysis. (Cranefield: 1958,320) Its 
radical roots have been to a large extent ignored within feminism which concentrates its 
attentions upon the feminine subject as she is captured within the case history of Herr Doctor. 
Such accounts ignore the background theory of Breuer and Freud set out in Studies on 
Hysteri (1895) and in which the case history of'Fidulein Anna 0. ' is presented. 
As the bedrock of psychoanalysis, this case-study can present issues at the very centre 
of the mind-body and sex-gender debate as symptoms are literally written upon the hysterical 
body. What is this relation between text and gender, text and sex, text and body? And how 
do these questions relate to the writing body of the doctor himselp. What is our role in the re- 
writing of his textual presentation and what is the nature of its legacy as we loop back through 
re-interpretation into interpretations which off-centre the case history itselP Have we really 
addressed the questions which Breuer and Freud presented us with or have we, in our 
interpretative act, merely reiterated the liberal humanist philosophies they were interrogating? 
In this section, I consider textual responses to the work of early psychoanalysis, to 
Breuer and to his case history, 'FrHulein Anna 0. ' 1 do this in order to examine how, in the re- 
presentations of this case such accounts present us with, Breuer has himself become a 
textuality entwined with the case and has become marginalized through and by what he wrote. 
The voice of Breuer has become silenced, muffled in the tissue of textuality which is 
interpretation and reinterpretation. I turn my attention to some feminist interpretations in 
order to attempt to clarify what exactly is under scrutiny here as it seems that critical attention 
displaces the text in its consideration of 'Anna 0. ' as a 'real' storyteller. It is interesting that in 
these recuperative accounts an area of erased voice occurs. Breuer is pushed to the sidelines, 
dismissed from the scene as if of only peripheral interest to the text which he produces. 
In this side-lining process, the critic jumps into the place of the doctor thereby 
betraying the vested interest of the critic as they engage unknowingly with their own desire to 
'author' this text. In order to offset this, I then unravel some of the knots of textuality which 
hold Breuer tightly and present another view of Breuer, itself a textuality but based upon an 
unravelled knot in order to release this voice from historical stranglehold so that we might 
consider anew what offering Breuer might present us with in this scenario so that the 
pendulum might swing to the other side for a while. I also consider the complicity of Freud in 
this erasure of Breuer's voice as further evidence of how the story of an other becomes 
implicated in the story of the subject and the representations of self. 
I end this section by considering the nature of critical desire as it is involved in the 
acts of interpretation and indeed re-interpretation. I shall argue that this area represents an 
intertext, a locus of critical desire which offers a corollary of the transference situation due to 
its positioning between signifying ýubjectivities. It therefore invites the question of the 
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relation of the critic to that of the hysteric, oscillating between two scenes and hallucinating' 
another space occupied through projection of the symptom. The text (both that under 
consideration and that produced by the critic) would then represent that mid-point - the point 
of fetish that is 'the centre' of its attention - over which the pendulum irresistibly swings in a 
perpetual fascinated dance. 
Critical Questions : The case history of the feminist literary critic 
Keep it well in mind, and this should not require a great effort, that the word 
'hysteria' means nothing, and little by little you will acquire the habit of speaking of 
hysteria in man without thinking in any way of the uterus. .. Charcot, Lcýons de Mardi a ]a Salpýtri&re. 1888-1889. (Guillain: 1959,134) 
Feminist interpretation of the case of 'Friulein Anna 0. ' has rested upon reading through the 
unified subject so beloved of the western philosophical tradition. It has sought to reclaim the 
story of Bertha Pappenheim as a whole and integrated being fully present to herself, operating 
as a Jewish feminist writer and agitator for women's rights. Such interpretations ignore the 
radical divisions of subjectivity operative in the symptornatology of hysteria and recognized in 
the psychoanalytical scheme of the "talking eure" in which feminists are eager to point out 
that Pappenheim was to play a vital part. This is wanting it both ways: Anna 0. as 
Pappenheim on terms of equality and Anna 0. asFrNulein Anna Wthe extraordinary patient. 
It also ignores the fact that were it not for Breuer's 'incarcerating! case narrative, there would 
be no 'Anna 0. ' for our critical attention. 
'Frhýulein Anna 0. ' has been read as a literary text by the same literary critics who are 
resistant to the idea of psychoanalysis on the grounds that it is a prescriptive text which seeks 
to analyse real women in its own terms. That this might consitute a radical response to the 
question of literariness or facilitate a questioning of the aesthetic qualities which make a text 
'literary' remains to be seen. Its recent inclusion on English Literature degree course modules 
allied to feminist study makes no such undertaking; it is accepted as worthy of literary study 
and therefore exists as a literary text: an interesting slippage which does not make any moves 
to question itself. Its interest for feminist literary criticism seems to be based upon its easy 
alliance with subsequent post-structuralist theorization which is then utilized in feminist 
representation of women's exclusion from the 'symbolic order' a la Lacan. In order to 
examine this non-questioning of feminist endeavour by feminism itself, I shall make reference 
to two influential and often cited essays on 'Fraulein Anna 0. ' by feminist literary critics. In 
doing so, I will make commentary upon a critical textuality which asks to be accepted 
uncritically, existing within its own working critical boundary, while it pays insufficient 
attention to the boundaries of other types of text different from itself. 
Dianne Hunter, in her influential essay 'Hysteria, Psychoanalysis and Feminism', 
states that she offers "a psychoanalytical feminist reading" of the Pappenheirn case (Hunter: 
1983,467). Hunter concentrates upon a recuperation of the Pappenheim biography whilst 
harnessing it to a literary interpretation which is itself filtered through an amalgamation of 
different psychoanalytical theories which do not declare their source. This feminist 
psychoanalytical confusion might provide an interesting correlation in its deranged mixture of 
theory with Pappenheim's laborious and "nearly unintelligible" presentation of different 
languages, what Hunter refers to as "mumbo jumbo" (468). In order to analyse this linguistic 
display by Breuer's patient, Hunter offers a description of psychosexual development which 
she allies to Pappenheim's upbringing. Hunter writes that "fo]ut of the infinite potential 
identities each newborn infant brings into the world, a single way of being is activated" via its 
symbiotic relation with the mother (473 - my emphasis). This statement offers no critique of 
the problematic of primal being such a scenar-io presents us with or the illogical hypothesis of 
"infinite potential identities" in a psychoanalytical account which must take account of the 
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dialectically cross-sectioned subject constituted only in language. Such a statement also' 
ignores the fact that potentiality can only ever be a retroactive conception of hindsight, in 
other words can only be perceived of by the already subjected identity. When a young Bertha 
Pappenheim writes that "I dayly must learn anew to find myseir, she does so only from the 
standpoint of an already constituted 'I' which is the very precondition of splitting, constituting 
a dialectical consciousness between the writing 'F and a new posited self which is represented 
in her writing as futurity (Hirschm5ller: 1989,297). In this respect, her view of what her new 
self may consist of is absolutely tied to her past conception of self, it is a retroactive concept 
which masquerades as future and unknown. This contradictory scenario may be connected 
with liberal humanist social projection coupled with self-knowledge which seems to be the 
therapeutic aim of psychoanalysis and its uncovering of the 'I' as radically split. It is this 
paradox which is translated in feminist accounts which seek to support women's agency 
whilst entering into a tryst with a therapeutic practice which initially formed itself around 
what may be termed a feminine complaint, paying attention to the silent protest of middle 
class women. In her account of psychosexual development, Hunter moves from a 
questionable liberal humanist philosophical premise to present a confusing amalgam of theory 
drawn from Kleinian object-relations to Kristevan concepts of the 'semiotic' to the Lacanian 
symbolic which is then presented through the theories of Nancy Chodorow without once 
acknowledging its sources or specifying its critical intentionality in the use of such theoretical 
combination (474-5). Neither is any awareness apparent of Hunter's wish to analyze Breuer's 
patient using the tools of subsequent theoretical positioning which was itself influenced and 
shaped by the scenario to which it applies itself, offering therapy to its own theoretical 
progenitor. The result presents itself as a neat and literary reading, seemingly unproblematic 
in its methodology, which takes the edge off the radical nature of psychoanalysis by blunting 
and blurring its boundaries thereby making it safe for handling by the literary critic. 
That there is likewise no agenda of self-reflection in Diane Price Herndl's essay, 'The 
Writing Cure: Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Anna 0., and "Hysterical" Writing (1988) is also 
troubling from a methodological point of view. Like Hunter, Herndl presents us with a 
reconstituted story of Bertha Pappenheim replete with details from Breuer's case history. She 
then places this hybrid narrative side by side with a study of Charlotte Gilman Perkins' The 
Yellow Wallpape without qualification of such a critical choice. There is no examination of 
the aesthetics in considering a psychoanalytic case history in the same study as a literary text 
or vice versa, no questioning of the textuality of biographical details which have become as 
second hand as the items for sale in Pappenheim's own story collection: her own'trodelbude' 
of personal history. ' Herndl lists Pappenheim's writings, including her 'literary' productions, 
without any consideration of their writerly qualities, as examples of the 'writing cure' which 
this essay posits. By the same token, The Yellow Wallpape is offered as a pseudo-case 
history due the convergence of biographical details of the author's life on the text. Through 
the alliance of biographical detail - posited as true - with the fabrication that is textuality, 
Gilman's text then moves out of its literary pivot into therapeutic practice just as Breuer's 
case-history of Pappenheim is made to fit into a literary groove as the 'story' of Anna 0. To 
posit a 'writing cure' is to present a seamless correlation of self-present agency and authority 
with fragmentation and illness. It is to accept the contradictory premise of potentiality in a 
situation which is read in reverse, i. e. reaching for what it is possible to be by looking back 
through a textual fabric to which we add threads of retrospective knowledge, thereby altering 
its materiality. In this, it can be seen that a text itself becomes whatever a discipline dictates 
to it. We may make thereby a 'text of becoming' out of a text which we have ourselves 
embroidered. 
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Anna 0. tells no story 
Without entering into a debate on the aesthetic qualities of 'literary' textuality, suffice it to say 
that 'FrHulein Anna 0. ' is not a literary text. Neither can it be said to be Anna O. 's text as it is 
not authored by Anna 0. but by Josef Breuer. Anna 0. tells no story. Feminist literary critics 
have behaved as if they are interpreting 'her' narrative simply because she is represented as 
having told stories to her analyst in Breuer's case history. This is not the same as her actively 
constructing a story, she is not actually engaged in the act of authoring nor is she the agent of 
her telling. 2 This is because she is active only as a representation of that which may or may 
not produce representations in a story form which are then enclosed in a case history. It is 
interesting that in its elaboration as a text, the case history of 'Fiklein Anna 0. ' becomes 
shortened to just 'Anna 0. ' as if to erase its medical significance and to conveniently separate 
it from its context in the co-authored , 
Studies on Hysteria. The text becomes synonymous with 
its name - it is 'Anna 0. ' 'Anna 02then becomes the title of a dis-placed text and the pseudo- 
biographical centre of its critical attention. 
In treating Breuer's case history 'Ffiulein Anna 0. ' as a literary text entitled 'Anna 02, 
an interesting evasion of place takes place. Critical attention can be seen to shift its locus by 
altering the parameters of what it thinks it is applying itself to: the textuality it finds is the 
textuality which it is looking for and is indeed fabricated by that encounter. In seeking to 
claim Anna O. 's autonomy in a text where she has none, critics seek to claim her as author of 
her own storyline, i. e. to perfect the cure for her illness, to reconfigure her as a seamless, 
functioning author of her own existence, to streamline her from a talker to a writer, from a 
representation to a representer. (All this, of course, ironically cuts across the still radical 
theories of psychoanalysis which are not taken on board by humanist feminist readings which, 
whilst supposedly supplying the commentary to one of the case-histories as new grist for its 
critical attention, generate another wave of inaccuracies and misrepresentation due to 
remaining within the confining boundaries of what has become its own academic convention. ) 
Yet despite later biographical details supplied to supplement the patient = author correlation, 
details which shift the locus of attention from the literary to the biographical without usually a 
blink of a qualifying eye, Anna 0. is not author of this storyline any more than author of her 
self as storyline. What critics appear to be doing in examining this case history is engaging in 
an endeavour to uncover the 'real story' of Anna 0., to somehow give a unified and fully 
present authorial st4tps to 4 stpdy of ý radically divided subject at the turn of the century with 
no consideration given to the nuances of theoretical hindsight as we approach the end of 
another century or homage paid to the radical questions raised by the context in which this 
case history is presented. In seeking to save her from her own radically divided condition, 
they place themselves in the position of Dr. Breuer himself. Here is yet another displacement 
of Breuer as author because the critic, it seems, wants to doctor his patient. What is this 
correlation of critic with doctor? The literary critic attempts to jump in between the patient 
and her doctor as if to do so would be to absorb her stories unmediated. There is no 
questioning of this persistence of critical phantasy, a phantasy which it might be argued exists 
in most literary analysis. The critic, it seems, has become a lover come-a-wooing; the critic, 
swooning with ambitious desire, wants to impregnate the supine body of poor Anna 0. all 
over again, interfering with Dr. B's patient so that their own baby can be born through the 
medium of an hysterical woman represented in a case history written in 1895. Literary 
analysts then become pseudo-psychoanalysts riding rough-shod over theories of hysteria 
whilst seeking to cure its analysand and return her to a full presence upon the stage of feminist 
history, to birth Dr. Bs child where it can be delivered as a comfort into the safe hurpanist 
arms waiting at the other end of a century wracked with civilized discontent. 
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Authorial questions 
Itis[ ]very difficult, purely from one's own memory, to separate the contributions in 
the case of work carried out so very much in common as that which produced this 
book. 
Breuer, Letter to Forel. 21 November 1907. (Cranefteld: 1958,319) 
As the critic jumps in the doctor's place in order to maintain the critical fantasy of analysing 
his patient unmediated by the doctor's narrative an interesting displacement occurs in terms of 
the authoring of the text which must needs remain fatherless, reduced to orphaned status by 
critical attention which seeks to foster the daughter within. The doctor exists only on the 
sidelines of his own text: an expulsed author. Josef Breuer is subject to author displacement 
as he has been elbowed from the scene of textual authorship continually. The muting of Dr. 
Breuer's voice through critical attention might be compared to that academic feminist 
reception and celebration of his loquacious patient's incessant story telling which brought his 
activities to an end due to the "medically unprecedented amount of time" he was obliged to 
spend in her company (Hunter: 1983,471). In a letter to Auguste Forel of 21 November 1907, 
Breuer writes that "I vowed at the time that I would not go through such an ordeal again" 
(Cranefield: 1958,319). The interest accorded to 'erasure of voice' by feminism and its 
examination of the position of repression being allied to 'femininity' must become pertinent 
here as it may be seen that feminist recuperative readings of the Pappenheirn case actively 
silence and effectively erase Breuer from historical consideration. As 'sex' has now become 
loosened from 'gcndee through feminist argument, and even men can be 'feminine', the 
marginalization of Breuer must be a matter of concern if feminism is not simply seeking to 
reverse the power construct. In this post-modem theoretical setting, it is troubling if Breuer's 
repression and mis-representation in the power construct of critical enquiry remains 
unanalyzed. In a scenario which seeks to 'feminize' Breuer, it would appear that feminists 
really do want things both ways, to reject the uterine theory of hysteria, (and Chareot already 
had way back in 1888, ) whilst holding tightly onto it and never letting go. Hysteria is then 
used as a token of proto-feminism; feminism becomes what Hunter terms 'transformed 
hysteria" (485). In what is a paradoxical argument, Dianne Hunter talks of male hysteria as 
the "repressed femininity of men" in what must be a repression of repression. Such an 
argument also nominates a glorification of repression as allied with feminine (485). 
It seems that Josef Breuer is twice punished for being the first physician to take the 
complaints of a female hysteric patient seriously and affording the time and space for her to 
cathartically off-load on to her family doctor. 3 The therapeutic relation between this doctor 
and patient was an extraordinary situation for the time of which Ernest Jones wrote: 
In those days, to devote hours every day for more than a year to a single patient, and an 
hysteric at that, signified very special qualities of patience, interest and insight. (246) 
Indeed, this exemplary scenario afforded the starting-point of psycho-analysis. That the 
erasure of Breuer's voice is an unrecognized problematic in the consideration of the 
Pappenheim. case history and its accompanying status as the seminal text of psycho-analysis 
must be of inherent interest to an analysis of the aetiology of a discipline. This elision has 
taken place on several levels: historically - in the representation of the beginnings of psycho- 
analysis; biographically - in the writings of Freud and Jones, and those who absorb their 
accounts as the definitive and authorized versions; critically - in the feminist examinations of 
the case ofFraulein Anna 0. '; and theoretically - in the lack of critical attention paid to the 
theoretical contributions of Breuer. It is also worrying that, in the quest to mark neatly the 
beginnings of psycho-analysig, it is the break between Breuer and Freud - as it has been 
represented by Freud - that is taken for 'authorized truth'. It is seen that the theories of Freud 
were more progressive than those of Breuer and that the older doctor, with his obstinate 
attachment to 'hypnoid states', was a burden to the-young reformer. This theoretical area of 
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contention represents another level of elision in the 'genesis' of psycho-analysis and in the 
contribution of Breuer to that 'genesis' and it is to this area that I shall return for later 
consideration. In the meantime, I shall turn to historical matters and examine the pathological 
'writing out' of Breuer from his own story by the stories of others. 
Hysteron Proteron 
I was always the bold oppositionist... 
Freud, Letter to Martha Bernays. 27 January 1886. (Freud: 1961,215) 
The name of Josef Breuer (1842-1925) is very often subsumed under that more famous name 
of Sigmund Freud who is latterly perceived to be the young and dynamic inheritor of the older 
doctor's research. Indeed, Breuer's contribution to Studies on Hysteri was omitted from the 
first two German editions of the collected works of Freud. ' Freud has been elevated to heroic 
status by perpetuation of a myth in which he is seen to be battling with ignorance and 
prejudice against his early work on hysteria. 5 Accounts of Freud's presentation of a paper to 
the Viennese Society of Physicians on 15th. October, 1886 entitled'On Male Hysteria' seem to 
support this view of the isolated innovator. 6 In this paper, Freud challenges the old uterine 
theory of hysteria based on his period of observation and learning with Charcot. The Society 
of Physicians gave his paper a hostile reception because, according to the chair of the meeting, 
Heinrich von Bamberger (a professor on the committee which awarded Freud his travelling 
bursary to Paris), the work presented nothing new as male hysteria had been encountered by 
its members for some considerable years. He is reported as having said that, "I was unable to 
find anything new in the report of Dr. Freud because all that has been said has already long 
been known" (Schnitzler cited by Sulloway: 1992,38). Rebuttals were also voiced by 
7 Theodor Meynert and the neurologist Rosenthal. Freud's perception of the meeting was quite 
different; he represents the occasion as one where his new ideas are rejected and this is bitterly 
recollected in 1925 [1924] in An Autobiographical Study (SE XX, 15-16) where he states that 
"I found myself forced into the Opposition" (aE XX, 16)". He then goes on to give an account 
of his expulsion from the laboratory of cerebral anatomy and his withdrawal from academic 
life and from the "learned societies" (SE XX, 16). That this was not the case is borne out by 
accounts to the contrary. 9 Jones gives a similar view of events which supports those of Freud 
but does speak of the "enthusiasm, perhaps over-enthusiasm" of the young Freud setting out to 
educate his elders in order to qualify the poor reception of the paper. 10 Although Jones does 
not support Freud's version in terms of the details of his resignation from the society, he 
nonetheless supports the impression of the beleaguered young neurologist as a precocious lone 
innovator; he writes that "Freud was bitterly disappointed at the very outset of his endeavours 
to convey new ideas to his conservative seniors" (Jones: 1953,255). 
Both Freud and his biographer Ernest Jones have been instrumental in presenting us 
with what has been definitively absorbed into biographical accounts of Freud. It is not my 
intention to claim that Freud's expansion of earlier ideas on hysteria or his subsequent 
pioneering work which became psychoanalysis is anything short of an achievement of 
astonishing proportions but that sufflicient homage has not been paid to those who did the 
groundwork and helped Freud along the way to developing the science of the unconscious. 
There has been a veil drawn over the beginnings of psycho-analysis, an area of enigma which 
seems to obscure and exclude the name of Josef Breuer. " Several myths have circulated 
around Breuer which have worked together to confound the beginnings of psychoanalytical 
theory and to deny Breuer's place in the scenario of scientific discovery, most of them 
derogatory to the man himself. The break in personal terms between Freud and his early 
mentor may have been instrumental in how the break between them in theoretical terms has 
been represented; indeed, it seems impossible to separate these two events as one was 
instrumental to the other. In his autobiographical study, Freud wrote that "[t]he development 
of psycho-analysis afterwards cost me his friendship. It was not easy for me to p# such a 
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price, but I could not escape it" (Freud, SE XX, 19). In consideration of this auto/biographical 
scenario and its textual fabric, let us now turn to consider some historical threads from the life 
of Josef Breuer which may help to unravel some of the psycho-analytical knots in which he 
has been implicated. 
"I wonder what his story is! " 
(Divine in Female Trouble, dir. John Waters, 1974) 
Breuer was of very considerable importance to Freud personally ... but his intellectual contributions were of less importance... (Jones: 1953,244) 
Breuer and Freud first met during the course of their researches in Ernst Brackes 
Physiological Institute where Freud worked from 1876 to 1882 and the two men soon became 
very close. On a personal level, Breuer was indeed very important to the young Freud. 
Breuer extended friendship and offered professional and financial support when Freud needed 
it most. As a well connected and respected physician, Breuer introduced and supplied patients 
to Freud when he was just beginning his private practice and thereby helped to establish the 
young doctor. 12 This resulted in them maintaining many of the same contacts in what was 
quite a small Viennese circle and, as if to cement their relation, Freud named his first child 
aller Mathilde, Breuer's wife. 13 Freud's debt to Breuer was also a monetary one and this 
rankled with Freud in later years as he never managed to pay off this debt due to Breuer's 
refusal to accept payment. Breuer made regular monthly payments to Freud when he worked 
in the Physiological Laboratory and this ultimately resulted in him lending quite a significant 
amount of money to Freud. In a letter to Fleiss, Freud estimates the amount lent as about 
2,300 florins, a very large amount in those days. 14 
Contrary to what Jones says on the subject, it would appear that Breuer also provided 
Freud with a strong intellectual impetus. In many respects, it seems that Breuer may have 
been an inspiration to the young Freud to look outside his science in order to define the 
parameters of his new science. Breuer was exceptionally well educated and cultured. He was 
well read not just in his own field but also in the arts, literature and philosophy. '5 On his 
known reading list were authors ranging in diversity from Plato, Kant, and Spinoza to Voltaire 
and H. G. Wells. Albrecht Hirschm6ller has traced references to Breuer's reading by careful 
examination of his correspondence and makes reference to "Breuer's profound knowledge of 
philosophical literature" in addition to providing reference to the breadth of Breuer's 
knowledge (Hirschmiiller: 1989,41-2). Hirschm5lier also records that Breuer was a skilled 
rhetorician and an entertaining and well-informed speaker. To talk with Breuer, said Freud in 
the earlier days of their relationship, was "like sitting in the sun" (Jones: 1953,183). In 
addition to his intellectual achievements, several sources pay homage to him as a kind, 
generous and forgiving person. 16 "One does not adequately characterize him by only saying 
good things about him, " writes Freud, "one has also to emphasize the absence of so much 
badness" (Jones: 1953,183). 
Breuer was already a well-established physician of some eminence and an 
accomplished neuroscientist with several publications to his name when he met Freud. It has 
often been assumed that his contribution to Studies on Hysteria, shrouded in the mists of co- 
authorship, is the only contribution of value that Breuer made to the world of science yet 
nothing could be further from the truth. As a medical student working under Ewald Hering in 
the Helmholtz School, he made an important physiological discovery of the feedback 
mechanism of breathing: what is now referred to as the Hering-Breuer reflex of the vagus 
nerve arising from a set of nerves attached to the medulla oblongata (Breuer: 1868). 'He also 
pioneered a dissection method of the semi-circular canals of the inner ear, thereby elucidating 
their function and recognizing it as a site of reflex mechanisni. 3 pertaining to equilibrium in the 
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organism (Breuer: 1874 & 1875). 17 As an indication of the importance given to the work of 
Breuer, he was nominated for membership to the Viennese Academy of Sciences in 1894 by 
three outstanding professors of the day: Mach, Hering, and Exner. 
Dianne Hunter states that Breuer obstinately looked for the 'somatic foundation' only 
of Pappenheias illness (Hunter: 1983,476). This is a view that cannot be borne out if only 
by considering how much time Breuer patiently gave his patient in an unprecedented situation 
in which he listened tirelessly to her stories to the detriment and erosion of the normal 
organization of his own life. In his letter to Auguste Forel of 21 November 1907, Breuer 
writes that "it was impossible for a 'general practitioner' to treat a case of that kind without 
bringing his activities and mode of life completely to an end" (Cranefield: 1958,319). His 
'ordeal' has not been alluded to in feminist considerations. That he would look only for 
tsomatic' causes is also not borne out by Breuer's deviations from the so-called 'Helmholtz 
School' of medicine presided over by Ernst Brdcke, under whom both he and Freud worked. 
Whilst it is true that he certainly looked for some psycho-physical parallelism, he did not 
ascribe uncritically to the physicalist laws of Briticke, Helmholtz and DuBois-Reymond 
(founders of the biophysicalist movement with its mechanistic view of natural science). His 
research was carried out under the tutelage of Ewald Hering, whose own work challenged the 
doctrine of Mcke. The fact that both Hering and Breuer were members of the so-called 
Helmholtz school actually challenges what has been perceived as the unproblematic unity of a 
Helmholtz school at all. Historical accounts of the Helmholtz school overlook its rather 
diverse and divided condition. Again, we must draw attention to the convenient 
categorization of hindsight and the formulation of critical surveys for ease of presentation and 
narrative style. 
In his obituary of Josef Breuer, Freud wrote that there was nothing in Breuer's 
background which would suggest his future involvement in the treatment of hysteria and his 
subsequent role in the beginnings of psycho-analysis. 
Nothing in his education could lead one to expect that he would gain the first decisive 
insight into the age-old riddle of the hysterical neurosis... (Freud SE XIX, 279) 
Yet it would appear that Breuer bad exactly the education and temperament which might lead 
him to become involved in psychical research and the formulation of a new science. Breuer 
already possessed a wide breadth of reading on the theory and therapeutic uses of hypnotism 
and had practical experience of the experimental treatment of hysteria by such a method 
through the work of Moriz Benedikt. (Breuer makes reference to the theoretical position of 
Benedikt amongst others in his 'Theoretical' contribution to Studies on Hysteria. ) He was, 
therefore, familiar with extensive research in an area which was then closely allied to the 
treatment of what was considered a neuro-physiological ailment. It is also interesting to note 
that hypnosis as it was being developed in relation to psychology held an interest for 
philosophical scholars at that time. Franz Brentano is known to have been one such interested 
philosopher and his family physician was none other than Josef Breuer. With his fluent 
French and interest in psycho-physical development, it is also known that Breuer was familiar 
with developments in France and the work of Charcot. "' When we consider Breuer's 
extensive physiological experience, and interest in neurological disorders set against this type 
of background knowledge and reading, it is hardly surprising that he should be involved in the 
beginnings of psycho-analysis. Bertha Pappenheirn was treated by an experienced and 
theoretically aware neurophysician who, due to the distorting mists of time and what has now 
become his 'historical role' as last of the old bastions before Freud broke upon the scene, is 
now portrayed dismissively as a bumbling old doctor. Dianne Hunter, for instance, 
confidently proclaims that "Breuer [] arrived as an old-fashioned physician with black bag in 
hand to treat Bertha Pappenheim's malady" (Hunter: 1983,471). 
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Strike the father dead 
In this relationship the gain was naturally mine. (Freud, SE XX, 19) 
I became the sole administrator of his legacy. (Freud, SE XX, 22) 
In what could be a classic Oedipal scene described in his own later work on sexuality, the 
younger doctor seeks to strike out the authority of the older physician by scrambling the 
chronology of the father-son relation. 19 In the development of psycho-analysis, Breuer has 
been portrayed not as he who supplied the precedent but as an antecedent, an inept follower of 
Freud. He has been portrayed as an frustrating and obstinate nuisance to Freud whose eager 
insistence caused him to write up a case history he would sooner forget . 
20 This case history is 
then perceived to provide a stepping stone to a pioneering individual who was struck with a 
singular talent divorced from any theoretical precedent. Freud talked of his "[Ijong battle" to 
publish Breuer's findings in what was to become Studies on Hysteria. In a letter to Wilhelm 
Fliess of 1896, Freud wrote with reference to Breuer, "I believe he will never forgive that in 
the Studies I dragged him along" (Masson: 1995,175). 
Although Freud always took care to officially allude to Breuer with respect, his 
private letters to Fliess document a less harmonious side to the relationship where 
disagreements in theoretical approach found their repercussion in deteriorating personal 
relations. There Freud refers to Breuer as a tiresome and cumbersome colleague, a dead 
weight. Through these letters, we become privy to Freud's efforts to avoid any meeting - 
accidental or otherwise - with his old friend and benefactor. 21 
It tends to be forgotten that Breuer's work on hysteria was not contemporaneous with 
that of Freud but that he was, in fact, writing up a fifteen-year-old case study for inclusion in 
Studies on Hysteria. It is his work as predecessor that is glossed over. Breuer was engaged on 
the case of 'Frgulein Anna 0. ' some three or four years before Freud set off to study Charcot in 
action at the Salpetriere, Paris. Bertha Pappenheirn first fell ill during the autumn of 1880 and 
Breuer treated her from December 1880 until June 1882 which represents an official cut-off 
date although there is evidence of his further involvement after this date as he continued to be 
informed of his former patienfs progress. 22 Freud's study visit to the Salp8triare, funded by a 
government-sponsored travelling grant, took place between 13 October 1885 and 28 February 
1886. Breuer communicated details of the case to Freud before he went to Paris. The first 
published mention of the case is in a letter to his flancZe written on 13 July, 1883 where 
"strange case histories" are mixed up with a growing intimacy between the two men. 
Freud writes, "your friend Bertha Pappenheim also cropped up - and then we became rather 
personal and very intimate" (Freud: 1961,56). According to Jones, however, a letter written 
by Freud to Martha Bernays referred to the Pappenheim. case as early as 18 November, 1882 
(Jones, 1953: 248). This letter dated 19 November 1882 remains unpublished. Breuer's 
extensive collaboration with Freud on many other cases is also forgotten in the shifting text 
which tells the story of the beginnings of psycho-analysis. Breuer and Freud worked together 
on such cases as that of 'Frau Emmy von N. ' (Fanny Moser) and, most important to their 
theoretical development, that of 'Frau Cacilie M. ' (Anna von Lieben) which was unpublished 
due to privacy reasons. 23 Breuer makes reference to several other unnamed cases in his 
'Theoretical' contribution. 
As the forefather of psychoanalysis, Breuer's pioneering work has been largely 
forgotten, enveloped as it is by the mythologizing textuality which tells of the making of the 
young hero, Freud. This distorting fabrication which surrounds the beginnings of 
psychoanalysis, referred to as a "mythical bubble" by Sulloway, is one in which Freud himself 
was himself self-consciously involved (Sulloway: 1992,5). Freud displayed a surprisingly 
precocious awareness of the narrative of his future biography. He destroyed his papers, 
including his manuscripts, diaries, notes and letters, in 1885 and 1907. The first of these dates 
is surprisingly early in his career. He wrote to his flandee on 28 April 1885 of his intention to 
frustrate his future biographers "as yet unborn": 
As for the biographers, let them worry, we have no desire to make it too easy for 
them. Each of them will be right in his opinion of the'The Development of the Hero', 
and I am already looking forward to seeing them go astray. (Freud: 1961,153) 
In another letter to Martha Bernays on 2 February 1886, trumped up on cocaine, Freud writes 
of himself as "an extremely daring and fearless human being" and that he "could gladly 
sacrifice [his] life for one great moment in history". "One would hardly guess it from looking 
at me and yet even at school I was always the bold oppositionist", he writes (Freud: 1961, 
215). Here then is early evidence of his desire to stamp his name on the history book. 
The radical revelations of psycho-analytical theories of fragmentary subjectivity are 
here undercut in the telling of the story of authorial genesis. In the interests of artistic unity as 
we are presented with Freudian '13 i lddngsroman' in the style of an immoveable metanarrative. 
Sex, Lies & Hysteria 
If we are to believe the Freud and Jones accounts of the termination of Breuer's treatment of 
Pappenheim, we might be led to believe that Breuer did not become involved in cases of 
hysteria ever again. In his 1914 paper, 'On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement', 
Freud states that, after terminating the Pappenheim case, Breuer "broke off all further 
investigation" due to the sexual nature of the "untoward event" that later became classified as 
transference (Freud, SE XIV 12). Freud later alludes to the frightened Breuer running in 
terror from the scene and Ernest Jones refers to a "profoundly shocked" Breuer who "fled the 
house in a cold sweat" (Jones: 1953,247). Breuer did, however, continue to treat hysteria 
patients after the Pappenheim case. In the course of his research, Albrecht Hirschii6ller 
discovered documents at the Bellevue Sanatorium, Kreutzlingen, pertaining to other cases 
dating after the termination of Pappenheim's treatment (Hirschinii1ler: 1989,137). What is 
uncertain is whether or not Breuer used the so-called 'cathartic' method in their treatment; the 
case-histories are certainly not as long and arduous as those pertaining to his exemplary 
treatment of Bertha Pappenheim. Hirschmiiller has found evidence that Breuer took on 
another case of hysteria in a female in the same month as the termination of that of Bertha 
Pappenheim; furthermore, contradicting Freud's perception of a sexually frightened Breuer, 
this case had a clear sexual aetiology (Hirschrrf6ller: 1989,13 1). 
It suited Freud to perpetuate the myth of a sexually retarded Breuer running scared in 
the aftermath of his treatment of Bertha Pappenheim, in order to establish himself as the 
bolder and more innovative of the two neurophysicists. A remark made by Breuer in the case 
history has been cited ad infiniturn in order to support and perpetuate the notion of Breuer's 
reluctance to face sexual matters in relation to hysteria. Every commentator on Traulein Anna 
0. ' must be familiar with that well-worn phrase from Studies on Hysteria with which Breuer 
shot himself in the foot: 
24 The element of sexuality was astonishingly undeveloped in her. 
(Breuer and Freud: 1991,73) 
This remark has often been used against Breuer as evidence that he was not able to see what 
was staring him in the face. It was a remark that was used by Freud to support his later view 
that Breuer simply could not admit the element of sexuality into the aetiology of hysteria. It 
must be noted that this is Freud's later formulation and not one which occurred to him in his 
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work contemporary to Breuer's in Studies on Hysteria. The Studies show evidence of Freud's 
reticence with regard to sexual matters consequently considered pertinent to hysteria. It is, 
therefore, unfair that Freud should specifically refer to Breuer when he records that, 
Breuer wrote of the girl, who has since become famous as his first patient, that her 
sexual side was extraordinarily undeveloped. It would have been difflicult to guess 
from the Studies on Hysteria what an importance sexuality has in the aetiology of the 
neuroses. (Freud, SE XX 22)25 
This view has been accepted unquestioningly by feminist critics such as Dianne Hunter who 
state that Breuer overlooked the "frustrated sexuality" of his patient (Hunter: 1983,470). 
This picture with which we are presented is not, however, congruous with the textual 
content of Studies on Hysteria where Breuer comments directly and repeatedly upon the 
sexual nature of hysterical symptornatology. There he states that [t]he most numerous and 
important of the ideas that are fended off and converted have a sexual content. They are at the 
bottom of a great deal of the hysteria of puberty" (326-7). Breuer discusses the effects of the 
repression of sexuality due to ideas of moral purity in the individual. 
They repress sexuality from their consciousness, and the affective ideas with a content 
of this kind which have caused the somatic phenomena are fended off and thus 
become unconscious. (Breuer and Freud: 1991,327) 
He then theorises about the different experiences of women and men with regard to sexuality, 
stating that "[m]arriage brings fresh sexual traumas" (327). He goes so far as to say that I do 
not think I am exaggerating when I assert that the great majority of severe neuroses in women 
have their oriain in the marriage bed" (328 - Breuer's emphasis. ) Furthermore, we are left in 
no doubt about the difference in opinion between Freud and Breuer on this matter as Breuer 
argues for the inherently sexual nature of the hysterical symptom. 
Certain sexual noxae, which consist essentially in insufficient satisfaction (coitus 
interruptus, ejaculatio praecox, etc. ), result according to a discovery of Freud [I 895b] 
not in hysteria but in an anxiety neurosis. I am of opinion, however, that even in such 
cases the excitation of the sexual affect is quite frequently converted into hysterical 
somatic phenomenon. (Breuer and Freud: 1991,328) 
And if we were in any doubt about Breuer's position on the role of sexuality, he adds that, 
... it is perhaps worth while insisting again and again that the sexual factor is by far 
the most important and the most productive of pathological results. The 
unsophisticated observations of our predecessors, the residue of which is preserved in 
the term 'hysteria' [ ... ] came nearer the truth than the more recent view which puts 
sexuality last... (328) 
In his theoretical contribution to Studies on Hysteria, Freud appears to be the more 
sexually reticent in his discussion of sexual neuroses in regard to the foundation of hysteria. 
He begs a forbearance from the reader which he was not able himself to later extend to 
Breuer: the forbearing allowed by those with the gift of hindsight. He states that he had 
"overlook[ed] the points of view that were of importance as regards sexual neuroses, the 
reason given is that these histories date some distance back" and that he did not, at that time, 
attribute sufficient importance to sexual factors (Breuer and Freud: 1991,343). Let us not 
forget that his problematic 1886 paper was arguing for stepping away from the sexual 
aetiology of hysteria, directed as it was at the diagnosis and treatment of male hysteria. This 
was in line with the teachings of Charcot who stipulated that hysteria did not have a sexual 
impulse and that the ailment was in no way connected with etymological unraveling of its 
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name. In defiance of the uterine theory, Charcot declared that "the word 'hysteria' means 
nothing" (Charcot cited by Guillain: 1959,134). 
In his biographical study, Jones states that Freud "displayed less than the average 
personal interest in what is often an absorbing topic ... He always gave the impression of being an unusually chaste person - the word 'puritanical' would not be out of place" (Jones: 
1953,298). This constitutes a surprising turn-about for a theorist who has been popularly 
perceived as sexually obsessed and who later admonishes Breuer for running from the scene 
of an undiscovered and unwelcome sexual impulse in the course of his treatment of Bertha 
Pappenheim, an action which Freud perceived as sexual reticence on his part and which 
constituted an unwillingness to admit sexuality into the theorization of the hysterical 
pathogenesis. 
"The door to the mothers": Dr. B. 's baby and the termination of treatment 
At this moment he held in his hand the key that would have opened the "doors to the 
Mothers", but he let it drop. With all his great intellectual gifts there was nothing 
Faustian in his nature. With conventional horror he took flight... 
Freud, Letter to Stefan Zweig. 2 June 1932. (Freud: 1961,409) 
If Breuer was the sexually timid partner in the Freudian narration of this scene, then the 
implication is that it was a bold and virile hero who picked up the key and claimed the 
theoretical spoils. Furthermore, this hero must be of the proportions of those heroes of 
Germanic literature, a superman who travels the regions of metaphor borrowed from literary 
production. It is interesting that, in the Studies, Breuer himself uses the same metaphor 
borrowed from Goethe's Faust (Part 11, Act I) in order to illustrate the need to return to a 
philosophical premise as the basis upon which research is conducted. 
I must ask to be forgiven for taking the reader back to the basic problems of the 
nervous system. A feeling of oppression is bound to accompany any such descent to 
the'Mothers' [i. e., exploration of the depths]. (Breuer and Freud: 1991,267) 
In Breuer's text, the Faustian reference is illustrative and topological in relation to the reader; 
in the Freudian text it is employed to illustrate the implicit heroic nature of the writer. Where 
Breuer uses metaphor to illustrate and follow through the swing of the pendulum of his 
thinking, Freud uses the same metaphor to underscore his own position as the locus in relation 
to which the pendulum swings. 
The story of the unheroic Breuer taking flight conveniently lends itself to sexual 
interpretations but, as I hope I have illustrated, this flight was not from the sexual aetiology of 
hysteria of which he had demonstrated he was well aware and unafraid. If Breuer took flight, 
it was from the sudden and violent contractions of a fully incubated transference phenomenon, 
the real 'baby' of his treatment. It is about this that Freud was able to be wise afler the event, 
although at the time of Pappenheim's treatment he was himself a student and it is highly 
unlikely that he would have recognized the future life of the term 'transference' in a flash of 
inspired anticipation of a science not yet born. Forrester writes, 
Freud, looking back in retrospect, implies that Breuer could have made the 
discoveries he himself later made, if only he had been able to recognise this sexual 
transference... (Forrester: 1994,18 - emphasis as original. ) 
'Dr. B's child' then was truly the result of a significant labour and represented the beginnings 
of the most powerful therapeutic tool of psychoanalysis. This is where "[flhe door to the 
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Mothers" leads us - into the chamber of virtuality that is the cross-sectioned desire of the 
patient in analysis. 
Let us now return to the scene of the biographical text. Freud and Jones present us 
with accounts of the birth of Dora Breuer as an event from Breuer's private life interwoven 
with myths of the genesis of psycho-analysis. Both Freud and Jones tell us that Breuer's 
youngest daughter was conceived on a second honeymoon with which Breuer placated his 
jealous wife, Mathilde. This was "not without significance for the deeper connections! " states 
Freud in the letter to Zweig (Freud: 1961,409). Jones goes a step further and distastefully 
connects not just the birth but also the death of Dora Breuer to her father's implication in the 
hysterical childbirth of Bertha Pappenheim, "the girl born in these curious circumstances was 
nearly sixty years later to commit suicide in New York" (Jones: 1953,247). 
According to official data, however, Dora Breuer was actually born before the 
termination of Pappenheim's treatment. The child that was supposedly conceived in June 
1882 had actually already been born on II March 1882.26 It would appear that the accounts of 
Freud on this matter do not stand closer reading; it is important to note that his interpretation 
of events are constructions based upon shifling sands of speculation and might be seen to 
constitute what Borch-Jacobsen has termed "a spiteful piece of slander that built up over a 
period of several years" (Borch-Jacobsen: 1996,34). It would seem that Freud pushed the 
pendulum too far so that it swings into a tentative area about which he chose to write with 
bold certainty, presenting as truth what was only guesswork. The letter to Zweig says as 
much, 
What really happened with Breuer's patient I was able to guess later on. .. (Freud: 1961,408) 
He states that this is based upon recollection as "I suddenly remembered something Breuer 
had once told me". This might be an opportune moment to recall Breuer's comments on 
Freud's work in his 1907 letter to August Forel. There he writes that, 
Freud is a man given to absolute and exclusive formulations: this is a psychical need 
which, in my opinion, leads to excessive generalization ... In the main, however, his 
views ... are derived simply from experience; and anything that goes beyond is 
merely fulfilling the law of the swing of the pendulum... (Cranefield: 1958,320) 
It would appear that sometimes, as in the story of the birth of Dora Breuer, the pendulum 
swung too far because it was pushed. We are presented with the screen of a rewritten history 
as Freud alters the story of the birth of psycho-analysis after its inception; each retelling is 
different from the last and each has an off-centring effect. 
Freud's fluctuating narrative on the birth of psychoanalysis provides a parallel to the 
scene of the unexpected transference. He tells different stories in different places, producing a 
textual pseudocyesis in response to the hiatus in Breuer's text. In place of Breuer's dignified 
silence on the matter, Freud fills up the space with opportune and profligate stories. In his 
series of lectures at Clark University, Massachusetts in 1909, Freud writes that, 
If it is a merit to have brought psycho-analysis into being, that merit is not mine. I 
had no share in its earliest beginnings. (Freud, SE XI 3) 
By 1914, writing On The Histoa of the Psycho-Analytic Movement, he has had second 
thoughts on the matter and reins in his previous credit to Breuer in no uncertain manner when 
he states that, 
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... psycho-analysis 
is my creation ... no one can know better than I do what psycho- 
analysis is... (Freud, SE XIV 7) 
Critical Desires : Authorial Transference 
If the beginnings of psycho-analysis provide a veiled area of enigma around which stories and 
re-presentations congregate for one who has been perceived as its progenitor, this raises 
questions about what it might mean to those who receive those second-hand stories second- 
hand and incorporate them into their own re-interpretations for further proliferation and 
generation. 
This story of origins provides a rich play-area for those who approach the case history 
of 'Fraulein Anna 02, so closely allied as it is with the evolution of a new science. It is 
interesting, however, that few readings from the discipline of literary criticism pay any 
sustained attention to this psycho-analytical genesis or, more importantly, to the 
transformative element that such readings might generate. In other words, the act of reading 
always alters the text it applies itself to and nowhere more so than when it innocently applies 
itself, uncritical of its own process, to a story that is not a story at all. That there is no direct 
access to the stories of 'Anna 0. ' seems to have been overlooked by feminist critics, so eager 
are they to redeem and transform a sick woman into a heroine, to make of her a "feminist 
doctor-saviour", an astonishing occupation of three exemplary roles at once (Herndl: 1988, 
68). A sensitive point then becomes apparent in the employment of psychoanalytic theory by 
feminism proper; this tension proceeds from an ambivalent position in itself relating to the 
'genesis' of psycho-analysis. (If Anna 0. really invented the so-called 'talking cure' as a 
feminist manoeuvre and escapist impulse, why do feminists spend so much time attacking her 
wonderful invention? ) There is here an area of great concern for in this clash between 
feminism and psychoanalysis lies an unresolved problematic which insidiously manifests 
itself in the hot and cold attitude of feminism itself towards the employment of a theory it 
declares itself to have been instrumental in developing. Perhaps this collision course between 
feminism and psychoanalysis is due to the bourgeois roots of feminism combined with its 
egalitarian quest which promotes the wholeness of women in the world set against the 
radically fragmented subjectivity psychoanalysis presents it with as it critiques western 
capitalism from within the nuances of its very own structures. Feminist reception of 
psychoanalytical theory is set on a see-saw edge where any full engagement with 
psychoanalysis might undermine feminism's presence and intentionality as a theory. 
Feminism therefore engages itself in an ironic rebuttal of the more radical theories of 
psychoanalysis in favour of the unified feminine subject whilst at the same time claiming an 
hysterical woman as a heroine. Dianne Hunter's statement that "feminism is transformed 
hysteria" seems to point to an unacknowledged paradox (Hunter: 1983,485). Furthermore, I 
would argue that, whilst claiming 'Anna 0. ' as the 'true! creator of psycho-analysis and 
therefore acting as her own doctor (a gross misreading of the therapeutic situation of the 
transference), feminist critics actually undercut this proposed position of the heroine by 
occupying the interpretative role and thereby doctoring the text themselves. 
If, in the critical reception of these case-histories, the critic plays doctor, we are faced 
with a textual corollary of the counter-transference as the text space is one of a transferential 
intertext which constitutes a projection between reading and writing subjects. This space of 
the transference as it figures as intertext presents us with an intellectual transpositioning which 
layers the critical response into separate spheres in which the critic is engaged with reading as 
a re-writing of the text as object of desire and in so doing occupies an hysterical position, 
negotiating with a condition seconde as it is interposed in the reading process. The 
interpretative act is an intedude of gestation, a process of parturition, whilst 'full' 
interpretation leads to the 'baby' of critical desire: it exists as an archi-structure which is 
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entered usually unbeknown to the critic (feminist or otherwise) unless theoretically aware. 
The critical reader is therefore caught in an engagement with what Lacan terms the objet a as 
the locus of critical desire: phantom of the phantasy of a 'real' text. 
The intertext as space must be a different space from that afforded by either the text or 
the reader separately, rather it is a place of activated marks rendered up through the desiring 
process. That there is an operative dialectics of the reading process is recognized in and by 
psychoanalysis. This space offers the reader a 'door to the Mothers', as an entrance to an 
unknown and wonderful realm - made by us yet unknown to us --a mystery in our own 
mechanism, and carried in our mechanics of relativity as reading and writing organisms. In 
this space lies a somatics of the textual. 
In our wish to write a lucid narrative, we tell ourselves and each other stories 
uncritically. In representation is inherent misrepresentation, whatever that may mean in a 
proliferation of meaning excluded by the containment that constitutes the form of writing. 
Here is the fantasy of critical desire, the hallucination to which we submit and admit to 'truth. 
This then is the structure of unity we strive to write and, once written, inhabit. This is the use 
of metaphor or narrative for similitude, our alliterative glittering prize as T am reflected in my 
unified story. It is the unacknowledged desire with which we engage in critical pursuits. The 
manifest text is that mid-point over which the pendulum swings first one way then the other in 
an endless fascination with the centre of its attention: a dance around a centre which is itself 
perpetually displaced by the process of reception and erupts from within whilst continually 
held in place by the very same process, thereby constituting an ironic outbreak in which the 
sign itself becomes a histrionic display in direct proportion to its interpretative rendering. 
In this section, I have travelled between accounts of the history of the beginnings of 
psychoanalysis, feminist literary criticism of its first case history, autobiography and 
biography to consider questions of critical receptivity of the case of TrHulein Anna 0. ' In 
doing so, a complicated area of dense textuality has been encountered, constituting an over- 
compensation for what has been lost irretrievably. In response to an historical hiatus, stories 
have been incessantly constructed in a proliferation which shifts the parameters of the 
loriginary' story itself These stories however, each contributing another version of an already 
overworked text, dance noisily over what is a still silence, an absence made by the erasure of 
the author: Dr. Josef Breuer. It seems that beneath the post-modern masquerade of the death 
of this particular author lies a wish to concentrate upon the character in the story, a dangerous 
impulse which will return us to a humanist grounding while we dance beneath the banners of a 
proclaimed theoretical stance. 
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The Hen and the Hawk: Breuer's 'Theoretical' contribution to Studies on 
Hysteria (1895) and its influence on psych o-th erapeu tic theory 
The Hen and the Hawk 
Breuer's 'Theoretical' Contribution to Studies on Hysteria (1895) and its influence on 
psycho-therapeutic theory. 
Freud's intellect is soaring at its highest. I gaze after him as a hen at a hawk. 
Breuer, Letter to Wilhelm Fliess. 5 July 1895. (Hirschm6ller: 1989,315) 
This section will concentrate upon Josef Breuer's theoretical contribution to Studies on 
Hysteria (1895) co-authored with his younger colleague Sigmund Freud. Through a close 
textual reading of Breuer's paper entitled 'Theoretical', it will argue that the ideas presented 
there have not received due attention. Although notoriously wavering in his accounts of the 
beginnings of psycho-analysis and fluctuating in the amount of credit he felt able to bestow 
upon his estranged friend, Freud found himself able to write in 1925 in his obituary of Breuer 
that his theoretical contribution to the Studies was "far from being out of date; on the contrary, 
it conceals thoughts and suggestions which have not even now been turned to sufficient 
account" (SE XIX, 280). Despite the valuable recuperative work of Albrecht Hirschmaller, 
this comment is sadly still applicable today. Freud's debt to Breuer's theories have still not 
been properly acknowledged; indeed it was in Freud's interests that he propagate heroic myths 
to present his overriding mastery as originator of psycho-analysis. These myths have, of 
course, been amplified by later presentations of this period in the life of Freud. It is my view 
that the ideational lineage of Freud's subsequent psychoanalytical theories can be traced to 
their beginnings in his older colleague's sharp argument, philosophical style and rich allusive 
writing. Indeed, psychoanalysis as a theory and a practice has not fully recognized its debt to 
Josef Breuer and his acutely aware textuality, indulging in a mis-recognition perhaps with 
regard to its own beginnings. That this mýconnaissance is written into literary criticisms 
acquisition of psychoanalytical theory as it is employed in textual readings is also self-evident. 
The name of Freud is synonymous with the famous complexes which, reeled off by any 
student of literature, have become set and static in their usage as if in defiance of what should 
be a dynamic and enlivening process of textual encounter. That Breuer already engaged with 
this quickening encounter with textuality in his theorizing has been forgotten and suppressed 
in the obscuring mists which have risen up around the beginnings of psycho-analysis. His 
presence in the later theories of Freud might be said to be like theforeign body' retained in the 
theoretical flesh, a thorn in the side of a psychoanalytical hysteria with regard to its aetiology 
as a theory, buried but still active under the surface of what has become a textual pathology of 
the defence theory in the interests of Freud. It is necessary to excavate backwards through 
Freudian theory in order to uncover the activating body of Breuer's ideas. 
Mechanistic Energy Models: Sharing the same perch 
Breuer and Freud shared a common physiological legacy as they both worked under Ernst 
Br5cke (1819-1892) at the famed Physiological Institute at the University of Vienna. Freud 
wrote that BrUcke was "the greatest authority who affected me more than any other in my 
whole life" (GW XIV, 34 cited by Jones: 1953,3 1). Ernest Jones writes that Freud so revered 
Br6cke that the remembrance of the professor's reprimanding eyes haunted him throughout his 
life (Jones: 1953,44). In 1892, Freud named his youngest son Ernst in memory of his 
respected teacher who died the same year. 
The Helmholtz school originated in the early 1840s and was composed of Emil Du 
Bois-Reymond (1818-1896), Ernst BrEcke, Hermann Helmholtz (1821-1894) and Carl 
Ludwig (1816-1895). "From its very beginning, " writes Siegfried Bernfeld, Lthis group was 
driven forward by a veritable spirit of crusade" (Bernfeld: 1944,348 & 1949,171). Emil du 
Bois-Reymond wrote in 1842 that: 
ýb 
BrUcke and I pledged a solemn oath to put in power this truth: No other forces than 
the common physical chemical ones are active within the organism. In those cases 
which cannot at the time be explained by these forces one has either to find the 
specific way or form of their action by means of the physical mathematical method, 
or to assume new forces equal in dignity to the chemical physical forces inherent in 
matter, reducible to the force of attraction and repulsion. 
(Du Bois: 1842,19. Cited and trans. by Bernfeld: 1944,348) 
It was within this pioneering environment that Breuer and Freud conducted their research. 
Both Breuer and Freud's theoretical work needs to be set within the physiological 
schematology of Helmholtz. It represented a principle to which Freud adhered for the rest of 
his theorizing. In his study of'Freud's Scientific Beginnings', Siegfried Bernfeld states that, 
.. in the fundamentals as well as in many details the Freudian concepts and theories have their roots in the Bracke Institute; that, to a certain degree, they are 
transformations of the ideas and methods Freud had learned there. 
(Bernfeld: 1949,170) 
In his 'Project for a Scientific Psychology' (1950 [1895] SE I), Freud presents us with a 
dynamic-energetic model stressing 'discharge! amongst neurons as the base of psychical life. 
Stressing dissipation of physical energy and the organic aim of achieving a constancy of 
energy in its system, this is what Breuer refers to as the "tendency on the part of the organism 
to keep tonic intracerebral excitation constant" (Breuer and Freud: 1991,273). 1 Freud, under 
BrUcke's tutelage, undertook biological observations and conducted neurological studies 
supported by illustrations and translated into diagrams which, it could be argued, formed the 
basis of much of his thinking on hysteria with its attention paid to nodal systems of 
interlocking nuclei. A visual display of the physical may be carried through into observations 
of the psychic via the neurological model. This may explain the way in which Freud was keen 
to speak of psychical structuration in terms of a series of interconnecting nodes, "points at 
which two or more threads meet and thereafter proceed as one" (Breuer and Freud: 1991, 
376). Breuer's was a theory based more upon the laws of dynamic energy inherent in a system 
of attraction and repulsion found in the physical laws of electricity as they perpetuate 
themselves through the organism. In relation to Breuer and Freud as observers of hysterical 
structure, it is pertinent to remember their observation of biological or neurological structure 
in the laboratories of Ernst BrEcke. The biological and the psychic can be seen to interlock in 
the aetiology of psycho-analysis as a theory. 
Of Hens and Hawks 
I believe he will never forgive that in the Studies I dragged him along and involved 
him in something where he unfailingly knows three candidates for the position of one 
truth and abhors all generalizations... 
Freud, Letter to Fliess. I March 1896. (Masson: 1989,175) 
'Hawk': a diurnal bird of prey; 
a person who is grasping or who preys on others; 
to carry about for sale, 'to hawk a manuscript'; 
(Longman Modern English Dictionary) 
In his theorizing, Breuer was acutely aware of his role in the writing and presentation of ideas. 
He often remarked that his use of metaphor to present these "half-understood processes" (316) 
might be as misleading as it was helpful in- extrapolation. The danger lay in a se!! ing of the 
methodology of the mind so that the accustomed methods of presentation would set the 
parameters of knowledge thereafter. This is not a concern found in Freud's paper on the 
psychotherapy of hysteria where he is found to be confident in his presentation and 
vocabulary, more given to the definite than Breuer in order to present himself as the one who 
may be deemed to know, the master of the scene. In a letter to August Forel written 21 
November 1907, Breuer states that, 
Freud is a man given to absolute and exclusive formulations: this is a psycbical need 
which, in my opinion, leads to excessive generalization. There may in addition be a 
desire'd'6pater le bourgeois' [sic]. (Cranefield: 1958,320) 
In comparison, Breuer can be seen to maintain an openness in his views, reserving judgement 
on many concepts and this perhaps did him no favours historically as Freud was only too 
eager to grab the theory and claim the spoils. By giving the impression of a sure set of truths, 
Freud was more convincing in his presentation than the more reticent Breuer. In a letter to 
Wilhelm Fliess of 24 October 1895, Breuer writes with some bitterness that, 
I keep in mind with all my views and actions the possibility that everything might be 
quite otherwise than I think it is. For this reason I envy you very much - on my 
highest holidays I should like to be as sure in my views as you are on any day of the 
week. (Hirschm5ller: 1989,318_9)2 
The deteriorating relationship between Freud and Breuer is documented in Freud's 
letters to Fliess at this time in which he makes reference to his colleague's pedantry. This 
view is continued by Jones in his account of the state of affairs between the two former 
friends. 
Breuer, so it would appear, had certain characteristics which were particularly 
antipathetic to Freud's nature. One was a weakness in his personality that made it 
hard for him to ever take a definite stand on any question. The other was a 
pettifogging kind of censoriousness which would induce him to mar any appreciation 
or praise by searching out a small point open to criticism - an attitude very alien to 
Freud's openhearted and generous spirit. In just these years Freud was in his most 
revolutionary stage ... The boycotting to which he was subjected induced in him a 
response of defiant rebelliousness. And when he was most in need of a companion 
with whom to share this, the one man who had the intellectual knowledge for the 
purpose and who had been the one to start him on his path only damped his ardour 
and withdrew from the fight. (Jones: 1953,28 1) 
It was during this time shortly after the publication of Studies on Hysteria that Breuer wrote to 
Fliess on 5 July 1895 that "Freud's intellect is soaring at its highest. I gaze after him as a hen 
at a hawk" (HirschmUller: 1989,315). This is the generous remark which Hanna Breuer 
describes as "most typical of Breuer" in her letter to Ernest Jones in which she objects to 
Jones' portrayal of her father-in-law. "I have never known a person more given to happy and 
often enthusiastic recognition of others' merits", she writes. (Hanna Breuer to Ernest Jones, 
21 April 1954. Reproduced in Borch-Jacobson: 1996,109. ) It is evident that Fliess 
communicated Breuer's comments in the letter to Freud as Freud's own letter to Fleiss of 13 
July 1895 makes reference to Breuees "ornithological communications" (Masson: 1985,133). 
His letter of 16 August 1895 also states that, "Breuer not withstanding, I am not a bird" 
(Masson: 1985,135). Accusing Breuer of pedantry, the hawk also had this to say of its 
nurturing other, "he unfailingly knows three candidates for the position of one truth and 
abhors all generalizations, regarding them as presumptuous" (Letter to Fliess. I March 1896. 
Masson: 1985,175). 3 
Differences between the two men may be detected in their writing styles in the 
Studies. One, determined to become the hero of history, writes confident prose in which T is 
projected constantly whilst the other is more modest and self-effacing, drawing attention to 
the space of the text as a place of configuration which is active in constituting knowledge. 
Freud writes himself into place as master in the place of knowledge whilst Breuer almost 
writes himself out of the scene in a readiness to admit not-knowing. In place of Freud's 
persistentT, Breuer more often writes 'we' or'our'. Freud is hawkish in his arguments, bolder 
and more direct in his textual presentations. He may be said to be linear in respect of his own 
writing discharge whilst Breuer scratches and picks his way between positions which are 
themselves subject to the scrutiny of the textual analysis in which they are installed. 
11[N]othing original": the dissemination of ideas and money & the doctors' spending 
power 
In his theoretical writing, Breuer displays a modesty which almost leads him to erase himself 
from his own script, a tendency which was fully exploited by later developments in the field 
of neurology in addition to that of psycho-analysis where others were eager to lay claim to his 
ideas. Freud writes that, "A kind of reserve was characteristic of him, an inner modesty, 
surprising in a man of such a brilliant personality, had led him to keep his astonishing 
discovery secret for so long that not all of it was any longer new" (Freud: SE XIX [1925], 
28 0). 4 The strength of Breuer's ideas and his newly communicated terms should have been 
enough to stand on their own but were later utilized and subsumed by Freudian theory, 
passing with some modulation into everyday language without proper credit being given to 
their reticent originator. 
The 'ownership' of ideas is given attention by Breuer at the beginning of his 
theoretical paper where he speaks of the difficulty of maintaining and attributing ownership in 
a fast-moving field of research (Breuer and Freud: 1991,259-60). He is meticulous in 
scholarly crediting, carefully referencing other authors and citations, giving space to preceding 
forms of analyses of hysteria and the foundational work done by others. By doing so, he 
displays a generous and fair character and the ability to place theories in the context of 
contemporary theoretical framework. By way of preface to his own theories, he provides the 
remarkable comment that "[o]riginality will be claimed for very little of what will be found in 
the following pages" (260). It is interesting that Breuer does not lay claim to ideas where 
Freud very often speaks of 'ownership' of 'property' with regard to ideas, later dividing up the 
different property of both authors with regard to Studies on Hysteria. ' 
In his attention to ideas as property, Freud presents an intellectual scenario closely 
allied with the money-making incentive of the doctor in a capitalist exchange mechanism with 
his fee-paying patients who freely enter into a contract based on an exchange between the 
postulated knower and the postulated unknowing subject. We may remember Breuer's 
comment on Freud's generalizing tendency being d'jpater le bourgeois. Ideas are the 
currency in this system of competition which then brings reputation and position as the doctor 
is maintained by the gold of the analYsand. Freud's letters to Fliess make reference to the 
referral of patients between himself and Breuer: hysteria offers itself as a means of living 
(Masson: 1985,108,249,414). 6 Freud's letters to Martha Bernays display an acute 
consciousness of money. It is patently apparent that the marriage of the analyst is dependent 
upon the transactional contract of analysis. The ills of the bourgeoisie will maintain the 
ambitions of its class, paying for its sickness by maintaining its sickness through the money of 
the paying patient. 
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Temporary Structures: Breuer's writing in 'Theoretical' 
Every theory is a temporary structure. 
Breuer: 1895b. 4th. November discussion of Ober Hysterie, three lectures 
delivered by Freud. (Cited by Sulloway: 1992,88) 
Breuer's writing style in the Studies is marked by an acute textual reflexivity and self- 
reflection. His work is punctuated by a conscious and extended use of metaphor and working 
example, drawing attention to psycho-analysis as a textual encounter, a new science in which 
"[e]cleticism is nothing to be ashamed of' (332). Breuer employs an intertextual mesh 
through which ideas on hysteria are filtered and fore-shadowed. His wide use of literary 
allusion and reference from classical sources provide an unusual textual play-area in the field 
of science. He makes special use of Goethe, referring to his review of the theoretical 
foundations of hysteria as a "descent to the 'Mothers"' (267). 7 Goethe was also a favourite 
author of Freud's who later supplemented his psycho-analytical writing with literary and 
classical allusion although it is not evident as a feature of his preceding work nor is a feature 
of his therapeutic paper in Studies on Hysteria. Breuer seems to have set a precedent by way 
of his writing style, expanding the notion of science and stretching the arena of a scientific 
paper, providing the example of what the new science-art of psycho-analysis might 
incorporate. In his theorization, he also makes reference to Schiller, Horace's Odes Uhland, 
and classical myth. Shakespeare! s A Midsummer Night's Dream is used to describe the 
theories of psychical processes as nothing "but shadows" (333). This eclectic use of texts 
within text provides an arena in which textual activation by other texts is seen to operate in the 
stories we tell about ourselves and the presentation of narrative to an other via the trajectory of 
speech as it is transmitted in analysis. Breuer presents us with a complex picture of the way in 
which we might conceive of hysteria by an awareness of its representation as it is incorporated 
in a theoretical text shot through with other diverse textual traces. This approach is one which 
invites us to a consideration of the parameters set by the means and terms available to us to 
think in and the impossibility of stepping outside metaphor and text. This was a question 
which was of central importance to Breuer in his 'Theoretical'. 
Breuer's reflexive writing style in his presentation of theories of hysteria displays a 
sharp awareness of short-fall in the use of terminology. This is a reflexive attitude which is 
not found so readily in the work of his younger colleague who wished to avoid 'pettifogging'. 
Breuer pays close attention to his own use of terminology, vocabulary employed and the 
metaphors by which he communicates the psychical processes. His theorizing is self aware 
and applies a critical attitude to itself It is interesting that in his writing he is aware that he is 
presenting a construction of the structuration of hysteria. Breuer writes of 
The attempt that has been made here to make a synthetic construction of hysteria out 
of what we know of it today... (332) 
Breuer is aware of the nuances of theory itself which effect a transubstantiation with regard to 
what is being observed, i. e. that the observed is formulated by the observer and the means of 
its observation so that "[e]very theory is a temporary structure" in which "[t]he observer is 
largely under the influence of the subjects of his observation" (312). In a letter to Gomperz 
dated 25 July 1895, he displays a critical distance combined with the topological metaphor 
which is so distinctive of his writing: 
t 
If we can realize that only the outworks of organic phenomenon have fallen to 
physico-chemical analysis whilst the fortress itself remains untouched, then we must 
doubt the validity of the assertion that is only a question of time and of cracking the 
central problem also by means of physics and chemistry. 
(HirschtTf6ller: 1989,224) 
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Breuer pays such attention to the topology of theory and to the topology of psychical 
processes that it might be said that he theorizes through metaphorical conceits. By inhabiting 
the metaphor he employs, he develops a theory in parallel with it. The space of theory can be 
seen to be shared by the space of the symptom itself, each crossing the path of the other in a 
dynamic exchange in the place between analyst and analysand, reader and text. Breuer also 
draws attention to the relation between theory and speculation in terms of psychic processes 
and physiological exposition of the mechanisms of the mind when he writes, 
... how far we still are from the possibility of any such complete understanding of hysteria! With what uncertain strokes have its outlines been drawn in these pages, 
with what clumsy hypotheses have the gaping lacunas been concealed rather than 
bridged! (332-3) 
Studies on Hysteria (1895) 
The book I am doing with Breuer will contain five case histories; an essay by him, 
from which I wholly disassociate myself, on the theories of hysteria (summarizing and 
critical)... 
Freud, Letter to Wilhelm Fliess. 22 June 1894. (Masson: 1985,83) 
Studies on Hysteri makes reference to three types of hysteria: retention hysteria, hypnoid 
hysteria, and defence hysteria which is presented as a later theoretical development and 
discussed more by Freud in his therapeutic chapter. These forms of hysteria are not to be 
regarded as discrete in themselves but one may be inhabited by or co-dependant with another. 
Freud and Breuer questioned the symptoms hysteria held in common with many other 
pathological states. What is its difference from neurasthenia, anxiety neurosis, phobias, or 
from aphasia, for instance? Because all of these conditions may all be present within the 
structure known as hysteria, this would seem to call for a special architectural space of the 
hysterical within which other pathological complexes may exist or co-exist, independently or 
in a state of mutual dependance as conjunct components. "[11f hysteria generally appears as a 
component of a mixed neurosis, the situation resembles that in which there is a mixed 
infection", writes Freud in his psychotherapeutic paper (344). There is also the neurological 
to consider - paralyses, tics - and the physiological - rheumatic and muscular pain - in a 
complicated picture of the interplay between the physiological and cultural. By unshaking the 
concept of hysteria as a single therapeutic entity, Freud and Breuer were already unsettling 
contemporary theories on hysteria. The Studies opened up the analysis of the psychical 
through the means presented to it by the cIFn-ical picture of hysteria. Freud states that it is his 
"opinion that hysteria is not an independent clinical entity" (342). It is clear that within this 
nexus of reference named hysteria is a complex interconnection of theoretical paths which 
interact with each other on a textual and historical basis. 
Tempo-Psychic Models 
Nothing takes the past away 
Like the future. 
(Madonna, 'Nothing Really Matters'. Maverick Records, 1998. ) 
Retention theory as it is presented by Breuer and Freud is the outcome of Breuer's discover)', 
through his treatment of Bertha Pappenheim, of a forgotten trauma which is still active in the 
organism. The existence of a covert memory trace pointed to hidden areas of the brain which 
Breuer termed the subconscious and the unconsc ioUS. 8 This becomes the buried object, the 
foreign body still active in the flesh of the present which is referred to in the 'Preliminary 
p 
Communication' of 1883. Breuer attributes the notion of'hysterical phenomena of retentiod as 
a developed theory to Freud (288) whilst Freud, in his psychotherapeutic chapter clearly 
attributes it to both of them and then goes on to doubt its importance as a concept when he 
argues that such terminology may be rejected in favour of an extension of the concept of 
defence and its role in hysterical pathology (371-2). 
This rejection of 'retention' as a concept drawn from Breuer's clinical practice and its 
erasure under the wider enveloping concept of defence might be seen to ignore the tempo- 
psychical aspect of a symptomatic complex for the sake of the establishment of a new 
terminology. It is clear from later developments in Freud's theory that the concept of 
'retention' figures under a different guise: the concept of Nachtrdglichkeit in the Volfman' 
case is implicitly related to this early theory. What retention presents us with is the temporal 
relations of this retained psychic scene. The mnemic image exists on simultaneous tempo- 
psychic levels, each interactive with the other. Although it is in part a remnant or trace of the 
past and retained by the mnemic apparatus of the brain, it cannot, of and in itself, exist except 
through the activation of the present and as such is also subject to the projections of the future 
as they are formulated in the present of the living organism. Here then is the germ of Freud's 
Nachtrdglichkeit or 'afterwardsness', the retroactive imperative of all psychical activity. 
To the dictum that "[h]ysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences" of the 'Preliminary 
Communication' (58), Breuer adds this temporal distinction: 
... the memory of the psychical trauma must be regarded as operating as a 
contemporary agent, like a foreign body, long after its forcible entrance ... then we 
must admit that unconscious ideas exist and are operative. (299-300 - emphasis as 
original. ) 
Breuer gives the example of forgetting to make a medical visit and the unsettled feeling which 
subsequently pursues him through the day. He says that "the idea of the visit has been all the 
time operative, that is to say presen , but not in my consciousness" (301 - my emphasis). 
He also emphasizes the recall element of the mnemic as a disparate mechanism 
discrete from the mnemic in and of itself, if indeed there is such a thing. By emphasizing the 
authors' view posited in the 'Preliminary Communication' that "the determining process (that 
is, the recollection of it) continues to operate for many years", Breuer draws attention to 
temporal models of psychical mechanisms (58 cited on 299). Discussing the stimuli of 
dreams as purely reliant upon mnemic sources whilst the organism is shut off from new 
external perceptions, Breuer describes this stimulus as a .. retrogressive' excitation, emanating 
from the organ of memory and acting on the perceptual apparatus by means of ideas" (264). 
Despite Freud's denial of the importance of the retention mechanism, it is to just this which he 
returns as a mechanism called by another name and which provides the temporal basis of all 
psychoanalytic exchange in the domain of the spoken through the backwards completion 
principle that is Nachtrdglichkeit. 
Topological Models and Metaphors 
All our thinking tends to be accompanied and aided by spatial ideas, and we talk in 
spatial metaphors. (307) 
Breuer offers a topological model of the mind via metaphors of structure, i. e. through the 
topology of theory itself. With regard to theories of the nervous system, he offers images of 
an underground system, speaking of a "descent to the 'Mothers' [i. e., exploration of the 
depths]" (267). The unconscious becomes "a difficult and obscure region" for the explorer 
(300). Invoking Goethe when speaking of the discharge of affect in the organism, he states 
that "we can follow the same process even up to the highest regions of human achievement" 
(282). It is clear that in his use of metaphor, Breuer is building a theoretical map by which to 
explore the psychical. A result of this practice is that there is a two-fold system of 
presentation confluent in its splitting with the splitting of the mind described. The 
cartography of theory then interplays and superimposes with the cartography of psychical 
processes being invoked. It is through the spaces of theory that we are led into the spaces of 
the psychical model, 
Breuer was aware of the dangers of such a presentation which might encourage a 
solidification of metaphor into physical correlates. 9 He writes of a need to maintain a 
"safe[ty] from our own figures of speech" (307). He states that, 
It is only too easy to fall into a habit of thought which assumes that every substantive 
has a substance behind it - which gradually comes to regard 'consciousness' as 
standing for some actual thing; and when we have become accustomed to make use 
metaphorically of spatial relations, as in the term 'sub-consciousness', we find as time 
goes on that we have actually formed an idea which has lost its metaphorical nature 
and which we can manipulate as easily as though it was real. Our mythology is then 
complete. (306-7) 
With regard to the conscious and unconscious, "we almost invariably form pictures" of trees 
and buildings where "roots in darkness" and "dark underground cellars" may represent the 
unconscious (307). 
If, however, we constantly bear in mind that all such spatial relations are metaphorical 
and do not allow ourselves to be misled into supposing that these relations are literally 
present in the brain, we may nevertheless speak of a consciousness and a 
subconsciousness. But only on this condition. (307) 
Through topological metaphor we are offered a way of explaining the multi-dimensionality 
and inter-functionality of the mind where the conscious and unconscious ideas alike may have 
their origin in the same cerebral cortex (307). Freud also makes topological references by 
way of archeological exegesis and diagrammatical explanation of the aetiology of hysteria via 
its mapping of the conscious and unconscious. 'o Where Freud, however, uses this concept of 
excavation or evacuation by systematic removal of layers, so presenting us with what is a 
teleological model, Breuer's use of topological metaphor presents a complex interplay of 
synergetic structures at play between theory and the theorized. Parameters are thereby set by 
the metaphorical representation with which we become familiar so that our thinking becomes 
a process gauged to the liminal edges of theoretical space and shot through by its own 
suggestibility via implicit or implied references. The observers of the structuration of hysteria 
are therefore subject to the space available to them in which to theorize, the concealed acts as 
an instigator, activating the momentum to discovery only to be subject to the mode of its 
uncovering. The mechanism of the lure alters what is, if anything, bidden beneath the layers 
of metaphor so that the excavator may find an archifact of his very own making. Whilst the 
observer is under the influence of the observed, subsequent observations will modify prior 
observers' theories so that subsequent observation is set within parameters which qualify and 
quantify its findings in a self-sustaining system out of which it is difficult to break. Breuer 
refers to the modification of his present views by subsequent observations "for it is certain that 
we have only taken the first steps in this region of knowledge, and our present views will be 
substantially altered by further observations" (317). 
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Topology of the Mind 
... ideas [] exist and are operative beneath the threshold of consciousness. Indeed, 
the whole conduct of our life is constantly influenced by subconscious ideas. (301) 
In his presentation of hysterical phenomena, Breuer pays close attention to theoretical 
vocabulary and its suggestible connotations. He astutely examines the seemingly 
contradictory concept of the 'idea' as an unconscious construct through an interrogative 
approach to technical connotations of terminology and its conceptual framework in its 
enabling and restrictive aspects. 
The objections that are raised against 'unconscious ideas' existing and being operative 
seem for the most part to be juggling with words. No doubt 'idea' is a word 
belonging to the terminology of conscious thinking, and 'unconscious idea' is 
therefore a self-contradictory expression. (301-2) 
He combines this interrogation with a vocabulary of topological dimensions, describing the 
idea rising above the threshold of consciousness or existing beneath it and posits the further 
construction of terminology such as 'ideational sub-stratum' in order to circumvent apparent 
contradiction and to facilitate further conceptual navigation. 
.. Ahe physical process which underlies an idea is the same in content and form (though not in quantity) whether the idea rises above the threshold of consciousness or 
remains beneath it. It would only be necessary to construct some such term as 
'ideational sub-stratum' in order to avoid the contradiction and to counter objection. 
(301-2) 
It would seem that hysteria is an illness with a sense of geography as the theorization of its 
aetiology and therapy presents itself through topological imagery and metaphor. The schema 
of this malady is such that, for Freud especially, it offers its tiered stages as evidence for 
discovery by the doctor-archeologist, its processes of symbolic displacement become a model 
of the therapeutic practice of psychoanalysis. For Breuer, however, the process is to be 
understood not so much as one of discovery and backward trajectory through buried layers but 
a complex interconnection of the many in the one: a manifold structure which presents itself 
as singular. Its ontology is therefore complicit with its presentation. Through careful 
figurative rendering of hysterical phenomena, Breuer's theorization is such that it draws 
attention to the anaglyphic linguistic structure that is metaphor and its power to enable 
conceptual perception. His use of imagery builds a theory in which the conceptual framework 
shapes what it is presenting. Breuer uses metaphors of buildings and houses to facilitate an 
understanding of the complicated lay-out of hysterical space. 
... if the basis of hysteria is an idiosyncrasy of the whole nervous system, the complex 
of ideogenic, psychically determined symptoms is erected on it as a building is on its 
foundations. And it is a building of several storeys. (326) 
We understand through metaphor so that a concept cannot exist a priori but always dependent 
upon the armature of understanding it presents us with so that the concept does not exist on its 
own to be rendered through language but is tied to it the linguistic mechanism in an holistic 
relation, "[j]ust as it is only possible to understand the structure of such a building if we 
distinguish the plans of different floors" (326). In this way, Breuer's theorization of hysteria 
is a counterpart to the positioning of the hysteric. Through over-simplification or failure to 
understand the manifold inconnecting honeycomb of associative and deterministic conceptual 
features, "[ilt is just as though we tried to insert the different rooms of a many-storeyed house 
into the plan of a single storey" (326). 
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In writing of the 'psychical material' of hysteria, Freud also thinks of a "structure in several 
dimensions" (374) but immediately organizes those dimensions into an ordered layering 
which is "stratified in at least three different ways" (374). This imagery again lends itself to 
the questing teleology of an archeological dig for therapeutic 'finds'. 
It is interesting that in her presentation of women as robber birds in negotiation with 
the symbolic, Cixous continues these topological metaphors in what is perceived to be a re- 
working and challenge to Freudian terminology. In "The Laugh of the Medusa" (1976), 
Cixous postulates that through 'feminine writing', ýcrffiirefendnine, "every structure is for a 
moment thrown off balance" (Marks and de Courtivron: 1981,249). Playing on the double 
meaning of voler, Cixous writes that women "go by, fly the coop, take pleasure in jumbling 
the order of space, in disorienting it, in changing around the furniture, dislocating things and 
values, breaking them all up, emptying structures, and turning propriety upside down" (Marks 
and de Courtivron: 1981,258). 
That such topological metaphor has a base in ego constitution in relation to body 
image is illustrated by the account of Anna O. 's spatial disorientation in her illness. Breuer 
tells us that her family had moved house in the spring of 1881 but because, in her condition 
seconde, she lived in the time dimension of the winter of 1880-81, she continued to formulate 
her psychical and physical existence with reference to that particular temporal dimension. 
She was carried back to the previous year with such intensity that in the new house, 
she hallucinated her old room, so that when she wanted to go to the door she knocked 
up against the stove which stood in the same relation to the window as the door did in 
the old room. (Breuer and Freud: 1991,86) 
Breuer describes how his patient, after relief from her condition seconde afforded by the 
'talking cure', woke one night to find herself in "a strange room" and her fright was such that 
it disturbed the entire household (92). The "terrifying hallucination" which terminates her 
treatment is produced by "re-arranging the room so as to resemble her father's sickroom" (95). 
By placing objects in a room in an arranged and recognizable pattern in order to replicate a 
past living space, the subject is psychically 'determined' by being once more placed under the 
influence of the objects of her observation. By absorbing the object into the subject via its ego 
ideal, inhabited phantasy may be posited as the basis of bodily reality. The importance of 
perceptual space to the constitution of the ego is demonstrated through this exercise which is 
itself a physical counterpart of theoretical space where we may be seen to inhabit a metaphor. 
Metaphors of the Dark Underground and 'feminine' connections 
I live like the plants, 
In the cellar, without light. 
From 'Love did not come to me', poem by Bertha Pappenheim: c. 1911. 
(HirschmUller: 1989,308) 
The concept of the unconscious is one which lends itself readily to ideas of darkness and the 
metaphorical construct of an underground system. Breuer writes of the "darkness of the 
unconscious" gaining control over muscular apparatus and ideational activity (308). Breuer 
continues this metaphor with his characteristic use of literary and classical allusion when he 
writes that, 
This half of a mind is therefore quite complete and conscious in itself. In our cases 
the part of the mind which is split off is 'thrust into darkness', as the Titans are 
imprisoned in the crater of Etna, and can shake the earth but can iiever emerge into the 
light of day. (309) 
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In the case history of Trýulein Anna 0!, the patient tells her stories in a state of auto-hypnosis 
which occurs in the evenings. This nocturnal condition seconde she named 'clouds' (80). In 
his early case history of Bertha Pappenheirn recovered from Kreutzlingen Sanatorium by 
Albrecht Hirschmýller, Breuer writes that in her severely disordered mental state she 
experienced "[flucid periods inbetween when she complains of the deep darkness in her 
head" (Hirschmýller: 1979,281). 
It is interesting to compare Brcuer's presentation of the 'darkness' of the unconscious 
with Freud's later formulation of femininity as a 'dark continent' rather like Breuer's 
representation of the unconscious as if picking up the metaphorical momentum from Breuer 
but transferring it to the idea of femininity allied with the unconscious and area topology, 
thereby introducing a cartography of sexual difference. In Freud's scenario, darkness is 
associated with the unknown region of the psyche in the feminine subject so that ideas of the 
unconscious are carried with this image as it is employed in descriptions of psycho-sexual 
development. 
Breuer, it should be noted, makes no such comparison between the unconscious and 
any notion of the feminine. He refers to other writers who have described hysterics as the 
"flower of mankind" (321) whilst he himself alludes to the clear intelligence of his hysteric 
patients and argues specifically against Janet's formulation of innate degeneracy or hereditary 
taints. It is in this line of argument that he says "[a]fter all, the patron saint of hysteria, St. 
Theresa, was a woman of genius" (312). 11 Although Breuer accepts some of the main 
theoretical ideas of Janet and pays homage to their founding importance, he disputes his view 
that hysteria is due to 'mental weakness' (309-312). In stressing the sexual aetiology in the 
underpinning of the development of -hysteria, he refers to sexual libido as an energy which is 
not sufficiently dissipated by the organism by the means available to it. He makes no line of 
demarcation between the feminine or masculine subject in this energetic frustration as may be 
seen by his clinical 'example of the small boy with swallowing difficulties due to trauma 
suffered by being offered a man's penis in an urinal (289). 
Electricity 
It is entirely in line with the mechanist physical philosophy of the School of Helmholtz that 
Breuer should apply that most pure applied system of "attraction and repulsion" - electricity - 
to his most extended metaphor in his analysis of hysterical structuration. The vocabulary of 
electrical phenomena is very clearly related to the language of psychoanalysis. Electrical 
analogy carries with it the vocabulary of electricity: the mechanisms of resistance, conduction 
and discharge, and the functions of the capacitor and transformer offer themselves as 
examples. When the vocabulary itself is not being used, the idiosyncrasies of electricity as a 
phenomenon and the functional devices used in electrical systems are being utilized in the 
ideational constructs of hysteria with which we are presented. Conversion may itself be a 
modulation of the transformer, the reflex a form of capacitor whilst the concept of resistance 
and defence may be drawn from the role of the resistor in the electrical circuit. In his 'Project 
for a Scientific Psychology' (1925), Freud also employs this mechanized energy model when 
he puts forward the theory of three different types of neuron which all have separate and 
synchronic parts to play in the discharge of affect. 
Whilst Breuer was at pains to point out that his use of the electrical metaphor was 
only an enlightening device and not to be taken literally, it is clear that the electrical analogy 
is drawn from its therapeutic counterpart in the established treatment of hysteria (amongst 
other illnesses) by galvanic muscle stimulation. 12 Galvanic theories have established that the 
application of electrical current produces a reflex in the muscle. The muscle is stimulated by 
electrical currents which replicate signals sent by the brain via the centi-di cortex to the nerve, 
causing the muscles to contract. If the nerve cell body is sensitive to electrical stimuli so that 
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it can perform its physiological function by by-passing the central cortex, this demonstrates 
that the central nervous system is itself a charged system and that the muscle contraction 
normally carries a low electrical current. Comparing the organism to "a widely ramified 
electrical system for lighting and the transmission of motor power" (268), Breuer writes of a 
"network of lines of conduction" with a dynamo engine ticking over which maintains the body 
in its state of 'stand-by' (269). In a split energetic manoeuver, the system itself is rendered 
quiescent by expending "a given quantity of energy of this purpose" (269). Its quiescence is 
therefore maintained by kinesis. In electrical terms, the organic system is 'charged' and 
thereby "best prepared for work" (273). The potentiality of the system is manifest in its 
charged state and "the whole immense network forms a single reservoir of 'nervous tension"' 
(269). 
If we return to the idea of the splitting in the energetic to which I have referred above, 
it is apparent that we are not indeed speaking of two different states of energy but of three. 
This is because the energy which maintains the organism in its quiescent state is different 
from the energy which is being suspended and, furthermore, the freed energy which is 
directed into discharge "thereby transforming tensile force into live energy" (272) is 
qualititively different from its quiescent form. 13 The organism expends energy in order to 
maintain its charged state, i. e. its quiescence or potentiality. This schema would not 
contradict the notion that these three forms of systemic energy may be modulations of one and 
the same energy, i. e. that the activated energy may itself be a transubstantiation of th6 
quiescent energy, and that the third quiescent energy is a split-off modulation of the energy 
that is quiescent and simultaneously of the same derivation as the discharge. In other words, to 
continue the electrical analogy, the same charge may be used for different purposes and those 
purposes will entail some modulation of the charge via the different components of a circuit. 
Throughout the entire interconnected network of the nervous system, "resistances are 
interposed, which prevent the general, uniform distribution of excitation" (279). 
This model was utilized by Freud in 1920 in Beyond the Pleasure Principl with 
regard to primary and secondary psychical processes. In his exposition of 'free' and 'bound' 
energy with regard to psychical processes, free energy would always precede or be anterior to 
the bound form of energy. Free energy is in direct engagement of discharge whilst bound 
energy is subject to different types of controls or resistances and are characteristic of a more 
complicated or evolved system. The relation is the same as a simple electrical circuit to that 
of a more complex circuit which is multi-functional and is modulated by means of a series of 
electrical components. Freud refers to "Breuer's distinction between quiescent (or bound) and 
mobile cathectic energy in the elements of psychical systems" (Freud: 1991 [1920], 235). It is 
interesting, however, that whilst Freud clearly attributes the origins of the concepts of free and 
bound forms of energy to Breuer, he makes reference to only two forms of energy where 
Breuer has clearly stated three. Breuer refers to this three-fold model in a footnote in his 
section on 'Intracerebral Tonic Excitation! (n. 269). There he states quite explicitly that in 
addition to the potential energy in the quiescent state and the unknown form of kinetic energy 
which is the psychic discharge (i. e. that which is the transformed state of the quiescent), there 
is "yet another quiescent state of nervous excitation: tonic excitation or nervous tension" (269 
- my emphasis). 
Apart then from a potential energy which lies-quiescent in the chemical substance of 
the cell and an unknown form of kinetic energy which is discharged when the fibres 
are in a state of excitation, we must assume the existence of yet another quiescent 
state of nervous excitation: tonic excitation or nervous tension. (269) 
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There is a layering of energy here in a tiered system, a topology of energized organic tension 
which suspends the flesh in a kinesis of psychical and somatic inter-relation. 
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In the grand picture that Breuer presents, there are indeed two main forms of energy 
which maintain the organism, quiescent and the actual discharge. It is important to note, 
however, his tuning of this in his footnote in a presentation which is integral to his argument. 
It is clear that in this physical model there must be a third energy expended in the maintenance 
of quiescence or organic non-expenditure. The schema attributed to Breuer as it is re-worked 
and presented by Freud is repeated in Laplanche and Pontalis' exposition of free and bound 
energy in The Language of Psychoanalysis (1988,171-173). There they state that Breuer's 
thesis is founded on "two kinds of mechanical energy" in accordance with the physical 
principles of the Helmholtz School (171). This takes account of the grand or more manifest 
system described by Breuer but does not take account of the third form of energy to which he 
refers. They then go on to posit that, 
Breuer is mainly concerned to define a kind of potential energy, present in the nervous 
system, which he calls 'intracerebral tonic excitation', 'nervous tension' or 'quiescent' 
energy. (Laplanche and Pontalis: 1988,17 1) 
Here Breuer's carefully differentiated modulations of energy defined by their purpose within 
the system are collapsed into one and the same, "a kind of potential energy". ('[N]ervous 
tension' for example might allude to the third energy described or might describe a discharge 
affect. ) His conception of "another quiescent state of nervous excitation" is completely lost. 
The interconnected model which Breuer presents of synchronic energetic modulations derived 
from the same source is effectively erased in this extrapolation which interprets Breuer's thesis 
as one of duality and polarity in the system. The reason for this might be that Laplanche and 
Pontalis approach Breuer through the texts and thesis of Freud which, whilst utilizing Breuer's 
ideas, also fail to recognize this third form of energy in the dynamic of his psychic model. 
The other reason for this might be due to overlooking the important and far-reaching 
modulations of his theory which Breuer presents in a footnote. 
What I propose as a candidate for the second unknown form of quiescent energy, i. e. 
the third energy, is that which acts to provide the 'trigger' or 'signal' to the quiescent state to 
release the energy into its free form. 14 This is because there must also be an energy involved 
in the act of discharge which is disparate from discharge itself. This 'trigger' must in fact itself 
be lying dormant or quiescent until called upon by the central nervous system to release its 
dynamic signal. It is also important to note that this quiescent energy which is the pre-form of 
the 'signal' is itself the result of a system of quiescence and discharge. In his electrical 
analogy, Breuer is presenting us with a complex interconnecting and tiered synergetic system 
of superimposed energy pathways. As a working example of this complex system of energetic 
synergy, Breuer offers a description of the energetic activation of the sensory nerve cell and 
its fibre and notes how the nerve cell is itself an activating carrier of energy to the nerve fibre 
through extension by contact. To illustrate this mechanism, he finds it useful to employ the 
comparison of a hydrostatic system (closed and self-maintaining system) to the free force of 
flowing water (simple hydraulic system); he also compares this with the relation between 
electrical tension and the electric circuit. 
In his next step, he then places these interconnecting systems within another much 
larger system which is the total of all these interconnections so that "the whole immense 
network forms a single reservoir of 'nervous tension' " (269). Here he is describing the 
secondary system in which all others are enclosed which actually presents itself to us as the 
primary system as it is the more obvious cohesive presentation of the forces of attraction and 
repulsion in the world. It is clear from the model that Breuer presents us-with in this footnote 
that he conceived of energy as a complex system of interlocking honeycombs in which three 
forms of energy are involved in each dynamic system of quiescence, discharge, and second 
quiescence (i. e. that which activates quiescence, that which provides the signal). We must 
then refer back to the topology of the system described by Breuer to apply his metaphor of a 
house of many storeys to this complex presentation of systems within interlocking systems of 
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energy at work within the organism. From the point of view of pathology it is obvious that, 
when this intricate and delicate system is then subject to overload and in a state of short- 
circuit or false by-pass, many complex new neural pathways may build up within the 
organism at a rapid and easily established pace. 
It is clear that Freud, in his subsequent work, and Laplanche and Pontalis in their 
contemporary extrapolations offree! and 'bound' energy have misrepresented Breuer's theories 
by over-simplification of the topological energetic model with which they are presented. The 
metaphoric nature of Breuer's analogy is also lost in the attempt to present 'free' and 'bound' 
energy in what becomes a more mechanistic model in Freud. Breuer's theories offer a 
complexity of interconnecting circuits in a manifold system which, when taken into account 
with his metaphorical and self-reflexive theorization, offer a challenge to binaristic models of 
metaphysical thought and present a holistic model of somatic and psychical experience which 
is only now being taken into account in contemporary theorization of bodily experience. 
State of Constancy 
Breuer states that the organism works to maintain a constant state of energy (tonic energy): "a 
tendency on the part of the organism to keep tonic intracerebral excitation constant" (273). It 
works to maintain this constancy by dispersing excitation unless the system finds itself in a 
state of overload. It should also be noted that the converse of this scenario may also occur, i. e. 
when the organism finds itself in a state of under-excitation. This transpires when the system 
finds itself in a state of exhaustion due to which it will seek to restore its depletion of energy 
by shutting down its perceptive capabilities and entering the state of sleep. The organism is 
then a mechanism which seeks to maintain constancy via its own apparatus of self-regulation. 
It maintains an equilibrium in its system and may do this through re-charging by shutting 
down organs of perception or by a 'conversion' of excess energy, transforming it into 
physiological activation. 
The organism relies upon its perpetual reservoir of energy in its compulsion to 
maintain this state of constancy. 15 In a theory which might be regarded as a forerunner of 
Freud's formulations in Beyond the Pleasure Principl , Breuer associates over-excitation or 
excitation without a discharge (i. e. a 'strangulated affecf) with a resultant unpleasure. If 
energy is not employed 'functionally' this results in psychical pain or a feeling of unpleasure in 
the organism (272,287). 
I have already [p. 281f] mentioned a view which should not, perhaps, be dismissed 
out of hand. On this view the clarity of our ideas, and consequently their capacity for 
being observed by our self-consciousness - that is, for being conscious - is 
determined, among other things, by the feelings of pleasure or unpleasure which they 
arouse by their quota of affect. (302) 
It it clear that from the above extract that pleasure and unpleasure act as the conductors and 
resistors of the ideational in this system. 
In a normal person, excess energy may find its direct discharge or, where this is not 
possible, it may be dealt with via tranpositioning or substitution, says Breuer. We may go for 
a run instead of hitting someone, for instance. We employ 'stand-ins' to stave off excess 
psychical tension (278). Here is a schematology of displacement or physical metonymy 
which presents us with a 'normal' scenario in which there is a transpositioning of the affects of 
excitation activated through the act of substitution. This substitution is a means of modulating 
or by-passing the simple or more direct discharge via a re-routing of the physiological reflex 
so that the outcome is socially acceptable. This substitution should be kept distinct from 
abnormal modulations of the affects of energy which finds its discharge 'strangulated' and 
which are a form of 'short-circuiting!. 
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States of Overload 
Because there is an optimum level of tensile energy in the organism (274), when this system 
of intracerebral excitation finds itself in an unpleasurable state of over-cxcitation due to an 
unconscious state which has prevented discharge, it will seek discharge by abnormal means 
via the route of least resistance. This is correlative to the laws of an electrical system in which 
the current will always, given the opportunity, travel by the easiest route, i. e. that of the lowest 
resistance. Breuer states that "the discharge follows the 'principle of least resistance' and 
takes place along those paths whose resistances have already been weakened by concurrent 
circumstances" (284). This furthers the electrical analogy by stating that abnormal facilitation 
of the system may be the result of weakening due to overload, setting up the conditions 
conducive to short-circuit (274). 
If the tension in such a system becomes excessively high, there is danger of a break 
occurring at weak points in the insulation. Electrical phenomena then appear at 
abnormal points; or, if two wires lie close beside each other, there is a short circuit. 
(279) 
Within the organism, 'abnormal facilitation' takes place along deviations from preformed 
motor paths or neural pathways (274-5). 16 Just as in an electrical circuit, the charge from the 
system cannot be drawn upon for its proper purpose if current has been by-passed through 
short-circuit, "[fln just the same way, the affect fails to appear if the excitation flows away in 
an abnormal reflex and is converted into a somatic phenomenon" (284n). When these 
abnormal neural routes become established through repetition, the conversion into hysterical 
symptom is complete (283). 
Shunt Circuit and 'abnormal facilitation' 
In a letter to Wilhelm Fliess written 24 October 1895, Breuer refers to an electrical apparatus 
used for 'abdominal electrization' employed in galvanic therapy. Breuer describes the 
principle of shunt circuit which will send direct current into the body and at the same time 
provide a shunt to prevent its full effect. Here is an extract from that letter: 
It appears that the two electrode plates serve both for constant and for induced current, 
which should be'mixed'. Then the secondary coil of the induction apparatus forms a 
shunt circuit for the constant current, and since it should be made of thick wire, with 
few windings, thus having very low resistance, the entire constant current equalises 
itself through it, and virtually nothing passes through the body. 
(Hirschmiiller: 1989,318) 
It is clear from the above that Breuer's understanding of electrical principle was thorough and 
detailed as can be borne out by his references to electrical systems in the Studies. 
A shunt circuit is one in which the current is provided with an alternative easier route 
via thicker wire with less resistance which carries the bulk of the current in the circuit. There 
is still, however, a much smaller amount of the same current (and here it is important to 
understand that this is not a residue of the current or another current but one and the same 
current) which still seeks to complete the circuit through the thinner wire. This phenomenon 
is referred to as a 'shunt'. The current is shunted on, thereby forming.?. configuration within 
which a false by-pass forms another path of the circuit and the current running through 
another part of the same circuit is thereby reduced. I would seek to argue here that this 
electrical phenomenon of shunt could provide an illuminating model for the aetiology of the 
symptom as the somatic presentation of a short-circuit which thereby presents a scenario of 
splitting within what is one and the same energy in which the energy is modulated into two 
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different values and behaves in different manners until it is again in a state of common flow. 
It is fitting that in his analysis of the pathological splitting of the mind, Breuer uses the 
metaphor of "divided streams" to describe this process. This metaphor of divided streams is 
directly comparable to the concept of shunt circuit as it describes a process of psychic 
confluency (314). 
Current 
Low resistance High resistance 
(Thick wire) (Thin wire) 
Current in common flow 
SHUNT IFV 
CIRCUIT 
"What seems hard to understand, " writes Breuer, "is how an idea can be sufficiently 
intense to provoke a lively motor act, for instance, and at the same time not intense enough to 
become conscious" (302). He then offers the explanation that this is due to the organism's 
resistance to the idea becoming conscious, thereby protecting itself. This ties with Freud's 
emphasis on defence and repression in his chapter which are useful concepts to apply here in 
order to explain the pushing under of a very lively affect and its physical transubstantiation or 
substitution into the somatic symptomatology. What it also ties with, however, is the 
electrical mechanism of the shunt circuit where the thin wire offers more resistance to the 
current which takes the easy route through the thick wire leaving the circuit divided within 
like two streams but with one side able to offer itself for utilization as a low current 'circuit' 
running confluent with a current of greater value/intensity. A very 'lively motor act' which is 
'not intense enough' to break resistance is due to its conversion or running off into an easier 
route which forms an alternative facilitation. The organism in its abnormality is then enabled 
to function after a manner, i. e. it is functioning by malfunction. This is an ironic manoeuvre 
on the part of the organism as it maintains itself by malfunction due to the compulsion to 
achieve discharge in order to maintain its optimum state. It achieves this even by means of a 
short-circuit so that the organism may maintain a state of energetic constancy even by 
abnormal means. The system of the organism here may be said to over-ride the organism (as 
entity) itself. This is due to the dominating impulse of the organism to maintain itself by 
whatever means. 
43 
Symptom as Symbol 
The aetiology of the symptom as a reflex lies in its formation through an abnormal facilitation 
which becomes established in the neural pathways of the organism. 
A surplus of excitation also gives rise to pathological phenomena in the motor sphere. 
Children having this characteristic very easily develop tic-like movements ... they become permanent unless they are promptly checked. The reflex paths are very easily 
and quickly dug in deep. (325) 
This points to an archeological aspect of the topology of the symptom, composed as it of a 
number of superimposed and interconnecting networks of energy. We can relate this to 
Breuer's argument that where there is a frustration of discharge in the normal organism, the 
energy must still find its release in discharge and it will seek to do this via a substitution or 
stand-in in conscious terms. There is a metonymic logic to the symptom. In a letter to Breuer 
written 29 June 1992, Freud outlines plans for the forthcoming Studies. In it he makes 
reference to symptoms; he says that "they are displacements [ ], in part along an abnormal 
path (internal alteration), of sums of excitation which have not been released" (SE 1148). 
In the organism maintaining itself by abnormal means, these discharges become 
'strangulated' and then find a release which is confined to the organism itself, i. e. it stays 
within its physiological limits in a scenario of psycho-neural feedback. (Here we may think of 
Breuer's analogy of the closed arena of the hydrostatic system opposed to the applied dynamic 
of the hydraulic system. ) This, in a person with a nervous disorder, of which hysteria is but 
one as Breuer carefully points out (281), leads to conversion of the affect so that the symptom 
is a stand-in, a symbolic transubstantiation or a plastic impression of ideogenic origin. It is 
the bodily presentation of psychical affect as it is played through permutations of the neural 
pathways (281). We should also bear in mind that the ideogenic remains as an active and 
activating force which can lie quiescent until triggered. 
If the original affect was discharged not in a normal but in an 'abnormal' reflex, this 
latter is equally released by recollection. The excitation arising from the affective 
idea is 'converted' (Freud) into a somatic phenomenon. 
Should this reflex become completely facilitated by frequent repetition, it 
may, it seems, drain away the operative force of the releasing ideas so totally that the 
affect itself emerges to a minimal extent only, or not at all. In such a case the 
'hysterical conversion! is complete. (282) 17 
Abnormal facilitation finds its conversion through its replay so that the symptom then 
becomes a 'reflex' which replaces the idea which was its affecting impetus. This is to say that 
it is the somatic response to abnormal excitation as it follows the new configurations of the 
neurological network as the organism mis-functions in order to function. 
It is a subtle and interesting argument against the charge of psycho-parallelism which 
is often levelled against early psychoanalytic practice that Breuer speaks of the repetition of 
the symptom which 'imprints' the ideogenic into body (299). This step in Breuer's theory is 
quite radical in its evasion of any simple mind-body parallelism. Whilst hysterical symptoms 
may be, for the most part, ideogenic in their origin, he says that it might be the case that: 
... the repetition of them has, to use Romberg's phrase [1840,192], 'imprinted' them into the body, and they would now no longer be based on a psychical process but on 
modifications in the nervous system ... they would have become self-sufficient, 
genuinely somatic symptoms. (299) 
4 
This speculation, although tentatively expressed as "neither untenable nor improbable", is 
radical and far-reaching in its implication for it connects with some of our most modern 
thinking on the body and provides a clear line to Lacads formulation of the linguistic 
intertwining with the fleshly put forward especially in'The Mirror Stage! and more pertinently 
in'The subversion of the subject and the dialectic of desire. This argument is also one which 
alters the grammar we use and the philosophical divisions which colour our perceptive ability 
to challenge the categories of knowledge which themselves shape what knowledge is. Mind 
and body, two areas which have been separately established through dimensions of vocabulary 
and theoretical/philosophical practice, become synchronic in this scenario. Psycho-analysis 
offers us an anti-Cartesian move. 
It is Breuer's use of'into' not 'on! to describe the synonymous interplay (though this is, 
of course, the wrong word to use but there is no other, ) of the ideogenic and the somatic, the 
mind and body, the psychical and the physical which is redolent here. If Breuer had used'od, 
as he well might have with a less subtle mind, it would have implied a separation of systems, a 
body to be written upon. To writeintd suggests an integral enfleshing of the ideogenic, that 
somehow the word has become flesh; that the body is a living cipher and the cipher is itself 
enfleshed. 
Association and the Symptom 
The symptom occurs as a result of what Breuer terms the repetition of "the facilitation of 
abnormal reflexes according to the general laws of association" (285). The short-circuit or 
organic malfunction coincides with a physical and ideational path which then carries the 
association for future misfunctions and so the short-circuit is 'set, into a reflex conversion. 
This is then "strengthened there by repetition" in the hypnoid state (295). Freud emphasizes 
Breuer's argument when he states that, 
The point at which a symptom has already broken through once [see p. 279] forms a 
weak spot at which it will break through again the next time. 
(Breuer and Freud: 1991,347) 
The symptom is manifested in a knot of symbolic relation to its precipitating causes. 
It is the reflex which is formed from a honeycomb of associative ideas in the unconscious. 
Breuer then adds on to this symptomatic scenario an important twist which turns what has 
been a kinetic model into a symbolic exchange in the field of speech. 
Here we have determination through symbolism. What unites the affect and its reflex 
is often some ridiculous play upon words or associations by sound, but this only 
happens in drcam-like states... (285 - emphasis as original) 
Here we may note the slippage of the purely somatic into the somatological. We may draw 
what is a significant analogy with Freud's development of the technique of word-association 
as a new therapeutic tactic with which hypnosis may be replaced. In this therapy, the attention 
paid to word-play, slips, lapsus, and sound-association builds upon the symbolic relation as it 
presents itself in the symptom for unravelling in the analytic encounter. Continuing his 
discussion of 'determination' and 'overdetermination' of the symptom, Breuer states that, 
... there must be a convergence of several factors before a hysterical symptom can be 
generated ... Such symptoms are invariably 'overdetermined', to use Freud's 
expression. (289) 
'Overdetermi nation' as the result of a number of converging associations is then linked to 
'repetition of an affect' which is necessary in order to bring about a'conversion' (290). 
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Language and Mnemic Chains 
In his extrapolation of the train of association operative in the unconscious of the apparatus, 
and of underlying importance in the apparent purely somatic nature of the symptom, Breuer 
finds it useful to speak of the hysterical symptom which may result from a blockage or 
inhibition in the course of association. He illustrates this with a further linguistic analogy and 
uses the concept of a chain as that in which associations are linked together. 
The simplest example and model of this is afforded by the excitation which arises 
when we cannot recollect a name or cannot solve a riddle, and so on. If someone tells 
us the name or gives us the answer to the riddle, the chain of associations is ended, 
and the excitation vanishes, just as it does on the ending of a reflex chain. (286) 
In 'The function and field of speech and language in psychoanalysis' (1953) also known as 
'The Rome Discourse, Lacan considers the linguistic element of the symptom as it becomes 
enfleshed. Taking into account the text provided by the patient in 'free association', Lacan 
speaks of the symbol and states that, 
... in order to map it out at the points where its verbal forms intersect with the nodal 
points of its structure, then it is already clear that the symptom resolves itself entirely 
in an analysis of language, because the symptom is itself structured like a language... 
(Lacan: 1977,59) 
We might also refer to LacaWs attention to the signifying chain in 'The agency of the letter in 
the unconscious or reason since Freud' (1957) where he refers to the need for a "topological 
substratum" when speaking of combinational elements of the linguistic as a system of 
mutually syncopated and co-dependent components. 
... the term I ordinarily use, namely, the signifying chain, gives an approximate idea: 
rings of a necklace that is a ring in another necklace made of rings. 
(Lacan: 1977,153) 
This need for a topological presentation of systems within systems is reminiscent of Breuer's 
terminology when speaking of energetic structures in the organism and their metaphoric 
analogy/relation to the structures of the symptom. The infinite en-chaining with which Lacan 
presents us is related to the infinite honeycombs of an interlocking and superimposing 
intricacy of circuitry with which Breuer provides us in his topological model. It is clear that 
the symptom both in presentation and extrapolation is the effect of an inhabitation of 
metaphor. "The mechanism of metaphor, " says Lacan, "is the very mechanism by which the 
symptom, in the analytic sense, is determined ... a symptom being a metaphor in which flesh 
or function is taken as a signifying element" (Lacan: 1977,166 - my emphasis). 
In this area of association, Breuer once again reaches ahead of his time when he 
advances the vocabulary of psychoanalysis with the notion of complexes. Each ideogenic 
impression may co-exist in an interlocking and reciprocal triggering mechanism which Breuer 
refers to as a 'complex'. Laplanche and Pontalis describe a complex as an "[o]rganized group 
of ideas and memories of great affective force which are either partly or totally unconscious" 
(Laplanche & Pontalis: 1988,72). Breuer, writing of hemi-anaesthesia states that, 
For the most part the sense-impressions that are not apperceived and the ideas that are 
aroused but do not enter consciousness cease without producing further complexes - 
mental strata withdrawn from consciousness... (310) 
$1 
It has already been noted that Breuer's use of the word 'compl& is close to Jung's which is 
generally regarded as having been introduced ten years later (Strachey: 31 On). Most authors, 
Freud included, attribute the term 'complex' to Jung but there is evidence in the Studies that 
Breuer preceded him in its usage. In Part 11 of his "History of the Psycho-Analytic 
Movement" (1914), Freud comments on his misgivings regarding the term 'complex' but it 
seems that by this time its received understanding had slipped into shorthand for the repressed 
rather than representing the system of enchained association and triggering that Breuer had 
described (Freud: SE XIV, 29-30). 
'Hypnoid States' 
The theory of the'hypnoid states' provided the biggest theoretical divergence between the two 
authors of Studies on Hysteria. It was a theory from which Freud was keen to disassociate 
himself and he began by expressing doubts about its efficacy as a theory in his 
psychotherapeutic chapter in the Studies, stating that "I have never in my own experience met 
with a genuine hypnoid hysteria" (372). In a letter to Wilhelm Fliess dated 25 April 1900, 
Freud refers to an article by a Dr. Warda of Blankenburg which reviews Breuer and Freud's 
theories on hysteria. Annoyed at the persistent inclusion of 'hypnoid states' in consideration of 
his work, Freud refers to "the unfortunate 'hypnoid' that was forced upon me" (Masson: 1985, 
411). By the time Freud came to give his Five Lectures (Clark University, Mass. 1909), he 
states that "Breuer's theory of hypnoid states turned out to be impeding and unnecessary, and 
it has been dropped by psycho-analysis to-day" (SE XI, 20). 
The 'hypnoid state! thesis presents us with a theory which is most clearly Breuer's'in 
its inception and development. 18 It is central to his formulation of hysteria and its attendant 
revelation of psychical structures. Writing in 1901 in his 'Fragment of an Analysis of a Case 
of Hysteria', also known as the 'Dora' case, Freud states that, 
If, where a piece of joint work is in question, it is legitimate to make a subsequent 
division of property, I should like to take this opportunity of stating that the 
hypothesis of'hypnoid states' - which many reviewers were inclined to regard as the 
central portion of our work - sprang entirely from the initiative of Breuer. I regard the 
use of such a term as superfluous and misleading, because it interrupts the continuity 
of the problem as to the nature of the psychological process accompanying the 
formation of hysterical symptoms. (RFL 8,57. Also SE VII, 27n. ) 
Replying to August Forel's request for information regarding the origins of ideas which 
contributed to the development of psycho-analysis, Breuer claims clear ownership of the 
'hypnoid state: 
What follows immediately from the case of Anna 0. is mine - that is to say, the 
actiological significance of affective ideas, deprived of their normal reaction, which 
operated permanently like psychical foreign bodies; 'retention hysteria'; the realization 
of the importance of hypnoid states in the development of hysteria; analytic therapy. 
(Cranefield: 1958,320) 
Here Breuer clearly links the hypnoid state with a correlative development of 'analytic 
therapy'. Interestingly, Cranefield notes that 'analytic' was written 'psycho-analytic' in the first 
instance and the 'psycho' was subsequently crossed out. Breuer goes on to state that in his 
development of the important defence theory, Freud was led to ignore the concept of 'hypnoid 
state'. "In comparison, " writes Breuer, "the pathological effects of the'hypnoid states' seemed 
to him negligible - which was not, I think, to the benefit of his theory" (Cranefield: 1958, 
320). 
5-Z 
From Breuer's comments to Forel in this letter, Paul Cranefield draws the conclusion 
that "[i]f by psycho-analysis is understood a discipline relying on the therapeutic technique of 
free association, psycho-analysis was solely Freuds discovery" (Cranefield: 1958,322). This 
is a conclusion I would dispute by a closer analysis of Breuer's ideas of the'hypnoid state' and 
the interplay of different influences brought to bear in that theory which might itself be 
capable of being presented as a theoretical complex, i. e. a convergence of different influences 
which become solidified into a categorizing vocabulary, what Breuer refers to as "juggling 
with words" (301). It is from this categorizing vocabulary, more than anything else, that the 
'hypnoid state! was to suffer for it contains, as we shall see, many of the 'germ-cells' of Freud's 
later theories which were presented in a quite different vocabulary rather like the old friend 
under a new linguistic cloak to which Breuer refers in his opening page of'Theoretical'(259). 
It is Breuer's view, advancing the thesis of Moebius (1894), that hysteria must 
resemble a state of hypnosis. It is dependent upon the existence of what Breuer terms 
'hypnoid states'. The existence of hypnoid hysteria denotes that psychical arena in which 
psychical trauma may not find sufficient abreaction due to its ideational affects being 'trapped' 
within a secondary condition, i. e. the hypnoid state. It is in this state that the abnormal 
pathology will manifest itself The organism maintains amnesia in relation to its condition 
seconde due to its unconscious content which is composed of an interplay of ideational 
complexes. The term 'hypnoid state' was used by Breuer to denote a state which occurs 
spontaneously in the organism yet is parallel to that of an induced hypnosis. This state, itself a 
condition of split-off, was used by Breuer to discuss the splitting of the psyche. The 
ideational complexes at play in this state are cut off from the conversation of normal 
associative discourse in the conscious state and so remain active in the condition seconde and 
resistant to what Breuer terms'wearing away'. It is this amnesia which offers protection from 
wearing-away of the converted ideas, "a protection which leads, ultimately, to an increase in 
psychical splitting" (298). A state of hypnoid consciousness is open to suggestibility and 
constitutes a condition seconde of which the patient is ignorant in their primary condition of 
consciousness, maintaining full amnesia with regard to the extra rooms hidden away in the 
psychical house. We may see this inhabitation of two different spaces in the hysterics' 
oscillation between conditions primes and secondes. Breuer writes with reference to Frau 
Ckilie M. that: 
After each of her momentary 'absences' - and these were constantly occurring - she 
did not know what she had thought of in the course of it. She oscillated between her 
'conditions primes' and 'secondes'. between the conscious and the unconscious 
ideational complexes. (318) 
The hypnoid state was seen as the basis of much hysterical pathology by Breuer and, 
furthermore, viewed as a state in which the normal division of psychical processes were 
illustrated by abnormal deviations. 
Because the hypnoid state reveals the organism in a suspended state with regard to 
perceptual experience, the organism then inhabits a sphere of virtuality which is dependent 
upon the mnemic store. This state of shut-down with regard to new impressions and reliance 
upon the mnemic image is a phenomenon which closely resembles sleep. Furthermore, this 
auto-hypnotic state has a "dream-like nature" (294). It is in this state, then, that the 
unconscious structure displays its intricate network of associative links. These links provide a 
collection of associative nodes which are of a symbolic nature and provide the underlying 
complex of the symptom which surfaces in the secondary consciousness of the hypnotic state. 
It is also a feature of the hypnoid state that, as in artificially induced hypnotism, the organism 
is highly sensitive to suggestibility of which it is amnesiac in its fully wakened state. 
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Hypnoid State and Unconscious Association 
It is clear that this hypnoid state is one in which the unconscious fully displays its symbolic 
nature via the associative links at play in this organic arena. Breuer offers an associationist 
account of the chain between the causative and somatic phenomena, i. e. their 'symbolic 
relation' which is often found to be based upon the vicissitudes of the linguistic system so that, 
as Lacan posits in his Seminar XI, the unconscious is indeed "structured like a language" 
(Lacan: 1994,20). Breuer writes, 
Thus it is almost only in these states that there arises a somewhat complicated 
irrational 'symbolic relation between the precipitating cause and the pathological 
phenomenon' [p. 55], which, indeed, is often based on the most absurd similarities of 
sound and verbal associations. (294) 
Bruer and Freud's 'Preliminary Communication' of 1893 makes reference to the associative 
connections which lead to the conversion of the unconscious complex into the symptom so 
that "[flt consists only in what may be called a 'symbolic' relation" (55). 
With regard to this psychotherapeutic development by Freud, Hirschmuller puts 
forward the opinion that "with his concentration technique and free association Freud deviated 
even more from Breuer's views" (Hirschm6lier: 1989,183). 1 would argue, however, that 
Breuer's repeated discussion of associationism in relation to the aetiology of symptom 
implicitly relates the symptom reflex to association and provides the very foundation for 
Freud's later development of his pressure technique which became known as 'free association' 
(354). Freud abandoned the practice of hypnosis due to a combination of lack of aptitude and 
an embarrassing erotic encounter with a patient which was interrupted by a servant. 19 Instead, 
he developed a therapeutic method which consisted of a modification of the laying on of 
hands called the 'pressure technique'. Following the example of Bernheim, Freud applied 
pressure to the temple region of the patient's head and combined this with an imperative to say 
anything which came into the mind. Far from being a radical departure from the 'hypnoid 
state', this technique of 'free association' does not really make sense without the ensuing 
discoveries of this forerunning theory which clearly operates to uncover links between the 
unconscious with associationism and symbolic phenomenon resulting in an underlying 
semiotics of embodiment. 20 
Breuer gives an example of this active associative impulse by making reference to 
bodily sensations experienced by Janet's hemi-anaesthetic patients. 
When their anaesthetic hand is repeatedly touched they feel nothing; but when they 
are told to name any number they like, they always choose the one corresponding to 
the number of times they have been touched. (317) 
This would indicate that bodily perception at the liminal boundaries of what constitutes the 
ego as separate entity is involved in somatic interplay. There is an in-corporation or 
corporealization of the symbolic in this scenario where the organism's physical embodied 
experience is drawn through the process of symbolization and vice versa in a tight confluency 
of what is not really separate but becomes separated through socialization into an embodied 
and separate individual entity in a capitalist system built upon a Cartesian distinction between 
mind and body. This interesting scenario drawn from Janet's clinical experience also draws 
attention to the sharp distinction between the primary and secondary states. In its secondary 
state the organism may not register its perceptual experience which is nevertheless being 
registered in its primary state to be relegated to mnemic experience when it is used in the 
ensuing symbolic conversion which is clearly dependent upon associative input. 
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Hypnoid States: Virtual States 
Every observer is under the influence of the subjects of his observation... (312) 
Auto-hypnosis may arise spontaneously and this is its only difference from the artificially 
induced hypnotic state. It may arise, according to Breuer, during boring or mechanical 
activities such as knitting or playing scales due to a frustrated excess of energy which seeks its 
discharge in the virtual state of daydream or reverie. Here we are reminded of Anna O's 
'private theatre' (313). Breuer then turns to consider other forms of mental abstraction or 
'sensory anaesthesia', what he terms'absence of mind'. He speaks of the investigator deep in a 
problem or a person engaged in application of creative imagination which renders them 
oblivious to certain external perception due to their concentration being employed elsewhere 
(295-6). These states of concentration are not, however, pathogenic where they are not 
accompanied by intense emotion and fatigue. "It is possible, " says Breuer, "that these states 
differ only quantitatively from true auto-hypnoses and that they pass over into them" (297). 
The amount that these states of abstraction pass over into auto-hypnoses must surely be 
relative to the amount of concentration upon the object and the investment in the object as the 
centre of the subject's nervous attention. Reveries which occur in a state of high tension and 
emotion are to be regarded as pathogenic states of abstraction and of these states Breuer gives 
two prime scenarios which may provoke such a passing over to the other side, i. e. the full 
entry into the virtuality of the condition seconde of the day-dream or abstraction. These two 
scenarios consist in the intense conditions of the lover and the sick-bed nurse and may be 
contained in "the anxiety of a person watching at a sick-bed of someone dear to him, [and] the 
day-dreams of a lover" (296). Both of these conditions share the same intense "concentration 
on an object" (297). 
Experience shows that sick-nursing and sexual affects also play the principal part in 
the majority of the more closely analysed case histories of hysterical patients. (314) 
Breuer notes that "[e]very observer is under the influence of the subjects of his observation" 
(312). In an intense concentration upon the other acting as object of the organism's attention, 
the ego is overtaken by the object upon which one's phantasies are projected so that the ego of 
the sick-bed watcher or ]over is quite taken over by its intense interest in the object. The 
object acting as a virtual nexus of projected phantasy is then absorbed into the ego and the 
organism quite literally converted into the place of the other whilst simultaneously and 
essentially occupying and maintaining its own place in this scheme of one and other where the 
other has no input apart from simply providing a focus for nervous energy. The anxious 
conditions of sick-bed nursing or being in love (with its attendant investment of sexual libido) 
results in the intense concentration on an external object - which then becomes internalized 
and enters one's own ego complexes, i. e. becomes 'in-corporated', entering even the flesh 
through somatic signs. The hypnoid state acts as a virtual sphere in which the affects of an 
overdetermined aetiology of symbolic superimposition converse in the unconscious. 
Auto-hypnosis has, so to speak, created the space or region of unconscious psychical 
activity into which the ideas which are fended off are driven. (316) 
This virtual state acts as the underside and anchor of every symbolic activity so that what is 
abnormal provides the model by which may be traced the mechanisms of normal psychical 
processes which lie as close to a pathological state as two naked electrical wires. 
A Love Letter: "[Djay-dreams of a lover" (296) 
Writing about being in love, Breuer says that "the subject's longing thoughts about his absent 
loved one create in him a 'rapt' state of mind [and] cause his environment to grow dim" (297). 
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The situation of the Iove-lorn also involves the activation of the sexual affect, recognized by 
Breuer as being of prime importance in the aetiology of hysteria. The 'rapt' state of the lover 
brings his conscious perception to a static point which is overloaded with emotional energy. 
In view of Freud's vehement rejection of Breuer's thesis ofhypnoid states', I take this 
opportunity to combine texts of psychoanalytical theory with texts written by the 
psychoanalyst in order to superimpose theory with private trajectory in what is a sphere of 
analysis. The texts to which I refer are those most private missives between lovers: love 
letters. These epistolary outpourings give an idea of the abstracted nature of Freud's 
protracted courtship of Martha Bernays, his own absent love object .2' Freud's love letters to his "Little Princess" Marty contain very many "day-dreams of a lover". 22 These love letters 
act as mediating material between one and other as destination of its written trajectory. They 
serve as a pre-marital substitute for sexual possession, themselves a linguistic conversion or 
'stand-in' for an excess of libidinal energy. In its very use of the symbol, the symbol is 
transgressed from within the confines of the love letter. This provides a parallel for the 
deconstitution of T through its very constitution, i. e. the liminality of subjectivity is 
transgressed due to there being limits in place - in the same way as jouissance actually 
underpins the symbolic by not being representable by it, or by not being contained in it yet 
being actually a constituent element of its functioning. It is what is missing and therefore 
provides the frustrated impetus towards full speech. In this way, the analytical situation is 
truly a lover's discourse. Writing 'A Love Letter' during his Seminar XX (1972-3), Lacan 
asks, "So what was I writing you? - the only thing one can do with a measure of seriousness, a 
love letter" (Lacan: 1982,154). 
Here is an extract from the newly engaged Freud to his fiancýe written 19 June 1882. 
I knew it was only after you had gone that I would realise the full extent of my 
happiness and, alas! the degree of my loss as well. I still cannot grasp it ... I would think it was all a beguiling dream and be afraid to wake up. Yet friends tell me it's 
true, and I myself can remember details more charming, more mysteriously 
enchanting than any dream-phantasy could create. It must be true. Martha is mine... 
(Freud: 1961,25) 
It is clear that in his concentration upon the object with which he is in love, Freud occupies a 
locus of abstraction akin to the 'hypnoid state. His frustrated excess of libidinal energy is not 
subject to a normal 'wearing away' due to being outside the desired marriage contract and is 
protracted by a combination of absence of the love object and a failure to achieve the financial 
security essential to bourgeois union. The much wished-for end of this suspended state is to 
be directly attained by Freud's success as a psycho-analyst. It is with this in mind that the 
letters display an acute awareness of monetary obstacles and expenditure which run parallel to 
the course of love in a transactional erotic economy. 
If I would like to see you again? Darling, what a question! Where is the money 
coming from? Darling, I don't know. 
Letter of 17 May 1885. (Freud: 1961,157) 
There is a strong displacement of ideas by money and money by the desired possession of the 
love object in an economy of substitution which might provide a biographical parallel to the 
conversion of affects noted in the theories of hysteria communicated by Breuer and Freud. 
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Jouissance and the Hypnoid State 
It is interesting that in linking the development of hysteria with sexuality, Breuer uses 
arguments which, in example and vocabulary, prefigure some of the theoretical formulations 
of Jacques Lacan. 
For, apart from sick-nursing, no psychical factor is so well-calculated to produce 
reveries charged with affect as are the longings of a person in love. And over and 
above this the sexual orgasm itself, with its wealth of affect and its restriction of 
consciousness, is closely akin to hypnoid states. (330) 
What Breuer is describing here is a state in the organism which is provoked by its intense 
concentration upon an object, the other. The subject has been led, 'under the influence of the 
object of attention', to enter another sphere which is named the 'hypnoid state. Within this 
hypnoid state, the organism is in a state of by-pass as regards its own ego. It is clear that this 
state described by Breuer is closely analogous to that described by Lacan asjollissance. The 
Lacanian concept ofjouissance describes a state beyond language in which the organism, in 
its encounter with an excessive pleasure-pain, experiences a loss of self so that the libidinal 
boundaries of the ego are transgressed. As an encounter with the fullness of the Other, it is a 
state to be associated with deathliness, with passing through the petit mort of orgasm. It is a 
loss of'subjeethood' by being fully subjected through an encounter with the other. The ego is 
side-stepped as it is involved in a tryst with what exceeds it, i. e. what constitutes it by 
exceeding it so that which constitutes its bodily limit is also the very means of its excess. By 
exceeding the boundaries of T, the organism escapes the subjection that is subjectivity and 
enters a surplus state that isjouissant and of which it can have no conscious experience nor 
can represent symbolically except by its absence in speech and by whic speech operates. 
Jouissance is a corporeal pleasure-pain that is unspeakable yet is written through and 
through by the symbolic structures which depend upon it. Prohibition of jouissance is 
contained in the symbolic structure of language and indeed underpins its very machinations. 
As such, jouissance is not just beyond language but actually integral to its operation. This 
unbearable pleasure which becomes painful to the organism is due to an overloading within 
the organism of energetic affect. It transgresses all laws of 'free' and 'bound' energy as Freud 
presents them in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920). This is because the pleasure principle 
seeks to limit pleasure, acting as a check upon over-excitation of the organism which becomes 
unpleasure. Jouissance is patently a transgression of this principle so that "there is a 
jouissance beyond the pleasure principle" (Lacan: 1994,184). If we cast our minds back to 
Freud's presentation of 'free' and 'bound' energy as a reformulation of Breuer's tonic excitation 
and discharge, we remember that in this and subsequent presentations of Breuer's thought in 
this area, there is a third energy (and, by analogy, subsequent layerings) posited by Breuer 
which has been completely subsumed in these readings. This lost energy (i. e. the second form 
of quiescent energy which is involved in triggering quiescent energy into discharge) may be 
that which is involved in triggering the organism back from the brink of jouissant extinction, 
providing a signal which returns the organism to subjectivity and acts in the interests of 
biological self-preservation when its libidinally invested schema of ego has been transgressed 
via the two-fold scheme with which Freud presents us. This would obviously render Freud's 
scheme inadequate to Lacanian reworking as it does not allow for the return of the organism 
to its state of stand-by as Freud's 'principle of constancy' is based upon the impossible null 
principle. To continue the electrical analogy, because Breuer's model has a trip switch, it 
allows for a state of compensatable fuse, a self-regulating o, ver-ride within the system where 
Freud's would condemn the organism to permanent shut-down. 
The hypnoid state occurs because the principle of constancy has been exceeded, i. e. 
the optimum energy level has been exceeded and the organism has fallen into over- 
excitability. It is a state of by-pass from within, a state of shunt or 'abnormal facilitation' 
S'T. 
which maintains the organism in spite of its malfunction. 'Hypnoid states' therefore, although 
occurring because of over-excitation, actually work to maintain the principle of constancy. 
We may then draw on the parallel state ofjouissance as a form of pass-over 'closely akin to 
the hypnoid state' as an extreme abstraction in which organism transgresses its very 
subjectivity through encounter with the other acting as objet a, the locus of projected phantasy 
on the part of the subject. Here we may easily see that unless the organism is to be fully 
consumed in this state so that it may not return from the dark hole of deathliness, a safety 
mechanism needs to be in place which maintains the organic basis of T and provides the 
energetic trigger to pull the ego back through the schernatological apparatus from which (and 
by which) it achieves jouissance as a temporary state tied to the erotic mechanism. Freud's 
model does not provide this model of shunting which is central to this state of functional by- 
pass and does not allow for a third energy which must be present in order to prevent 
jouissance becoming permanent, i. e. full incorporation in the Other or death. Analogously, 
the organism cannot permanently inhabit a hypnoid state or its near state of extreme 
abstraction but must 'returd to a lower storey of the psychic topology in order to function. 
Interpretative Acts, Hypnoid States and the Jouissant Excess of Theory 
Breuer describes highly abstracted states closely analogous to self-hypnosis which exist as 
closely parallel to'hypnoid states'. He gives the example of "[a]n investigator who is deep in a 
problem" where intense concentration renders him/her "anaesthetic to a certain degree", in a 
suspended state with regard to new perceptive stimuli and inhabiting a region more dependent 
upon the mnemic store (295). These comments throw light upon the theorizing process in 
which we engage so that the parameters of observation are set by the observed itself as it 
displaces the subject's concentration, i. e. the subject's ego is transposed by the object in direct 
relation to the amount of concentration upon it to the exclusion of all else. The act of 
observing is one of alterity, it is integral to the production of what is called the observation yet 
it alters the object of its scrutiny by filtering it through the lens of its projected phantasy and 
subjecting the object to the vicissitudes of ego configuration. The observation is itself a direct 
result of the parameters set and the theoretical complexes by which we frame our observation. 
(This situation is one which is analogous to that of electrical feedback. ) Here it is clear that 
Breuer's theory of the hypnoid state and its closely contiguous states have repercussions in 
epistemological questions pertaining to the critical process. 
What does this scenario signify for the evolution of theoretical observations and its 
illustrative schemata as the parameters which set the observation then set the parameters for 
future application? This scenario between one and other - subject and its object - actually 
reflects on the process of theorizing itself so that within the arena of the theory we enter we 
become inhabited by its structures and so "under the influence of the subjects of our 
observation" through the very perceptual schemata we bring to bear on the object of our 
scrutiny. By subjecting the object to our theoretical analysis, we 'subject' it, i. e. 'convert' it so 
that its conversion becomes relative to the amount of energetic tension we bring to bear 
through the application of theory. It isjouissant in proportion to the degree in which the critic 
reader/writer enters its virtual house in order to hallucinate another room. 
Postscript 
This exploratory section has woven together the theoretical with medical history, biographical 
details, and extrapolations of physical laws such as electrical phenomena. It is hoped that this 
eclectic blend of texts presents a post-structural arena in which, through the intertextual, the 
interplay of linguistic application may be stressed as it becomes activated through the 
applications of psycho-analysis. In focussing this section upon Josef Breuer's 'Theoretical' 
contribution to Studies on Hysteria, I have paid attention to some of the most derided areas of 
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Breuer's theory, namely his electrical analogy and his notion of the 'hypnoid state'. His 
extended electrical metaphor and the electrical analogies he employs have been regarded as 
simple physical-psychical parallelism yet a closer reading, as I hope to have demonstrated, 
reveals a complex psychic scenario of a honeycombed energetic model which has "not even 
now been turned to sufficient account" (Freud: [ 1925] SE XIX, 280). It offers an inspirational 
side-kick to Freud's later theories by pre-empting them and also challenging tile foundations 
upon which Freud based his notion of 'free' and 'bound' energy. The much maligned 'hypnoid 
state' was long held in high regard by Breuer against Freud's opinion. Breuer stated that he 
thought it detrimental to Freud's theory that he rejected it (Cranefield: 1958,320). The 
'hypnoid state' represents an area of theory which has perhaps suffered from its own 
vocabulary as it has become solidified into an outdated theory smacking of the ogre Charcot 
and mesmeric experiments. A closer examination of Breuer's writing uncovers an area which, 
in its examination of states closely analogous to the hypnoid, offers a commentary on the 
anaesthetic critic engaged with the object of his/her scrutiny. In its attention to extinguished 
perceptive capabilities, it points ahead to Lacan's state of jouissance in the organism as a 
state fully dependent upon feeling the liminal edges of ego structure rubbing against it in order 
to transcend the ego as a temporary "I-escapee" from the symbolic. 
Freud comments in his obituary of Breuer (1925) that Breuees theoretical contribution 
to Studies on Hvsteria was "far from being out of date" ([1925) 5E XIX 280). That Breuer's 
ideas, absorbed into the work of Freud, are utilized without acknowledgement might be seen 
to support this view. This back-handed form of utilization, however, off-centres Breuer's 
theories due to their intercepted nature. The suggestions Breuer puts forward in the Studies 
may act as modifications upon the Freudian theory we have received and may activate further 
areas in Freud and Lacan in order to open up yet more rooms in an already many-storeyed 
theoretical house. From a critical point of view, Breuer's acute awareness of the dictates of 
vocabulary and metaphor in his writing raise epistemological questions with regard to the 
beginnings of psycho-analysis and the spaces of theorization it offers. 
"In the new house she hallucinated her old room": Hysterical Topology and the 
Phantasy of Gender 
"In the new house she hallucinated her old room": Hysterical Topology and the 
Phantasy of Gender' 
This section considers questions of psychical and bodily topology in relation to the temporal 
dimension of signification. It also seeks to examine the idea of gender as a phantasy, an 
activated figure of speech or an extended metaphor that we inhabit and live through via the 
configurations of ego constitution. It does so by considering notions of the imaginary and its 
relation to the 'the real' as it is encountered by the inhabited space of the subject. This is then 
related to textuality via the working of metaphoric structure through and in the flesh. It 
thereby questions the relation between text and gender, text and sex, text and body. 
The quotation in the title is from Josef Breuer's case history of 'Fr5ulein Anna 0. ' 
and it is to this famous first case history of psychoanalysis that I will refer in order to examine 
the relation of the space of metaphor to the space of the body in a cohesion of mind and 
matter. I will consider that there is a direct correlation here with the operative dynamic of the 
two scenes of the hysteric. I then go on to relate this to ideas of gender and argue that it is not 
so easily separable from biology, that somehow the biological body is a constantly reiterating 
sphere of metaphor by physical means. 
The separation of sex from gender, biology from culture, has become standard in 
feminist thought yet this separation raises problems because it does not question the 
parameters within which its careful manipulation of terminology takes place. It is 
problematic, for instance, around issues of sexuality. If sex and gender are separated, how do 
we fit the body into this scenario? In this separation of terms designed to escape determinist 
or essentialist accounts of en-gendering lies another determinism as our accounts within this 
framework are written through by a new vocabulary, made to fit a scheme of its own making. 
It would appear that these two terms - sex and gender - cannot be so easily separated and 
indeed are co-existent only within their own rhetorical framework. It is hoped that this section 
makes some contribution towards a new formulation of the bodily by offering a 
psychoanalytical phenomenology of the body. As the first interface between self and world, 
subject and other, the biological body must be reconsidered and written back into accounts of 
gender and the category 'gender' thereby challenged to the extent, perhaps, of being obsolete 
due to its dependence upon divisive and binaristic terminology. 
The section will make use of Breuer and Freud's theories on hysteria in conjunction 
with Freud's later formulations on ego constitution. These theories are then combined with 
those of Lacan so that the section is fully aware of its own activation of vocabulary through a 
retroactive reach-back through theoretical space and time. The theories of Paul Schilder are 
referred to in order to offer an energetic forerunner to some of Lacan's later theories on bodily 
topology, whilst offering an activating influence upon sexed positioning in corporeal terms. 
The section concentrates upon hysteria as a pathological area which offers a useful elucidation 
of theory due to being the 'germ-cell' or starting-point of all psychoanalytical theory. It is 
thereby able to offer a close working model of what psychoanalytical thought formulated itself 
in relation to and which then resulted in the proliferation of medical categories due to a 
theoretical positioning and vocabulary. The case history of 'Fraulein Anna 0. ' is the focus of 
this reading, due not only to its pertinent interest to any consideration of the area of bodily and 
psychical topology, but also because of its strategic interest as the seminal text of psycho- 
analysis. 
Biology 
Biology is truly a land of endless possibilities. 
(Freud Beyond the Pleasure Principl , 1920) 
Body and sexuality, biology and gender are implicitly related in the psychoanalytic scheme. 
In a sense, biology is destiny, to borrow Freud's famous dictum, but it is an unstable and 
unfixed destiny which is constantly shifting and rewritten, as fluid as bodily secretions. For 
there is no pre-given body, no originary biology, no flesh which has not been trained. For the 
speaking subject all is subject to the trace of the signifier. This is not to say that the flesh is 
written upon which would represent a passive body in discursive production, the tabula rasa. 
To the contrary, it is the locus of the activation of flesh and simultaneously a locus of 
activating flesh: the space of the body is a space of writing itself, an intertextual incorporation 
by which we image ourselves. Space becomes a seduction. 
Body Image: The seduction of space 
Thou hast clothed me with skin and flesh, and hast fenced me with bones and sinews. 
(Job 10.11) 
All there is for the flesh-habitation called T is the body-image by which we relate to our 
corporeal frame. This body-image is itself subject to continual shift according to our internal 
and external experience. Bodily space is labile, continually reassembling itself in an 
orthopaedic display of inhabitation and dis-inhabitation. In The Image and Appearance of the 
Human Body, Paul Schilder states that 
The image of the body is not a static phenomenon from the physiological point of 
view. It is acquired, built up, and gets its structure by a continual contact with the 
world. It is not a structure but a structural ization in which continual changes take 
place. .. (Schilder: 1935,173-4) 
Following on from the work of Schilder, Lacan presents a scheme where body image is 
implicit in the constitution of the ego. 'The mirror stage as formative of the function of the V 
(1949) presents the dispersed biology of a fragmented body assembled before the reflective 
surface of the other. This constitutive transitive relation between self and other had also been 
noted by Schilder: 
The postural model of our own body is connected with the postural model of the 
bodies of others ... We experience the body-images of others. Experience of our body-image and experience of the bodies of others are closely interwoven with each 
other. (Schilder: 1935,16) 
The complex of instincts and drives run through the 'virtual compl& of space as it is 
presented through the mirror of the other to what Lacan terms its "alienating destination": "the 
transformation that takes place in the subject when he assumes an image" (Lacan: 1977,2). 
'Subject' might be replaced by 'pre-subject' here in this inadequacy of grammar to provide us 
with a word for what is pre-subject as linguistics allows us no exit from its own grammatical 
and semantic spaces. This geometry of being is our spatial location invested with 'libidinal 
dynamism'. 
This jubilant assumption of his specular image by the child at the infans stage, still 
sunk in his motor incapacity and nursling dependence, would seem to exhibit in an 
62. 
exemplary situation the symbolic matrix in which the I is precipitated in a primordial 
form. .. (Lacan: 1977,2 - emphasis as original. ) 
This mirror of the other is one of flesh: its reflective surface made of skin, its frame is the 
bone which supports the ego. 
This then is the passage from the Innenwelt to the Uniwelt. Here a ni-econnaissance is 
operative so that the disassembled pre-subject may project itself in the dissembly that is the 
unified T. T is a statue into which the ego projects itself in order to operate in the world. 
This rigid configuration, what Lacan refers to as 'orthopaedic', is far from fixed, however, for 
it is by breaking out of the inner circle of the dyad that we enter into the endless configuration 
of the ego. This mirror 'stage' is the stadium A miroir: a never ending piece of theatre which 
constantly stages its drama of what Lacan terms "inexhaustible quadrature" (Lacan: 1977,4). 
In this scenario, T becomes a geometry of psychical planes. The effects of framing via the 
symbolic is not a stage to be passed through, indeed it is never past but continually present, 
continually re-enacted in a bid to confirm the stability of ego identification in the face of a 
radical alienation in the organism. This is where the seduction by space leads. 
... the subject, [is] caught up in the lure of spatial 
identification, the succession of 
phantasies that extends from a fragmented body-image to a form of its totality that I 
shall call orthopaedic - and, lastly, to the assumption of an armour of an alienating 
identity, which will mark with its rigid structure the subject's entire mental 
development. (Lacan: 1977,4) 
The body image then may be allied to an anatomy of fantasy. The subject is indeed caught up 
in the lure which it feeds back to itself in a psychic looping of seduction, it is seduced by the 
armature of'l'to which it must inevitably succumb. 
The body map is that by which we configure ourselves, it is the mapping of flesh by 
which we orient ourselves in a cartography of desire. On a more practical plane, the psychical 
investment in body image allows us to judge space, insert ourselves into gaps, orient ourselves 
round objects, insert objects even - putting pierced earrings in, guiding the object into that tiny 
puncture mark with amazing accuracy. Here is our own bodily geogaphy: the topology of 
self, the cartography of skin as we travel to and fro with this built-in body map. The ego 
investment in flesh may be illustrated by the phenomenon of the ghost limb, a space no longer 
occupied by flesh yet its fleshy sensations are still active in an hallucinated filled space. 2 The 
neurological patterns are so established and trained in their psychical runways. 
Skin: The Limits of the Ego 
In The Ego and the Id (1923), Freud makes several important references to the skin of the 
organism as central to the ego. The surface of the body is the interface between internal and 
external and is formative of consciousness, constituent in the ego. 
The ego is first and foremost a bodily ego; it is not merely a surface entity, but is itself 
the projection of a surface. (Freud: 1991,451)- 
This idea is continued in a footnote added to the English translation in 1927: 
Le. the ego is ultimately derived from bodily sensations, chiefly those springing from 
the surface of the body It may thus be regarded as a mental projection of the surface 
of the body... (Freud: 1991,451) 
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The "conscious ego", he says, "is first and foremost a body-ego. " The cutaneous surface of 
the body in the constitution of the ego is not prior to ego-configuration but constitutive of and 
interactive in it as the flesh is trained into zones, invested and fetishized with erotogenic 
sensation by the ego and the ego formed by these in the very same process. Here is a 
reciprocal interaction of psychical and bodily space as the human organism organizes the 
relational topology by which it traverses internal and external spaces. 
That the ego is formed in conjunction with the projection of the cutaneous surface of 
the body is indicative of the liminality of subjectivity. Here is a subjective intertext of skin, a 
dermodectic-bound volume. In Life and Death in Psychoanalysis, Jean Laplanche refers to 
the "sack of skin" in reference to the constitution of ego founded as it is upon an introjection 
of the other, a psychical act "modelled upon a bodily process". He states that identification 
with the other is "an identification with a form conceived of as a limit, or a sack: a sack of 
skin" (1985,81). Libidinal investment in the structure of the ego is a biological function, one 
is not reducible to the other but synonymous with it and involved in an interactive dynamic 
which incessantly reconstitutes itself in the face of a primary loss, a primal scene of absence. 
Some interesting "facts" about the skin borrowed from the world of biology state this - 
that it is the largest organ in the body, it "constitute[s] approximately one-eighth of the weight 
of a normal individual" (Wood and Bladon: 1985,1). And this - 
The epidermis arises from the embryonic ectoderm and forms most of the cutaneous 
appendages including the sweat and sebaceous glands, and the hair, and the nails. 
(Wood and Bladon: 1985,1) 
Freud, trained in medical biology and neurology, noted in Beyond the Pleasure Principl 
(1920) that "embryology [... ] actually shows us that the central nervous system originates 
from the ectoderm" (Freud: 1991,235). The cortex itself then is related to the ego. The skin 
of the organism, through its projected psychical surface, trains the receptors in excitability; the 
registration of pleasure and unpleasure is a matter closely allied to the formative relation with 
the other in the construction of the ego. Can T train a synapse how to leap the gap and does 
the leaping of that synapse in turn train my biology into an T? 
It would be easy to suppose, then, that as a result of the ceaseless impact of external 
stimuli on the surface of the vesicle [sic], its substance to a certain depth may have 
become permanently modified, so that excitatory processes run a different course in it 
from what they run in the deeper layers. (Freud: 1991,235) 
Schilder, with reference to ectodermic sensation, also notes that "[flt appears that all our 
internal sensations are in this sensitive zone close below the surface" (Schilder: 1935,89). 
The Perforated Ego 
The liminality of the body is important in figuring the boundaries of T, subject as they are to 
labile movement. The in-out orifices of the body through which we ingest and expel provide 
the loci of the biological processes upon which ego configuration lays claim, as the relation 
between self and other is usually based upon an aggressive introjective fantasy as the infant 
seeks to control its surroundings. These areas of anatomical boundary become invested with 
erotogenic meaning as it is in these places of perforation that the organism is socially trained 
and learns to transpose its sexual drive through the mechanism of Verwerfung (the Freudian 
concept of'refusal' later reworked by Lacan's notion of 'foreclosure! ). In the 'The Subversion 
of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire' (1960), Lacan specifically speaks of the the 
function of the cut in discourse and its relation to the "lips, 'the enclosure of the teeth, the rim 
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of the anus, the tip of the penis, the vagina, the slit formed by the eyelids, even the horn- 
shaped aperture of the ear" (Lacan: 1977,314-5). 
The orifices and rims of the body are the privileged sites of erotogenic investment, 
they set and by so doing represent a grammar of the body. Here is the locus of biology and 
culture in a clash of instinct and drive. These holes have been carefully trained; the etiquette 
of social attention has been especially attentive to these cuts in the bodily surface. These are 
the apertures through which the textuality of self becomes apparent. Kristeva speaks of this in 
Powers of Horror as "a primal mapping of the body" (Kristeva: 1982,72). Desire jumps these 
gaps and flickers over these bodily rims in the dialectic set up between one and other. It is in 
absence that we assert/insert ourselves, absence is the missing across which desire flickers 
incessantly. That these bodily apertures relate to the textuality of the subject may be borne out 
by examination of the famous first case history of psychoanalysis, Breuer's 'FrHulein Anna 0. ' 
Anna 0. presents her story through 'absences', activating an aperture, a lacuna in her text. It is 
in the face of absence that we signify. 
Here we may recall Freud's reference to a "hiatus" in Breuer's text; this textual hole in 
the case history is an absence in response to Bertha Pappenheim's hysterical pregnancy -a 
lacuna in response to an hallucinated erotic fullness. 3 In The Psychotherapy of Hysteria', 
Freud compares his own analytic practice to evacuating a cavity in the flesh: 
I have often in my own mind compared cathartic psychotherapy with surgical 
intervention. I have described my treatments as psychotherapeutic operationS and I 
have brought out their analogy with the opening up of a cavity filled with pus, the 
scraping out of a carious region, etc. 
(Breuer & Freud: 1991,392 - emphasis as original. ) 
We may think here of the analytical process of retrieval of the 'foreign body' of the primary 
scene trauma of hysteria. There is an operative eroticism of the hole in the organism. 
Physical development literally turns us outside-in. 
Invagination 
[N]ot because the sea urchin is a particularly interesting animal... 
(Breuer, 'Fidulcin Anna 0. ' 1991,96) 
In biological terminology, the physical process of turning outside-in has been specified by the 
use of the term 'invagination'. Its representative dimension has been utilized by Merleau- 
Ponty in The Phenomenology of Perceptio (1962) to comment upon the ambiguous interface 
between one and other in phenomenological perception; he thereby offers a philosophical 
reading of a biological term. It is to its biological employment that I wish to return for a 
moment. In his Introductoly Lectures (1916-1917), Freud refers to "W. Bblscbe's valuable 
book" to posit a phylogenetic origin of the development of the libido; this gives an 
evolutionary nature to the constitution of the ego. The popular work of Wilhelm 1361sche 
(1861-1917), Love-Life inNature (1898-1903. Trans. into English 1931) comments on the use 
of mouth-intestine orifices in sexual union, what he referred to as 'anal love' in both sexes, as a 
practice drawn from primitive organic development (1361sche: 1931,673). It is important to 
note that 1361sche's formulation utilizes the work of Ernst Haekel (1834-1919) on primeval 
development (1874 and 1875). Haekel posited that all multicellular organisms share a 
4 common pattern of early development via invagination in order to form a stomach . From this 
primeval gastrea, other invaginations follow to form the mouth, ears, eyes, anus, vagina, etc. 
Simple marine organisms such as the sea sponge and sea urchin with its exo-skeletal structure 
are used as fixated examples of this primary process to relate to the development of the human 
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embryo with its formation of apertures of the cutaneous surface. We can, through this 
embryological model in which the external membrane is turned outside in so that even the 
cortex is itself related implicitly to the interfacing ectoderm, gesture towards an understanding 
of ego formation as itself of an invaginated nature. This then forms an armature of being for 
the organism so that the cultural and organic may be seen to be so intertwined as to be 
inseparable. Didier Anzieu, in The Skin Ego (1989 [1985]), also comments upon this 
biological phenomenon of invagination and the intimate relation between the cortex and the 
ectoderm. He asks the question, "what if thought were as much an affair of the skin as of the 
brain? And what if the Ego - now defined as a Skin Ego - had the structure of an envelope? " 
(Anzieu: 1989,9). This suddenly makes the sea urchin seem a particularly interesting animal, 
offering a physical model of what might be regarded as the most simple form of 
phenomenology by process: an holistic metaphor. By positing this simple organism as a 
metaphor in the living flesh, I am of course turning terminology inside out in order to draw 
attention to how such terminology operates, drawn as it is from the regions of rhetoric 
interpoised with physical procedure. If the hysterical symptom is to be regarded as a 
metaphoric substitution in the flesh, making visible upon the interface of the organism what is 
invisible and 'buried' within its psychical apparatus, does it not appear that the organism is 
simply culturally reiterating a corporeal rhetoric which has become systemic? The 
developmental process of turning outside-in is a spatial procedure in biology which has its 
psycho-textual parallel in Freud's 'partial instincts'of the sex drive. The partial instinct always 
backs around itself and returns to base passing through the rim of the body in its passage. 
Lacan actually describes this process as one of invagination in The Four Fundamental 
Concepts of Psychoanalysis: 
Does it not seem that the drive, in this turning inside out represented by its pocket, 
invaginating through the erogenous zone, is given the task of seeking something that, 
each time, responds in the Other? (Lacan: 1994,196) 
That the drive is searching for a reflection indicates a parallelism at the level of the organism 
which points us to the primal narcissistic economy of ego configuration based in transitivism. 
Lacan uses a diagram to illustrate the recuperative path of the partial drive as it 
embarks on its backward journey (Lacan: 1994,178). This parallels the linguistic base of the 
subject as it is activated bodily illustrated by the four Che voui? graphs (Lacan: 1977,303, 
306,313,315). The rim of the organism formed in invagination is retroactively invested with 
erotogenic sensation; it is privileged in the zoning of the body according to the fetish of 
culture. In the Lacanian scheme here presented, this process has its linguistic parallel in the 
retroactive path of the signifier in its recuperation of a lost object; it sets sail on a course of 
desire which inevitably leads it back to the place from which it set off as unsatisfied as ever 
before. Now we are in the realm of the invaginated text because just as the bodily surface is 
itself presented as a series of rims and holes to be contextualized and textualized so too it 
offers itself as model of texual mechanics. Metaphor is made flesh as the terminology of 
biology is transpositioned by that of philosophical phenomenology, "a symptom being a 
metaphor in which flesh or function is taken as a signifying element" (Lacan: 1977,166). 
What is imaginary becomes 'real' via its framing rigidity. The body which is textualized 
becomes the forerunning paradigm of all metaphorical substitution which takes place in the 
body of the text which becomes its subliminal counterpart, its sophisticated substitute which, 
once taken into a geography of its own making via the tools of rhetorical interplay, actually 
feeds back into the body per se. This constitutes an area of feed-back into the organic by the 
cultural mechanisms of the trained organism. 
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Textual Invagination 
The textual aperture is the hole by which we enter, the rim of the organic text we traverse in 
our encounter with the signifier. The outer edge of the text is the point of narrative 
investment, it points up the boundary of the story: what is said and what is unsaid are 
operative within its presence as hole. This presence-absence oscillation presents us with the 
condition seconde of the text. The fading of the signifier as it passes through the rim of the 
absence present in the text provides the dynamic of the text. Here we may think of the cut-up 
of the textual body into sections, its beginnings and endings, chapters, headings, division of 
word groups. All texts are produced in relation to zero-being, a reaction to loss. There is a 
reverse chronology operative which refers back and thereby completes its meaning with the 
last term which activates the preceding terms thereby cutting across spatio-temporal ordering 
and upsetting the teleology of the sentence, "each term being anticipated in the construction of 
the others, and, inversely, sealing their meaning by its retroactive effect" (Lacan: 1977,303). 
In a reverse chronology which correlates with hysterical recall of trauma, narrative is 
5 haunted by ghosts of the primary scene in its backward recollection. Anna O's narrative 
flows backwards day by day, according to the private diary of her mother to which Breuer 
refers. 6 The retrograde effect of the signifier in its path of desire relates to the retroactive 
affect as it links to the looping path of the partial drive. This compelled return of the signifier 
refers us forward to the repetition compulsion due to the reiterable nature of desire in relation 
to the compelling need to reinstate the ego in the face of an irrecoverable loss. 
Repetition Compulsion: The dimension of the lost object 
I dayly must learn anew to find myself.. 
('Report by Bertha Pappenheirn on Her Illness' [1882]: Hirschnf6ller: 1978, 
297. Original written in English, spelling as original. ) 
Re-configuring T is a process which never ends. The concept of T is in perpetual shift, 
constituted as it is in insecure and powerless circumstances as a response of the organism to 
the armature that maintains it. Freud describes this process in Beyond the Pleasure Principle 
(1920) in the famous Yorl-da' game in which he observed his grandson playing with a cotton 
reel, throwing it out of its cot and retrieving it in a game of repetition by which he consoled 
himself for the absence of his mother. By doing so, he gains power in his powerlessness. 
Here then is the story with which Freud illustrates the genesis of the repetition compulsion as 
the ego is constituted in the dimension of the lost object. In no-space'l' configure. 
The presence of the organism 'I' with its topology of drives inhabits a framework of 
absence. We endlessly compensate the lost object with the language which replaces it, 
stuffing the cavities of our mouths with words in a repeated substitution attempt. Words jump 
in the other's place. The topology of the lost object is still active as a ghost running through 
and through the performance. Linguistics and the topology of the body are intrinsically 
related: here is the hysterical typology of the body. It is the hysteric's "sudden loss" for which 
she must compensate, transposing the libidinal investment in the lost focus to a phantasy 
located in her own body: a rigid limb, a contracture, a tic. This configuration through which 
we re-present ourselves and project ourselves into this grammatical armature called 'I' is pure 
phantasy, an insistent circuit of hallucination. Based as it is upon a lacuna (and here it links 
with those body holes), it is through the act of affirming myself for others that T pass through 
the shadows of deathliness. Freud's discussion of the repetition compulsion implicit in the sex 
drive is inherently linked to the concept of the death drive. In the en-gravement of the 
signifier, I erect myself, an assumption which has passed through the valley of death. 
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It is in effect as a desire for death that he affirms himself or others ... and no being is ever evoked for him except among the shadows of death. 
To say that this mortal meaning reveals in speech a centre exterior to 
language is more than metaphor; it manifests a structure. (Lacan: 1977: 105) 
In his reading of Freud in 'The agency of the letter in the unconscious or reason since 
Freud' (1957), Lacan uses the term 'instance' to 
_purvey 
this orgiastic repetition of identity 
operative even at the level of the signifier. In Ecrits: A Selection (1977), Alan Sheridan 
translates Lacan's use of the term 'instance' as 'agency' but 'instance' gives a better 
indication via word play of the irrepressible and urgent nature of the signifier as revertant and 
its structuring of identity for "it is in the chain of the signifier that the meaning 'insists"' 
(Lacan: 1977,153). In addition to this insistent power, the word also carries connotations of 
solicitation and legal power so that the authority of the letter is also represented in the use of 
'instance'. 7 This compelled retrograde return of the signifier refers us forward to the 
compulsion to repeat. It is the compulsion to repeat which facilitates signification so that it is 
possible to say that the ego is an implicitly reiterative structure. This is because 'I' is never 
fully formed but always and ever in process, it is constantly re-staged in the stadium of the 
subject. Its reiterative construction is always in the face of dissolution and, it must be 
stressed, because of the threat of such dissolution. 'I' must constantly assert myself in order 
to avoid having my '1' cut off. 
This repetition compulsion is due, it may be seen, to an acute anxiety at the base of 
the ego; there is a constitutive insecurity in the identificatory processes of the organism. In 
the face of the loss of the object, we are powerless and need to compensate in order to control 
and thereby master loss. Here there is an aggressive mastery at work in the very depths of 
powerlessness: the master-slave dialectic, borrowed from Hegel, is reworked by Lacan to 
relate to the paranoic base of subject constitution. 8 The subject lives under a sentence then. 
Compelled to repeat in order to continually reassert 'l' in the phantasm/mirage of a unified 
ego, the subject incessently sloughs off this mortal coil of the signifier to rise again through its 
affective excess. This excess is produced in spite of the signifler's function, for the more 
insistent and authoritative the signifier is in its purpose, the more it slips up in the excess 
which it produces. 
As we remember the insistent return of the partial instincts of the sex drive, compelled 
to be cut short in their passage due to risk of total annihilation of the organism (petit 111ort of 
orgasm), we may link text here with sex. Because the set up of sexuality is crossed through 
with the function of the cut in signification, it may be noted that sexuality is closely positioned 
to the death-drive. The sexual drive is therefore a melancholic structure as it compulsively 
seeks to recapture a posited wholeness prior to primal loss through a bio-cultural iterative 
imperative. There is also an active linking ofjouissance here as an excess of enjoyment which 
returns to transgress the limits of pleasure and seek death. Performative iterability and 
deathliness may here be seen to be implicitly linked. It is at this bodily-textual crossroads 
where sex, biology, and sexuality are presented in drives and instincts that the affects of a 
cutural interpellation of named bodies can be seen in action, operative as the metaphoric 
phantasy through which we live. In a scenario which presents itself as deceptively binaristic 
due to the vocabulary available to it, the instinct itself may be seen to be operative as a writing 
agency whilst being written into place as it transmutes into the dimension of drive. In the 
space of the body, biology is both harnessed and harnessing for on the one hand it proffers the 
idea of the phenomena of untutored flesh whilst operating as an academic-scientific category 
within which any concept or postulation of the fleshly is placed. Is there any place where the 
flesh does not pass beneath the shadow of the sign? 
b. 5 
Hysterical Typology: The space of the sign 
The hysteric symptom reveals the structure of a language, and is deciphered like an 
inscription... (Lacan: 1977,50) 
The links of the repetition compulsion with the reiterability of the organism cross-sectioned by 
the death-drive has a tied link with the condition seconde of the hysteric. 9 The whole of Anna 
O. 's story is constructed around a death, an activated hiatus in her text - it is a concatenation of 
stories spinning around a central absence: the withdrawal of the libidinally invested object. 
These are the stories of a young woman waiting by a death-bed, nursing her sexual drive until 
it becomes transposed upon representations of the paternal function written in her own flesh. 
(it is indeed this over-investment in the paternal function - represented in her self by the 
articulate and multiple acquisiton of the symbolic - which explains her precocious linguistic 
access. ) Not for nothing does Josef Breuer compare sick-bed nursing with being in love. 
(Breuer and Freud: 1991,314) She is compelled to tell and tell again her stories round a hole. 
Anna 0. "talk[s] herself out" (Breuer and Freud: 1991,79), her symptom speaks her: she is the 
performative of her own words. Her text is written through with punctuations of the body, 
marked by muscular pulsions and biological rhythms. Her language is of the flesh: performed 
through the body. What is repressed returns. 
The symbol is here the signifier of a signified repressed from the consciousness of 
the subject. A symbol written in the sand of the flesb... (Lacan: 1977,69) 
Writing with reference to the self-induced 'hypnoid states' as he referred to the delusions of 
hysteria, Breuer states in his 'Theoretical' contribution to Studies on Hysteria that "the 
hysterical symptom remained restricted to the hypnotic state and is strengthened there by 
repetition. " He continues, stating that "the repetition of them has ... 'imprinted' them into the body" (Breuer and Freud: 1991,295,299). 
This points to the performative plane of narrative and the fleshy space by which it 
presents itself. The repetitive imperative is that which injects the body of narrative with what 
has already been narrated and projects it forward by pointing backwards into the impulse of a 
new performance. In 'The subversion of the subject and the dialectic of desire', Lacan 
describes the retroactive affect of the signifter as it recuperates its treasure, i. e. the object a as 
fantasy of desired wholeness (Lacan: 1977,292ff). This might be cross-sectioned with the 
performative plane of narrative to highlight the materiality of the signified affect in terms of 
shaping the flesh, thereby altering the terms of biology. The narrative itself is a phantom 
pregnancy as Dr. B's child is born over and over again in each re-reading: its textual space is 
stuffed full of the marks under which the signified is supposed to obligingly slide. Yet the 
performative imperative of grammar and the hallucination it produces in hysteria might be 
indicative of a process which may not be so easily shaken off due to the deeply textual and 
contextual dimension of flesh. The separation of 'sex' from 'gender' in feminist theory may 
be seen to clear a space in which to theorize culturative influence and to question and 
challenge essentializing and naturalizing discourses fluctuating around 'biology'. Such 
academic practice, however, must be recognized as raising a new set of problems 
disseminated by the feedback of terminology to itself. In its qualification and establishment of 
the category 'gender' lies an integral acceptance of the term 'sex' as somehow discrete and 
independent from gendered positionality in a manner which ignores the phylogenetic 
development of ego in a holistic dimension of what we conveniently term the 'cultural' and 
'biological' in representative practice. Interestingly, such practice also simultaneously ignores 
the phylogenetics of theoretical rhetoric and vocabulary itself which also seeks to assert itself 
reiteratively. The interface between one and other, inside and outside, subject and object is 
wholly called into question when such terminology breaks down. Within the domain of 
discipline, vocabulary must be called to account due to its profulgation of such categories of 
thinking. There is need of a new formulation of phenomenological experience of the body in 
co-relation with the psychical which recognizes that itcrability may indicate a performance 
which the organism is not in control of. 
Gender Phantasy: The signified sexual symptom 
Hysterical hallucination correlates with the lived phantasy of gender: the solidified metaphor, 
the signifter made flesh. This is the sexual passion of the word which would become 'me'. 
Gender is nothing but a textual hallucination as the refusal of biology transposes itself upon 
the other scene of a theoretical space. Gender must be constantly and compulsively reasserted 
and repeated as a phantasy hallucinated in 'the real'. Speaking of 'foreclosure, Lacan states in 
his Seminar If: The Psychoses that "whatever is refused in the symbolic order, in the sense of 
Verwerfung, reappears in the real" (Lacan: 1993,13). What is refused in conscious psychical 
space does not simply disappear, it simply resurfaces in 'the real'. The signifier turns inside 
out displaying its visceral apparatus to become what it says it is: it enters the referent. 
Anna O's refusal of the loss of her "adored father" in psychical terms has an affect in 
physical terms as the forced withdrawal of libidinal investment transposes itself - in a reversal 
of the phantom limb scenario - on another part of the body in hallucination. This is the result 
of a trans-position, an occupation of parallel spaces: Anna feels that she has two selves, that 
she occupies both a new house and her old room (Breuer and Freud: 1991,86). The "two 
scenes" of the hysteric might be compared to a dyadic structure which emulates the subject- 
other relation which underscores all the moves T might make, directed as they are at obtaining 
the reflective recognition of an other. In Breuer's account, Anna 0. "'cross[es] over"' to the 
condition seconde in order to tell her stories, her narratives require her to take up a position of 
otherness within her self in order to direct her speech to an other (Hirschmiiller: 1989,282). 
These doubling manoeuvres are analogous of the turned outside-in movement of 
embryological development which is the forerunning base of ego constitution if, with Freud, 
we regard the ego as the projection of a surface, a psychical entity intimately consitituted in 
and by an armature of the skin. In Anna O's illness, which causes a co-existence yet radical 
separation of scenes, we may trace the interplay of signifier with body through the manifest 
symptom. Illness gives us a clue to 'normal' structures which run a path close to the 
pathological. In our 'normal' state, we are free to designate separation of terms to facilitate 
theorizing - sex and gender, body and mind, for example - yet 'normality' indicates that 
signifier and body have become implicit one to the other, masquerading as seamless until 
disrupted by psychical disturbance. In our theorizing which requires us to carry conceptual 
notions within vocabulary whilst being fully implemented and produced by such vocabulary, 
we occupy a thinking position which posits two scenes. 'P who theorize am hysterical whilst 
'1' place myself as central through the act of theorizing. When we theorize, we do so as a 
coherent 'P, we are obliged to speak from the position of a projected unity, our 'scenes' neatly 
stacked and collated, inter-related and fully cross-referencing in varying configurations 
according to changing circumstances. It is perhaps only the ability to live through and 
maintain the illusion of a unified 'I' - the ability of self-consciously sustain metaphor - which 
separates normality from abnormality. It would seem that the parallelism required by such 
terminology as sex and gender, whilst it offers itself as new vocabulary with which to counter 
old divisive vocabulary, reproduces yet more binaristic parallelism so that theory becomes, in 
Anzeiu's terms, an envelope to itself. As 'gender' itself becomes naturalised within feminist 
discourse, it too must come under scrutiny as a theoretical concept in its reproductive 
capacity. 
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Hysteric Typology: Oedipal disturbance 
Anna 0. displays a number of different language disturbances typical to diagnosed hysteria. 
In his study of the life and work of Josef Breuer, Albrecht Hirschm6ller reproduces a 
document from Kreuzlingen Sanatorium which is Breuer's case history of Pappenheim 
contemporary with her treatment. In this report, Breuer writes that his patient had suffered 
from complete aphasia "for about 2 weeks" after being offended by her father (Hirschmaller: 
1978,282). For some part of the time, she loses the capacity to communicate in her native 
German language; divided from her mother tongue, she is able to communicate only in 
English. She writes in a report on her illness that 1, a native German girl, am now totaly 
deprived of the faculty to understand or to read German" (HirschnUler: 1978,296 - in 
English in original, spelling as original). 
Linguistic access or non-access indicates an organic or psycbical base of origination 
and as such may be unique in offering a psycho-somatic scenario which offers itself as a 
knotting of physical and mental processes which may not be separated but only re-tied in a 
different configuration to enable normal functioning according to cultural convention. 
Aphasia or its antithetical counterpart of manifold language by which Anna 0. communicates 
during her illness constitute linguistic disturbance which may be considered as indicative of a 
disturbance at the level of ego configuration. Such disturbance also, however, demonstrates 
how intimate the links are between ego and somatic organization. If, in the process of 
transitivism, the ego has absorbed the projected ego of the other through the screen of the ego 
ideal, this results in a space of virtual reality based upon a transitivity between self and other 
so that "[e]very observer is largely under the influence of his observation" (Breuer and Freud: 
1991,312). Here the interface between self and other, subject and object is a permeable 
interface which is jealously guarded in direct ratio to the perceived fragility or strength of its 
consitution. When Anna O. 's father dies, the qualifying object of her subjectivity is 
withdrawn, the object of her intense observation is removed and her ego constructed and tied 
together with bonds of love is cast adrift in a shattering encounter with 'the real'. Grief at this 
loss finds its symptom in a bodily absorption of the signifier: the body becomes the word. 
The two scenes of the signifier transpose until it be-comes itself and breaks down distinction 
between metaphor and metonymy, displacement and condensation. 
It is here that we can see the linking of space and ego again, especially if we remind 
ourselves of the hallucinated space in the symptomatology of the hysteric so that while she 
occupies one space she hallucinates another, thereby living in two rooms. The substitution, 
through foreclosure/refusal, of the genital with other parts of the body is a process of 
transpositioning. Schilder states that "[w]hat goes on in one part of the body may be 
transposed to another part of the body ... There is said to a transposition from one part of the body to another part of the body. One part may be symbolic of the other" (Schilder: 1935, 
171). This metaphoric substitution of the body becomes an hallucination: it enters 'the real' of 
the patient. 
This represents a challenge to the Oedipal structure yet it is the Oedipal structure 
which actively produces this dissent by off-centering precisely through encouraging over- 
investment in the paternal function as it figures within this scenario. 10 For such a challenge to 
be understood, we must conceive of the Oedipal not as a stage but as a constantly reiterating 
structure operative within all symbolic acts that the organism engages in "since by binding 
himself in signification he is placed under the sign of the pre-conscious" (Lacan: 1977,299). 
It is synonomous with the function of the cut in Lacanian discourse. With reference to 
analysis, Lacan says that "we must bring everything back to the function of the cut in 
discourse, the strongest being that which acts as a bar between the signifier and the signified" 
(1977,299). If this bar is tied to the Oedipal prohibition, barring the subject from what must 
not be admitted consciously, (although still operative and actively formative of the subject, 
however, ) we must ask why it is necessary that it be repetitively asserted and strenuously 
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protected through legislative and cultural codes which make of it a negative law. Such over- 
investment and perpetual assertion might be seen to indicate excessive fragility where such a 
show of strength oscillates. 
As a structural repetition which seeks to continually establish the boundaries of the 
organism, (here the ego may be regarded as an organic process, ) the Oedipal drama is one in 
which substitutive energy is constantly transubstantiated not just psychically but also in the 
flesh which is the warm metaphor of the living signifier. Because the irresistible return of the 
signifier is not always to the same place from where it set off due to the viscissitudes of its 
journeying trajectory in relation to desire, the act of signification may be seen to off-centre 
itself through its very process. This would constitute a challenge to the Oedipal through the 
Oedipal and as such might effect some modulation in the monolithic incest taboo as that 
prohibition upon which cultural ordering rests. 
If, through incest taboo modulation, the bar between the signifier and the signified is 
traversed, and if we follow Lacan in his reversal of The Saussaurian scheme by privileging 
signifier over the signified, then it is the signifier which occupies the place of primacy and 
becomes active in the jump into the signified. The relation between signifier and signified 
will therefore no longer be arbitrary. On the contrary, by the reiterative (and culturally 
agreed) use of the signifier in conjunction with the signified, the trans-figuration into 'the real' 
constitutes a performative grammar. By jumping the bar into 'the real', the signifiler becomes 
itself, it is what is says it is, it no longer refers but is referent. This is not to say that, in 
jumping out of its designated place, the signifier does not continue to function in discourse but 
rather that this forced symbiosis occurs synonomously with its 'normal' functionalism. It is 
through such an understanding that we may then trans-functionalize the signifier. From here 
we may turn to consider the topology of a decentred sign: a typological space, to play upon a 
substituted letter. 
Topology of a decentred sign 
The reassertion and continual performance of the signifier results in a shift in the status of the 
signified. Here is true primacy to the signifier as that which is named is instilled in its name: 
this then is the 'In principio'of hysteria. The word is the thing. This hysteric extreme draws 
attention to how the subject dis-places itself through 'normal' signification. Normative 
displacement occurs during linguistic operation and this relates to the loss trauma constitutive 
of the ego. Freud says that "every developmental process carries with it the seed of a 
pathological disposition" (Freud: 1995,71-2). There is a psychotic base to the 'normal' 
individuation process from which we may never escape but may instead produce decentering 
displays in our captivity by which we may challenge the normative whilst contained and 
enabled within its structuration. The normative is, therefore, to be regarded as both enabling 
and displacing. 
The signifier will be seen tojump its own bounds, it literallyjumps out of its skin as it 
crosses the bar that holds it in place and lives beneath the surface of another, lodged as an 
activating "foreign body": a hypnoid kinesis. 11 The signified becomes synonymous with the 
signifier so that the flesh is the word. It is in the realm-of'the real' that we signify hysterically. 
Word and flesh write themselves together in the place of solidified metaphor. As the 
metonymic chain is arrested, metaphor becomes frozen as the signified is fully replaced by the 
signifier. The body comes to bear the signifier of its sex. But if the signifier of its sex is 
already 'mis-placed' according to the body-image of the individual in accordance with 
Schilder's representation - he says that, "we shall have a variation in the structure of the body- 
image according to the psychosexual tendencies of the individual" - then new transformations 
of the body-sexuality rhetoric may occur which must radically shift any theorization of gender 
per se (Schilder: 1935,124-5). In his discussion of body image and sexuality, Schilder writes, 
?2 
Manifold investigations and experiments have shown me clearly that the difference in 
the libidinous structures is reflected in the structure of the postural model of the body. 
Individuals in whom a partial desire is increased will feel the particular point of the 
body, the particular erogenic zone belonging to the desire, in the centre of their body- 
image. It is as if energy were amassed on these particular points. There will be lines 
of energy connecting the different erogenic points, and we shall have a variation in the 
structure of the body-image according to the psychosexual tendencies of the 
individual. (Schilder: 1935,124-5 - my emphasis) 
In this scenario, the structuration of the body is in accordance with a desire felt in the flesh 
which correlates with "the psychosexual tendencies of the individual,,. ' 2 This is far removed 
from the postulation of biological destiny of which psychoanalysis is often accused. The 
reception of psychoanalysis in this biology=destiny fashion may occur because we have not 
shifted our inherited philosophical base which insists upon a binaristic model. The difficulties 
in the conception of such a model may also lie in the vagaries of linguistics itself Language, 
rooted in lack, is always a cover-up, always a transmission from one to other and therefore 
dependent upon lack and articulated towards a fantasied fullness in order to constitute itself 
Perhaps the difficulties of an holistic understanding of the intricate interlacing of flesh and 
culture is due to the vocabulary which obliges a division of terms: flesh and culture. Any 
symbolic framework must posit a here and a there due to its substitutive imperative which is 
after all thrown into the face of absence so that representation is tied with the death of the real 
thing. Here the place of 'the real' is riddled with deathliness for its backward passage to 
complete satisfaction is where the organism encounters the shadow of death. This place of 
radical subversion in the Oedipal is a place of delight and a place of danger. 13 By turning 
outside in repeatedly via our encounters with the other through the bodily interface, we 
traverse the revenant signifier in the flesh. By so doing we may challenge gender as a textual 
space but we do this in face of a danger of actually failing back through the holes and 
encountering the other into which we may be fully absorbed, full satisfaction obtained at a 
mortal cost: an impasse of our own making. 
Gende : The necessary phallus 
In terms of the morphology of the text, we may not exit its body but must remain within its 
economy to retain the narrative affect, just as there is no exit from the symbolic. For we may 
only negotiate space through the idea of space, can only be subversive when there is a law, 
can only signify if there is a mechanism to button movement: take away the armature and this 
endless glissement leads nowhere - only to a dazzling display. We are already inserted within 
its spatio-temporal arena of the signifier, it already holds us firmly within its literary lips. Our 
challenge to it is therefore dependent upon it even though formulated in resistance to it. 
Foucault states that no form of resistance can ever be anterior to that which it is resisting. He 
says that: 
Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this 
resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power. 
(Foucault: 1990,95) 
It is the slippage of the reiterated form that is of interest. In spite of itself, the authorized 
symbolic offers subversion: power offers us its undoing in its very operation. It is in the 
desperate reiterative process of the performative that the symbolic slips up. If the normalizing 
process needs reiteration, its base must be insecure. Here between the signifier and the 
signified is a place of ambivalence, representing as it does a challenge to the incest taboo on 
which the symbolic is overlaid. The idea of transgressing the incest taboo upon which 
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western cultural signification and symbolization is based brings us back full circle to Anna 
O. 's substitution of the paternal function in herself as object-ideal. Here is slippage in the 
Oedipal function as it constantly needs to reassert itself through symbolic representation. This 
constant need to repeat points to fragility at the constitutive base and this must be the locus of 
new possible configurations in the narrative of the subject. 
In reproducing the model of mind and body, sex and gender, we demonstrate 
seduction via grammatical practice and notional division. We may be seen to enter the 
solidified space of our own commonly received metaphor and fail to question our own 
rhetoric. In his contribution to Studies on Hysteria, Breuer uses the metaphor of a many- 
storeyed house to illustrate the idea of psychical space, he then warns against the "danger of 
allowing ourselves to be tricked by our own figures of speech" (Breuer and Freud: 1991,307). 
As a post-structuralist exercise, let us think of the word 'gender', let us think of the two spaces 
of this sign. 
Gender: signifier Gender: signified 
[Sight+Sound] [Concept] 
In a feminist scheme, these spaces of gender are then traversed by sex and sexuality, adding 
more rooms to an already problematic linguistic topology. At what point does the space of the 
signifier 'gender' become en-fleshed, at what point is biology conceptualized as gendered? 
Where is the referent of 'gender'? Does gender as a concept have any entry into 'the real'? Is 
it possible that its entry into the real is merely the effect of a reiterated metaphor which would 
mean that there is no such thing as gendered space at all? If there is no such thing as gendered 
space, it must exist only as a phantasy of a lived system of rhetoric. In 'The Seven Veils of 
Fantasy', Zizek writes that 
The first thing to note is that a fantasy does not simply realize a desire in a 
hallucinatory way. Its function is rather that of a Kantian 'transcendental 
schematism'. A fantasy constitutes our desire, provides its coordinates, i. e. it literally 
'teaches us how to desire'. (Zizek: 1998,19 1) 
It is this systemic phantasy of gender which haunts us for it correlates with the 
hallucinated 'real' of the hysteric where the word has become enfleshed. In this scenario, we 
are all of us in the grip of a possession by a frozen metaphor. Only by repositioning the 
biological with respect to textualizing the body can any configurative subversion take place in 
gender. Indeed, it would be necessary to fully excise 'gender' from the vocabulary as a 
misleading and divisive chimera. There is a need for new interactivity of biology and gender, 
sex and sexuality in a superimposition which is actively constitutive of this visceral 
concatenation of signifiers. To negotiate this, we need to re-negotiate the "old room[s]" of 
theory in an unhinging of terminology with which we have become familiar to search out a 
new grammar by which T am identified lest in our new house we simply hallucinate 'old 
rooms' and be led by the hand of rhetoric to ignore the "endless possibilities" of biology. 
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PART 11: Textual Production 
"I have no story to tell! ": Maternal Rage in Susan Hill's The Woman in Black 
"I have no story to tell! ": Maternal Rage in Susan Hill's The Woman in Black' 
This section considers Susan Hill's novel The Woman in Black, a text which, despite its 
adaption by Stephen Mallatrat into a long-running theatrical production for the West End, has 
received little critical attention in terms of literary analysis. This reading makes use of 
psychoanalytical and post-structuralist theory to comment upon the location of the writing 
subject and the production of narrative in relation to a maternal presence operating as a 
schematic absence in Hill's text. Just as the fictional mother haunts the textual production of 
Hill's main character, Victorian ghost story motifs and textual references haunt the storyline of 
her novel so that a mechanics of intertextuality may be seen to operate within its literal 
dimension. Its own narrative mechanism also offers a haunting from within as stories within 
story are unravelled so that just as the narrative 'I' is haunted by its terrible tale, the story 
itself is revealed within another layer of narrative. This presents us with a complex 
interleaving of narration reminiscent of the convoluted narrative structure of Emily Bronte's 
Wuthering Heights except that in this parodic tale "the wind did not moan through the 
casement" (Hill: 1983,95). 2 
The intertextual references contained in the textual body of The Woman in Black 
function by means of the implied extra-textual presence which is actually a mechanics of 
operative absence in the textual structure. The storyline is haunted by these other texts which 
pre-exist it and relies upon the reader's recollection of past textual encounters which may be 
called up by the interpretative act. This scenario of reading echoes the replay of past events to 
which Kipps is subjected in his own psychical arena. When the affairs of Mrs. Drablow are 
first related to him, he notes that "[tlhe business was beginning to sound like something from 
a Victorian novel. .. " (28) He later describes Eel Marsh House as "like the house of poor Miss Havisham" (61). The activation of such comments rely upon the reader's recognition of 
the motifs, characters and conventions of Victorian texts. Wilkie Collins' The Woman in 
MLhite (1860) is an absent presence in the text due the inference carried in its title. Kipps may 
be said to occupy the place of the detective in a structure which is dependent for the success of 
its revelatory movement upon the depiction of tantalizing suspense. What is hidden provides 
the page-turning impetus to reveal whilst its horror is directly dependent upon remaining 
concealed. To stave off his terror of the unknown, Kipps reads the poetry of John Clare and 
Sir Walter Scott's The Heart of Midlothian (93-4,107) as if wishing to displace himself from 
his 'present' situation by being absorbed into texts tied to other spaces and places. It is 
perhaps ironic that Clare's poem, 'I Am' contains the lines, 
I long for scenes, where man hath never trod 
A place where woman never smiled or wept (Ricks: 1987,169) 
Another character who reads himself to sleep due to the affects of an unsettling haunting is 
Professor Parkins in the M. R. James short story, 'Oh, Whistle, and I'll Come to You, My 
Lad'. Events of the day cause him to "get out a book" whilst being contained within the pages 
of one (James: 1994,83). The Professor, formerly possessed of a certainty that ghosts are 'not 
real', is haunted by a nothing which comes in answer to a whistle. The name of this short 
story will be recognized as the title of Hill's chapter, 'Whistle and I'll Come to You' in which 
Spider the dog comes to his name in a direct performative result of the auditary signifier. It is 
interesting that another dimension is added to this intertextual scenario by James' implied 
reference to the Robert Burns' poem, 'Oh, Whistle, and I'll Come to You, My Lad'. This 
tertiary haunting of text within text within text is analogous to the mechanics of the story with 
which we are presented in which Jennet's story is contained within Kipps' narration of the 
ghost story which is recollectively placed within his primary narration with which the text 
opens. This results in a breakage of the narrative '1' which becomes dislocated in its very 
localized existence tied as it is to the conventions of textual representation. 'F becomes 'not- 
F in this intrusion of sign systems one into the other. 
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Kipps writes his ghost story against the stereotyped conventions of the Victorian 
ghost story, his tale will not tell of "dank charnel houses and overgrown graveyards, of 
footsteps creaking upon staircases and fingers tapping at casements, of howlings and 
shriekings, groanings and scuttlings and the clanking of chains. .. " (17) His story thereby 
posits itself to be 'more true', 'more real'; his is not a tale to be told out loud for the 
delectation of others because "ftlhe truth is quite other, and altogether more terrible" (19). His 
story is one in which the Victorian ghost story is cut across by a twentieth-century awareness 
of the psychical processes forwarded by psychoanalytical theory. Childhood memories 
interplay with a recurrent replay of trauma and affects of the unconscious undercut any full or 
stable presence that this narrator might lay claim to so that his I was living in another 
dimension" (82). Kipps writes that, 
I knew now that I had entered some hitherto urnimagined - indeed, unbelieved-in - 
realm of consciousness, that coming to this place had already changed me and that 
there was no going back. (72) 
This realm of consciousness is one analogous to the locus of a transferential desire set up 
within the dimensions of the text as it is transmitted from one to the other. It is an arena in 
which the absent is given agency in its very vacancy. The intertextual 'presence' in The 
Woman in Black does not issue from a static presentation of textual reference existing as a 
source or mother text in the linear sense. It exists rather as an activating circuit in which the 
novel's enclosed serniotic system is haunted by other semiotic systems which are activated in 
their absence by the scriptible function which is overlaid by the interpretative act thereby 
adding another dimension of transferential virtuality. 
In considering the haunting effect of an absent text, this section will argue that there 
is a radical estrangement in the very establishment of the writing T. It comments upon the 
function of the scriptor in relation to the non-presence of the woman in the Lacanian scheme. 
It also considers how writing always produces an excess which might be attached to the 
workings of horror via a repudiation of the subject by itself The climax of story is therefore 
attached to the death drive; jouissance is carried in the signifier as it relates to the cut which 
demarcates it so that its very presence is an en-gravement. 
The style in which this section is written attempts to reflect the subject matter it is 
examining by presenting a textual dimension shot through with different textual ghosts. Just 
as the narrator, Kipps, in order to establish his narrative performance withdraws from the 
scene of telling, the full presence of critical authority is avoided in order to try to present a 
space in which the reader may encounter a dynamic of absence/presence in the writing as it 
reflects upon Hill's storyline in conjunction with the psychoanalytical theory used. 
The word mother is one of the sweetest words in our language. It has more power 
over us than any other. 
Rev. Richard Newton. Pebbles from the Brook: Sermons to Children. 1897. (90) 
All the things thou canst desire are not to be compared unto her. 
Proverbs 3.15 
The Woman in Black is a tip-tilted text where the darkness of maternal rage and murderous 
horror at the centre of subject formation is depicted. The missing or dead mother of so many 
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popular Victorian texts haunts these pages - she has become an avenging presence. The' 
mechanics of maternal attachment, encountering the loss of the infant as object, loops back 
into infantile anger which is boundless and transgressive. The mother's loving gaze becomes 
the instrument of death. Her jealous rage that states, "he is mine, mine, he can never be yours" 
(100) is displaced onto the children of all those who look upon her. 3 The scopophilic 
investment in the sign first formulated in relation to the mother as Other is turned upon those 
who dare to signify whilst the mother is bereft. A robber mother. 
Passing Through 
There was no sign at all of the woman in black. (59) 
Hers is a death which has been passed through. The signified woman passes through the 
signifier of her own presence to occupy a place in the'real', however fictional: " she had been 
real. She had been there. .. " (61) Hers is a place based upon her own absence. She is a Woman in Black. She is a sign of all-encompassing love set adrift from its anchorage in a 
signifying system which denies her appellation as "mother" to her own child. Hers is the 
"passionate love" (123) which may not lie down, hers is the anguish which transgresses lines 
of 'the real' and breaks the signifýing chain: her leap over the line (of maternal demarcation) as 
resurrected woman. She represents the The referred to by LaCaD in 'God and the Jouissance 
of The Woman'. She exists via a crossed-out "nothing" which has the effect of the trace, the 
stain of black ink which strikes through The woman to raze her down with excision, a blow 
from which she may rise again by virtue of her excess, surplus to the signifying which 
demarcates her position. She who has always been the recipient of left-overs becomes the 
most powerful left-over of all. Jennet Humfrye's 'real' presence in the story is one based 
upon the banished existence which underpins her very presence both as a mother and a ghost. 
Her crossing-through is visible, her 'nothingness' is quite something. "Was there something I 
still did not see? " (128), asks Kipps in his scopic quest to round off the narrative, to solve the 
mystery, to see it through; unaware that he has already seen 'nothing'. 
... once the the of the woman is formulated by means of not all, then it cannot be 
written. There can ýe-no the here other than crossed through. This The relates ... to the signifier 0 when it is crossed through. (Lacan: 1982,151 - emphasis as original. ) 
This is a novel of 'passing through'. In terms of its internal story mechanics and 
narrative presentation, the text presents a turn-about, a flip-over point, a bib-bob of turnings 
within and without its own constitution - demonstrating the necessary otherness of narrative 
dynamics and its dependence upon transferential desire. It contains story within story within 
story whilst the ghost of m/Other traverses its pages as a moveable function: she enters stories 
freely, indeed they are all her story, she is its name (who has no name), most importantly, it is 
they which are her function. The functional absence which is at the heart of the text becomes 
activated within its own negative mechanics in a repudiation of the text in which it is lodged 
and the character precipitates its own movements. With reference to the role of transference 
in the backward completion process in the analytical situation through the analysand's 
narration of a recollected past to an other, Lacan writes that 
... there is no progress for the subject other than through the integration which he 
arrives at from his position in the universal: technically through the projection of the 
past into a discourse in the process of becoming. (Lacan: 1982,72) 
Like the child predeceasing its mother, the future is seen to haunt the past. The ghost becomes 
the very machine of this fiction. We effectively start reading at the end which is just the 
beginning of Kipps' tale. His tale precedes itself as the story progresses by revealing a process 
through which Kipps has already passed but has not yet occurred in narrative terms, i. e. it is 
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outside the text and may not masquerade as 'real'! The text has death as its basis, not just 
thematically but structurally, as it is implicit in its being written. The schema predisposes the 
subject in a mapping of points of cross-section in the interplay of drives. Lacan describes this 
constitution of the subject as the "topology of a four-cornered game" (1977,304), thereby 
denoting the diagrammatical nature by which the subject fills the gap which is the prerequisite 
of its subjection. Just as the narrative progresses by means of an operative absence, so the 
subject necessarily invests in a fetish which exists around the vanishing point of subjectivity, 
the hole, the zero of becoming. Deathliness then is the motivation for the propulsion of 
narrative, its very structure depends upon the shadow beneath which it must pass. 
It is in effect as a desire for death that he affirms himself for others... 
To say that this mortal meaning reveals in speech a centre exterior to 
language is more than a metaphor; it manifests a structure. (Lacan: 1977,105) 
The Woman in Black passes through Victorian texts whilst maintaining an internal 
masquerade of late Victorian narrative. Its own story is a passage through Kipps' middle- 
aged years to his young manhood, infancy, and back again in a motion of recollective 
detection which is the catharsis of trauma. Here is a place for everyone's ghosts as each 
individual is moving about its mother (as she about hers) in an institutionalized social 
formulation that runs rings around us all. The hole boxes us in: as subjects we depend upon 
our very subjection in order to function. The text demonstrates how the past is never past but 
always and ever'passcd through'. Time is unhinged as the future of Kipps' story is the past of 
itself and its future thereby haunts its movement like a time-traveller so that as readers we are 
enmeshed in the to-and-firo movement in the place of the Other as the narrative "I" begins to 
doubt itself in a loss of focus and identity. The careful temporal and spatial location of Kipps' 
narration gives way due to a transferential disphoria. "I began to doubt my own reality, " says 
Kipps in an ironic statement which draws attention to the true lies of fiction with which we are 
presented (110). Disorientated in the obscuring frets and mists of the textual encounter, "I" 
loses "all sense of time and ordinary reality" (104). 
'*" between an extinction that 
is still glowing and a birth that is retarded, T can come 
into being and disappear from what I say. 
An enunciation that denounces itself, an opportunity that loses itself, what 
remains here if not the trace of what must be in order to fall from being? 
(Lacan: 1977,300 - emphasis as original. ) 
Just as textually, the novel enters a space where its structure reaches backwards in terms of its 
own construction and narrative, the basis for the story-teller within its confines is always 
one of retarded movement, always searching for the missing Other to whom it must project its 
story. Kipps' tale is a compensation for not being able to verbally tell, it is an expulsed gift to 
an other whose own'treasure! is also buried in a primeval place. In this scenario, a network of 
love and loss is set in motion to which we are attracted in a net of transferential desire. 
Because every body loves a good story, we are sure to turn the page in an attempt to uncover 
what must necessarily remain hidden for the dynamics of the tale to continue to be operative. 
In Passing: Acts of Story-telling 
As a writerly function, what is named Kipps displays an obsession with his narrative "I" in an 
irresistible drive to reach 'the end', to solve the mystery of the woman in black, to unveil her 
darkness. The woman in black holds him in thrall to his desire. 
Such is the woman concealed behind her veil: it is the absence of the penis that turns 
her into a phallus, the object of desire. (Lacan: 1977,322) 
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This writer's wish is to resolve the mystery of her hidden name and uncover her identity, the 
impossible desire for the revelation which will supply us with what is missing which lies at 
the heart of narrative interpellation. Story-telling is revealed as a dilemma, an attempt to 
unveil by veiling further. It is a contradiction, a mesmeric drive to cover up/over the hole left 
by the unrecoverable, to veil the veil which disguises loss but is itself borne of that self-same 
loss. Kipps the writer experiences "desolation" (107) and "an overwhelming grief and 
sadness, a sense of loss and bereavement" (112) which results in a breakage of the self due to 
the threatened loss of the primary object which lies at the heart of his haunting and is integral 
to the textual tactic by which he deals with grief. In 'Coming to Writing', Cixous states that 
... we move away from and approach Death, our double mother, through writing, because writing is always first a way of not being able to go through with mourning 
for death. (Cixous: 1991,38) 
The narrative drive is then one of nostalgia as all drives return to a primary source of 
remembered satisfaction. It must be remembered that this remembrance is achieved through 
the signifying system and as such is a representation, a phantasy through which filters the 
vicissitudes of present recall of the past. This is the story of a narrative subject embroiled in 
the mechanics of its own subject formation as it is figured in narrative function. Through the 
figure of Kipps, the story-telling capacity may be shown to exist in relation to a primary Other 
against whom all signification is measured and indeed comes into being. This birthing 
process of the narrative is a metaphor which reverberates as a literal passing through. It 
echoes the physical passage that breaks the borderline of the maternal body as a reciprocal 
exchange between one and other, between I and 0 on the relational scale. It is in relation to 
the phallic I of Mother that the infant passes through its own nothingness to become itself 
gone': its subjecthood depends upon the very threat of its extinction, a reduction to zero. By 
doing so, it passes through what, in his discussion of the mirror stage, Lacan terms "the circle 
of the Innenwelt" whilst simultaneously tethered to its confines in a never-ending staging of 
the borders of subjectivity. From her own nothingness, the zero-point of her own becoming 
which is replayed in all her acts of signifying, the mother too retains the operative ghost of 
"the circle of the Innenwelt". She carries its effects through her body set in relation to the 
infant who squares up to its fear by learning to substitute, to frame through metaphor in order 
to die and live again through the resurrection of the signifier's excess. 
... the reader should recognize in the metaphor or the return to the inanimate ... that margin beyond life that language gives to the human being by virtue of the fact that 
he speaks, and which is precisely that in which such a being places in the position of a 
signifier ... this body itself. (Lacan: 1977,301) 
Our narrator Kipps finds his experience takes him "to the very edge of the horizon where life 
and death meet together" (80): a place where his identity is under violent threat. The writing 
subject, haunted by the ghost of the maternal, is in danger of losing itself through its writing 
process which requires the subject to negotiate with the absence in spite of and because of 
which it asserts itself as a signifying body. The scriptible function presents itself as an 
ambivalent territory which offers an opening up but may also carry a terrible penalty. 
That Which Has Passed Away: Engraving "I" 
The Woman in Black is the story of a dis-possessed subjecthood, of the castration that exists 
at the time of writing and the anguish that is at the basis of scripting. We, who are 
dispossessed, rely on this bereavement for our subjectivity. We, in order to say "I", must 
already have lost and only melancholia or madness may follow if we rebel in our subjection. 
Connected by the causeway, cut off by the sea, crossing to the past, our main character enters 
a regressive state under threat of having his "I" cut off. Unwilling to relinquish the 
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misrecognized certainty of his own seamless, perfectly welded state of autonomous presence, 
Kipps moves through various positions of madness and terror, anger and hysteria. Initially he 
is unable to accept the ghost of mother fluctuating within himself and by which he is 
undermined in his individual imperialist ambitions. The woman in black's rage that the 
maternal is also a place of unrecognized loss and castration is, however, forced upon him. 
... it was as though she were searching 
for something she wanted, needed - must have, 
more than life itself, and which had been taken away from her. (58) 
The empire-building "I" is in its turn crossed through/traversed by The woman, herself crossed 
through to present a text of a double negative. The castrated mother, doubly bereaved by law 
and death, dares to become powerful in her powerlessness, dares to look back in her anger at 
the castrated subject and embroils him in her drama which is implicitly his. By violent 
intervention, Kipps must return to the "wom[a]n's tale" which is the very basis of his own 
(87). Cixous describes this as 
... the desire to remain as close as possible to Her, 
death, our most powerful mother, 
the one who gives us the most violent push of desire to cross over, to leap, since one 
cannot stay close to her, she desires and incites desire; and this desire is split, it is 
simultaneously its own opposite, the desire to approach her close enough to die from 
it, almost, and to hold oneself extremely far back from her, as far as possible. 
(Cixous: 1991,37) 
This transferential desire network between one and Other is complicated by the 
presence of narratives internal to the main narrative, all of which are contained within the 
main character of Kipps who is pregnant with many stories. He caff ies the mother within the 
body of'his' text in a paradoxical reversal so that his writing body is split. His narrative is a 
complex cross-scctioning, haunting itself in an intense display of a subversive wish to drive 
out any semblance of the stable narrative of classic realism whilst simultaneously offering 
itself as a parody of that very same stability. 
We live on that border, crossroads beings, crucified beings ... A mother is a 
continuous separation, a division of the very flesh. And consequently a division of 
language... (Kristeva: 1987 [1976], 254) 
'He' is at the mercy of drives which are contrary to his own position as the Story-Teller. Kipps 
is our mother in this fiction as he struggles in his anguish to "retain control of [him]self, rather 
as a mother will feel obliged to put a brave face on things in order to calm her frightened 
child" (103). He carries his textual treasure and keeps it to himself for fear of the 
consequences. He is disorientated in his tale-bearing, unable to admit that he is in the family 
way as the condensation function of his signing collapses and he is unable to distinguish what 
is 'real' anymore. He cannot reveal to his wife and family "whatever will surely follow" (128). 
His pregnancy must be a well-kept secret as he cannot admit his 'story' within its own 
boundaries, i. e. in familial terms. His 'unnatural birth! must be expulsed beyond the circle of 
the family, a 'familiar story' thrown out as a bastard birth so that his narrative position mirrors 
that of Jennet Humfrye's exile. This infant progeny is vomit retched from a body struggling 
to retain its clean and proper place as patriarch. Responding tetchily to his step-sons' request 
for a Christmas ghost story, he exclaims that, 
'I am sorry to disappoint you ... But I have no story to telff And went quickly 
from 
the room, and from the house. (19) 
His story remains far "too real" to be told (21). Without oral manifestation, its 
'authenticity' may only be written. Indeed it is thereby posited that to be written is to be 
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authentic as seeing is believing. His tale therefore remains a visual phenomenon, a 
meconnaissance on the page. 
I decided at once that it should be, at least during my lifetime, a story for my eyes 
only. (21) 
His constructed "I" and its dissolution within its own boundaries is a fictional display of the 
fracturing effects of the misrecognition which is the predicate of the ability to say "I am". 
Here then is a display of the psychical ghosts which inhabit our framing as subjects and which 
haunt the borderlines of identity in a raging bid for proper possession. In his encounter with 
the haunted nursery which causes him to remember his own childhood, Kipps says that "I felt 
strangely quite unlike myself. .. " (107) 
And if there were no forward direction? No other forward than, ambiguously, that 
which had taken place before? 
Speaking from this place pervaded by restlessness, how could I have said 'I 
arn' ? (Cixous: 1991,25) 
Moving beyond then and now, between 'present' narrative 'F and its past 'F represented in its 
trajectory results in a multi-structure where 'F is utterly dislocated. 'F escapes its own 
quadrature, slips the noose of its niVeonnaisance, shakes itself out of the textual frame only to 
expose the more its implicit dependence upon such structuration. The narrative presence of 
Kipps as story-teller becomes synonomous with the hysteric's symptom, at once a 
representation and a representing activity. His story is actualized on paper and yet 
simultaneously retained as a foreign body within the textual enclosure, activating its 
movements through by-passing itself in its own set-up. His story is both disseminated and 
retained, it is told by not being told. Kipps' tale is stowed away as a treasured offering for his 
wife-mother who, in a spiteful touch, he hopes to "be beyond" at the time of her reading which 
must necessarily re-activate the ghost story. 
I have been quite unable to tell her anything at all, she has no idea what I have been 
going through or why: she will have no idea until she reads this manuscript and at that 
time I shall be dead and beyond her. (136) 
Unable to Pass: The 'author' as retentive function 
Pause. (96) 
I could not get my breath and felt as if I was pushing against a heavy weight which I 
must remove before I could go any further. (132) 
If babies are born through the anus, then a man can give birth just as well as a 
woman. (Freud: 1990,160) 
By expulsing himself from his own disowned text of 'no story', Kipps has shit out: producing 
turds in his own hiatus. After writing of his young and arrogant bid to reveal the mystery of 
the woman in black, his own enclosing story reaches its end and he cannot tell "the last thing 
left to tell" (135). He finds himself unable to write. 
I have sat here at my desk, day after day, night after night, a blank sheet of paper 
before me, unable to lift my pen... (135) 
Accosted by the signifýing process in which he is enmeshed, confronted by the consequences 
of narrative, Kipps is shitting himself as he realizes that the story is perfectly capable of 
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breaking its own boundaries and entering his. The story of the woman in black has physical 
repercussions. Reading Jennet Humfrye's letters, he feels "a terrible, cold, sickening 
sensation ... so that I was sure I would either vomit or choke" 
(124). His "I" becomes 
unclean, his self abject. Here is the real horror story. Speaking of the subversion of the 
subject in its encounter with desire, Lacan says that, 
.. this subject, who thinks he can accede to 
himself by designating himself in the 
statement, is no more than such an object. Ask the writer about the anxiety that he 
experiences when faced by the blank sheet of paper, and he will tell you who is the 
turd of his phantasy. (Lacan: 1977,315) 
Hiatus is represented in and by the text as the story empties itself of its residual story within, 
discharges itself in numerous emptyings of internal narratives. Physical depletion is attendant 
upon the writing procedure as if its weakening diarrhoea places itself beyond itself - this paper 
discharge is an exorcism in the'present' writing of the story. 
... now at last ... I will use the very last of my strength, that 
has been so depleted by 
the reliving of those past horrors, to write the end of the story. (136) 
In order to maintain a clean cut-off point from the mother's story contained within his own, 
Kipps must supply an ending to his narrative in order to pass his story to others in a passage of 
goods from one to the other. This transmission of treasured goods which Kipps has long held 
on to signals his release from the suspended horror - the fantasy that excrement might bite 
back and consume the body which produced it as the mother-made-abject threatens to 
consume the infant - and exit from the story in fictive terms so that he may emphatically 
declare, "I have told it. Enough" (139). 
The location of that self-inscription is set in specific relation to the mother; it is in 
Mrs. Drablow's meticulously retained personal papers that Kipps finds "a map to buried 
treasure" enabling him to circumnavigate the active absence central to his telling (118). In the 
round of narrative, the mother around whom all stories circulate determines the enclosing 
circuit of the story. She who is enclosed in his serves to expose this fraud as it is he who is 
properly enclosed, encircled by the woman who trained his writing flesh as the mother 
regulates the infant's rhythms, drives, and sphinctral spasms that are the forerunners of the 
symbolic order. When Kipps admits to holding onto a story, it is described in terms of an 
incorporative bodily inscription: "'Yes, I had a story ... it was now woven into my very fibres" (20). In Powers of Horror, Kristeva describes how the flesh is partitioned through the 
symbolic via the agency of the maternal. 
Through frustrations and prohibitions, this authority shapes the body into a territoa 
having areas, orifices, points and lines, surfaces and hollows, where the archaic power 
of mastery and neglect, of the differentiation of proper-clean and improper-dirty, 
possible and impossible, is impressed and exerted. 
(Kristeva: 1982,72 - emphasis as original. ) 
Passing Over: Literal Ghosts 
The Woman in Black is a novel of false starts. It begins in a display of containings, haunted 
by intertextual ghosts, repeating itself and propagating narrations in an internal tryst with 
desire. It is so full of story as to be spewing them in all directions. Story within story, circuits 
within circuits of telling, the narrative propulsion is itself an uncovering manoeuvre as the 
trace of the past is seen to be working through the'present' and future of the narrative. 
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This trace relates no less to what is called the future than to what is called the past, 
and it constitutes what is called the present by this very relation to what it is not, to 
what it absolutely is not. (Derrida: 1976,143) 
Like the trace of a trace, "the faint memory of a memory" (20), the remembrance of an other 
story is one of abjection as the "trace has, properly speaking, no place, for effacement belongs 
to the very structure of the trace" (Derrida: 1976,155 ). 4 Kipps' story is "[flike an old wound, 
it gave off a faint twinge" (20), it is a sore that has "pierced me through" in a stigmata of "I". 
Kipps is crucified on the prick of his own castration as the irresistible drive to tell places him 
in danger of losing control of his clean self, leading him to a place where he may be 
"weakened and broken, by what? A woman? " (80). His literary defence is to produce 
something visual, a 'real' gift with which to placate the murderous mother. By representing 
her in his text, he thereby attempts to separate from her, to drive out her ghost whilst ensuring 
that her "passionate love" will always rise again in the place of the visual signifier, i. e. in the 
reading process. 
I recalled that the way to banish an old ghost that continues its hauntings is to exorcise 
it. Well then, mine should be exorcised I should tell my tale, not aloud ... I would 
write my own ghost story. (20-2 1) 
The classical privilege of speech over writing is here reversed so that writing becomes the 
primary means of tale-telling. Telling = writing = exorcism. In this scenario, reading the 
'story' raises the ghost whilst the act of writing is the exorcism. Black ink is the intermediary 
host, the transmitting mirror and screen through which the written 'trace' must pass. This 
scriptor-priest is compulsively confessional: "I confess I catft explain it. .. " (87), "1 don't 
mind confessing. .. " (119), "1 confess. .. " repeats Kipps the lawyer in a quasi-religious, hysterical outpouring by which he hopes to achieve cathartic release from the affects of a 
haunting which has left him "prone to occasional nervous illnesses and conditions" (11). His 
hysteria consists of a lost faith in'the real', he is unable to "explain it"; within his own story he 
is no longer able to distinguish between the signified and the signifier as the signified rushes 
into the vacuum of its loss which precedes its being signified and transgresses the reality of 
the referent. For the signifier always carries excess in spite of itself so that the beyond might 
be attained by stepping through itself under a pressure which shatters the preconditions of 
signification. This surplus aligned by Lacan with the feminine is what shatters 'the real' so the 
anger existing in the heart of an other transgresses its place and enters that of the subject 
which is then haunted by the ghost of the signifier which has passed through its signified 
place. The subject is then broken by the trajectory of his own narrative, run through by his 
own stories so that "[t]hey all but broke me" (112). 
In what is a denial of negation, this story-teller is stuck in a refusal to deny the 
mother, a necessary step in order to signify as a separate entity. Kipps is mortally afraid of the 
consequences of his own tale-telling. Suffering from a severe crisis in the signifying function, 
he is unable to experience the seen and the heard together, he is visited separately by a vision 
and haunted by a child's cry. He is locked in the dimensions of a symptom, a separation of the 
functions of the signifier: endlessly replaying audio-visual ghosts in a circuit of haunting 
(102). Seeing "nothing" is therefore the result of the signifier crossing over to the 'beyond' to 
become its own'real'and bringing life-in-death. His trauma is a denial of the cut which is the 
basis of signing. His fear is bound up "[w]ith whatever will surely follow" the interpretation 
of the sign (128). The wish to escape from the inevitability of the narrative drive, to avoid 
"whatever will surely follow" is indicative of an implicit fear of the story-telling imperative, a 
wish to avoid the ghosts that are called up by the signifier in its audio-visual display. Kipps' 
so-called written text which spells out what cannot be, tells a story which he does not wish to 
speak of. His story is of an illicit visitation, called up by a radical separation of the auditory 
and visual aspects of the signifier. Kristeva writes that, 
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... when the condensation function that constitutes the sign collapses (and in that case 
one always discovers a collapse of the Oedipal triangulation that supports it), once the 
sound image/sign image solidarity is undone, such a splitting allows one to detect an 
attempt at direct semantization... (Kristeva: 1982,53) 
This re-temporalizing of speech and writing results in a divorce of time and space which is 
equal to the place of The Woman: .. I wonder who she was? Is? ... I hardly know how to 
refer to her! "' (80) She is in excess of time and space, a mystery that may never be looked 
upon due to its veiled nature. 
Thou canst not see my face: for there shall no man see me and live. (Exodus 33.20) 
As readers, we are shielded from the predatory look of the Woman in Black, we are 
intercepted by the text which represents her. No-one may enter the terrifying place of a 
thwarted maternal, the aching gap and open wound left by a taken child where exists a rage 
which forces barricades and rips open the purpose of the cut in the signifying function. She 
has crost the bar. Her grief is not decent, it breaks bounds, it will not R. 1. P. To look upon 
her place would be to die of fright. Our look is, therefore, itself veiled. 
Each sighting of the wasted woman brings a child's death for this is the "climax" (130) 
of the story as it represents the inevitable drive towards the zero point by the visually 
signified. The "climax" of the story = death. The crux of representation passes through the 
little 0 of orgasmic narrative fulfilment in the death of the subject embroiled in the dialectics 
of desire set up through the screen of the teller. This is a death which may be passed through 
in reading, existing as a jouissance called up by the quickening interpretation of the dead 
letter. It is Kipps' wish to arrest the transmission of the story by intercepting the visual sign of 
The woman. His fantasy is to hold onto the tale, retain the treasure and thereby arrest the 
chain: "Oh, pray God ... - that the chain is broken -" (135). To foreclose, to end forever by finding out the perpetual 'trutW: the 'author's' impossible fantasy is to oust the woman by 
taking her place. "If I could uncover the truth, perhaps I might in some way put an end to it all 
forever" (118). This constitutes freezing the glissement of the signifying chain, petrifying the 
name of 4: he woman so that her signification may not have any affect, i. e. by possessing the 
mother fully so that the hole may be filled, his wound salved, and full satisfaction attained - 
the end of desire, the end of the subject, zero point ... death ... Yet her desire reaches through the veil of the grave as there is "[a] jouissance beyond the phallus" (Lacan, 1982 
[1972-3], 145). 
Nearly at the close of her life her voice and speech failed; but she was frequently 
heard to whisper, 'I want, I want. ' 
'Obituary of Ann Fisher'. The Primitive Methodist Magazine. Vol. XXIV. 
1843. (318) 
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"Through a door". Retroactive Narrative in Philippa Pearce, Toas Midnight Gard 
"Through a door": Retroactive Narrative in Philippa Pearce, Tom's Midnight Garde 1 
Tom opened the door wide and let in the moonlight. (24) 
Torn's garden is a midnight garden. It is a place where a different sun shines, shedding its 
"white daylight" upon the exiled (Pearce: 1984,24)2. It is in this territory that two subjects 
meet, separated as they usually are by conventions of time and space. Outsiders in an outside 
world, they find a play-area in which their mutual fantasy is installed and in which their 
differences intersect. 
Opening on the word 'Exile', Tom's Midnight Garde explores the radical strangeness 
at the root of subject constitution. It presents a story of banishment, isolation and prohibition; 
conversely it also presents a story of fantasy, laughter and liberation. It is in the frightening 
unhinging of the familiar that playful subversion finds its route. Two scenes lie side by side, 
in narrative terms and in story content so that the story of Tom and Hatty takes place in "a 
time between night and day" (40). 
There and Back: The Second Childhood 
The most crucial aspect of psychoanalysis for discussing children's fiction is its 
insistence that childhood is something in which we continue to be implicated and 
which is never simply left behind. (Rose: 1991,12) 
Childhood can never die - 
Wrecks of the past, 
Float o'er the memory 
Bright to the last... 
(Abby Hutchinson c. 1840, Hymn 324 in Sunday School HymnaEy, c. 1918) 
Tom's Midnight Garde brings together the childhood yearnings of a twentieth-century boy 
and a late-Victorian girl. Or so it would seem for the story has a twist in that these desires 
intersect in the mind of an old woman "dreaming the scenes of her childhood" (39). Tom's 
incarcerated unhappiness beats about the house and meets the loneliness of Hatty. 
He had longed for someone to play with and for somewhere to play; and that great 
longing, beating about unhappily in the big house, must have made its entry into Mrs 
Bartholomew's dreaming mind ... (215) 
It is in the grown-up Hatty's dreams that the children meet so that the whole narrative of the 
text is actually back-to-front for it a,. tively takes place in the past whilst dependent upon the 
present. 
The Victorian orphan motif of so many nineteenth-century children' s stories mingles 
with a twentieth-century angst at separation: Hatty's actual orphaned state makes her "a 
monster" (95), isolating her and placing her outside familial law so that she is "a shame ... a liar, a criminal" (95). Tom, meanwhile, is a virtual state orphan; his rage is one of separation 
from the mother. The modern child, having culturally passed through the historicity of 
psychoanalysis, angst-ridden at the prospect of the virtual real, finds himself face to face with 
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'the real' in the shape of "a tiny little figure, all in black" (96). "Tom had never seen a grief 
like this" (96). 
'What are you crying forT asked Tom gently. 
'For home! 'she wept. 'For my mother - for my fatherV 
Then Tom understood the meaning of the funeral black she was wearing and 
of that desolate, ceaseless crying. (97) 
It is the grown Hatty's memory of her unhappiness which provides her with a back-to-front 
companion in childhood longing. It is Tom's intersection of her story that "had brought back 
to her the little Hatty of long ago. Mrs Bartholomew had gone back in Time to when she 
was a girl" (96). This going back in time is not, however, a regression but a retrograde 
motion operative in the narrative. It is by moving backwards that the story moves forward. 
"Time no longer" (157) 
For us believing physicists, the division into past, present and future has merely the 
meaning of an albeit obstinate illusion. (Einstein cited by Zeh: 1992,164) 
Pearce! s text upsets the conventions of 'normal' time in its story-line and by so doing draws 
attention to this unsettling of time at work in written texts and operative in narrative 
production. That this is a feature of children's fiction in general is indicative of the fluidity of 
childhood perception, it allows a movement which comes from the less rigidly held laws of an 
ego-in-transition. This transitional openness correlates with a feminine positioning which is 
both the cause of celebration and a cause of hysteria: an openness which is jubilant yet 
dangerous. 
Through the same opening that is her danger, she comes out of herself to go to the 
other, a traveller in unexplored places... (Cixous: 1996,86) 
Tom is a boy in exile, dislocated in time and space so that "(h)is home now seemed a long, 
long misty way away" (63). He has been banished from the locus of ego formation and in his 
howling loss finds a compensatory object. He reaches for the maternal figure in Hatty and 
becomes her grandson-lover in return in a Harold and Maude type drama .3 Their love-story is 
an in-between land where each provides the fantasy for the other as a reciprocal relation of 
desire is set in motion. It is this desire set loose from beneath the frozen surface of suspended 
life that allows Tom to time-skip, "to burst the walls" (18) and to leap the boundaries of 
ordinary time and space. 
Tom was thinking about the Past, that time made so far away. Time had taken this 
Present of Hatty's and turned it into his Past. Yet even so, here and now, for a little 
while, this was somehow made his Present too - his and Hatty's. (143) 
He enters the time of the other: a place not of "Time no longer" but "Time no longer as we 
know it", a place "full of enormous possibilities" (160) for narrative. He is propelled through 
the narrative by reaching back through the structure in which he is incarcerated as function. It 
is this action which so neatly mirrors the narrative process as a transposition of one upon the 
other. 
By the very act of narrating, the subject of narration addresses an other; narration is 
structured in relation to this other. (Kristeva: 1986 [1980], 45) 
This entry into the other is through deathliness; "time no more" is the proclamation in 
Revelations X by the angel who ingests the text : it is post-Judgement and therefore in a place 
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of extra-time. This proclamation is tied firmly to signification and time, written as it is on the 
pendulum of old Mrs. Bartholomew's grandfather clock, itself moving through space in an 
endless oscillation from one side to the other. The text operates as the locus of the activation 
of two'scenes'. It is the implicit deathliness of the sign to which Lacan refers in Lrits. 
It is in effect as a desire for death that he affirms himself for others ... no being is 
ever evoked by him except among the shadows of death. 
To say that this mortal meaning reveals in speech a centre exterior to 
language is more that a metaphor; it manifests a structure. (105) 
All who signify must pass incessantly through the shadows of the valley of the 
signifier and shall fear not the defiles and traces of its path, though they are constantly dying 
in the fading of their speech, they shall fear not death for they shall rise again anew in the 
endless configuration of the signifying system. This is the faith that is required of those who 
would signify. 
It is from a stultifying suspended life, incarcerated in a flat with no garden and from 
behind a barred bedroom window that Tom finds a new world so that "(he) lived his real and 
interesting life at night-time, when he went into the garden; in the daytime he wanted only 
peace - to think back and to think forwards, always to the garden; to write. .. " (99). From his depressed position comes forth liberation for this is the locus of (re)negotiation with the 
symbolic order. 
Black Sun: Melancholic Exile 
What proof have we that the sun which we see by day, also shinesa t night? 
The Bible Class Magazine: 1848,148 
The thing that hath been that is that which shall be; and that which is done is that 
which shall be done: and there is no new thing under the sun. 
Ecclesiastes 1: 6-10 
Melancholia and depression in the subject position is due to denied negation of the primary 
object: the mother. It consists of a refusal to negate the primary object of cathexis investment. 
Yet "the loss of the mother is a biological and psychic necessity ... Matricide is our vital 
necessity" (Kristeva: 1989,27). The depressed subject is one who engages in a refusal to kill 
off the mother, a necessary step in order to enter the symbolic. It is integral to becoming 
'subject' to commit matricide in order to project the ego into the statue of "I". 
... the possibility of concatenating signifiers (words or actions) appears to depend 
upon going through mourning for an archaic and indispensable object ... Mourning for the Thing - such a possibility comes out of transposing, beyond loss and on an 
imaginary or symbolic level, the imprints of an interchange with the other articulated 
according to a certain order. (Kristeva: 1989,40) 
Just as the subject negotiates with enforced extrication from the maternal apparatus, 
the reader howls in abandonment by the primary text. This disengagement may also, 
however, lead to subversion due to outbreak from the liminal for where no law is, there may 
be no transgression. This motion leads back to the essential function of the Symbolic in the 
Lacanian subject knot, i. e. the triadic configuration of Symbolic-Imaginary-Real in the 
configuration of T. 
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On the symbolic level, abandonment and the refusal of the subject (Tom) to relinquish 
the mother leads to anger, melancholia and a skewed time-sense as he compensates in fantasy 
for what is missing in the Real. 
The vanishing speech of melancholy people leads them to live within a skewed time 
sense. It does not pass by, the before/after notion does not rule it... 
(Kristeva: 1989,60) 
The maternal apparatus is intercepted by the shadow of Hatty, the trace of Tom's desire is 
written in his relation to Aunt Gwen as she calls his name. 
The voice recalled him without his understanding at once to what: his eyelids opened 
on to his own bedroom, but his eyes printed off the shadowy figure of Hatty against 
the barred window and the cupboard and between himself and, the figure of his aunt 
atthe foot of the bed. Hatty's image haunted the room for Tom. (101) 
Tom suffers a depressive's insomnia and withdrawal, he lives through a daytime suspension: 
"He did not want to sleep, but, all the same, the daytime in the flat was like a period of sleep 
to him" (100). His longing is excessive, it is what Kristeva terms the depressive's "impossible 
mourning for the maternal object" (1989,9). For Kristeva, "the Thing is an imagined sun, 
bright and black at the same time" (1989,13). For Tom, "the garden was the thing. That was 
real" (29). 
By opening the door into the midnight garden, Tom enters the dark side of the page 
which tells his story. It is a place which explores the unwritten at work within the writing 
itself, the dark shadow which underpins the text and activates the narrative body with its long 
exhalation of deathliness. 
At the very origin of narration, at the very moment when the writer appears, we 
experience emptiness. (Kristeva, 1986 [1980], 45) 
Aggression: The story in bits and pieces 
depression, like mourning, conceals an aggressiveness toward the lost object... 
(Kristeva: 1989,11) 
In its depressed state, the subject displays an aggression which correlates with the paranoid 
aggressivity endemic to ego-formation. This is due to the negotiation with the primal object 
which takes place in the narcissistic stage and which, according to Lacan, "dates from the 
deflection of the specular I into the social I" (Lacan: 1977,5). Tom displays this aggressivity 
in his exile, he "raged that he had to leave" his little garden at home and his brother Peter (7). 
He says goodbye to his mother "angrily" (9) and his words are bitter (8). He is "darkly intent" 
(30). 
This aggression underpins the subject's negotiation with textual production for the 
entry to the symbolic order is marked by the melancholic trace, the shadowing of the refusal to 
commit matricide in order to become fully subject. To write is to make a mark, to incise like 
Hatty's knife upon a tree-trunk as she "half scratched, half pressed" her mark there. In writing 
to his brother, Tom makes "stab-marks" upon the paper (61). This process harbours 
aggression and is built upon an introjective process for it is with our mouths that we speak our 
desire and by introjection we attempt to hold the other in our mouths as if to enter the other by 
it entering us through the linguistic system in a reciprocal game of body-snatching. 
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It is here where the moveable mosaic of "I" is assembled that the subject is most 
paranoid, terrified by the signing which writes him/herself. For the textual product is an 
attempt to hold together what is split apart: a phantasmagorical relation to the other. 
If one grants that every signifying practice is a field of transpositions of various 
signifying systems (an intertextuality), one then unddrstands that its 'place' of 
enunciation and its denoted 'object' are never single, complete and identical to 
themselves, but always plural, shattered... (Kristeva: 1986 [1980], 111) 
As readers, we pass through liminal boundaries of the narrative as Tom passes from one world 
to the other. This is a door-opening process, as physical as the turning of a page. The 
manoeuvre of 'going through' the text is a painful yet radically subversive process for it is in 
negotiation with the other that the one may change configuration. Tom displays this 
ambivalence of attitude as he finds himself able to go through physical barriers and pass 
through doors: ... I'm going through, ' Tom gasped, and was seized with alarm and delight" 
(53). 
in his half-dreaming, he became two persons. (15) 
Suspense of these fragments of telling is operative in sustaining the reader's desire as s/he is 
kept in an agony of awaiting revelation, left as we are peeping in a voyeuristic fascination as 
flashes of story pass us by like "the flick-flick-flick of Tom" (45) in another landscape. 
dark - light - dark - light - dark (41) 
The Retrograde Motion 
Check out the retrograde motion. 
The Fugees, 'Zealots': Ruffhouse Records, 1996 
By making Tom's story operative by its entry into another scene supposedly preceding it in 
logical time but actually constitutive of it in narrative time, Torws Midnight Garde actively 
presents in the shape of its own narrative, the signifying system which writes it. It locates two 
scenes in story-time, two scenes which write themselves together in an interactive narrative. 
The intrusion of a third term into this equation is represented in the story-line by Tonfs 
brother, Peter, almost a twinned function to Tom. His desire to enter the scene of writing 
correlates with the reader's position as s/he enters story-space as a traveller-exile traversing the 
structure of an other whilst simultaneously changing its boundaries: to haunt the machine is to 
be haunted by the machine. 
In this coming-and-going movement between subject and other, between subject and 
other, between writer (W) and reader, the author is structured as a signifier and the 
text as a dialogue of two discourses. (Kristeva: 1986 [1980], 45) 
Tom is locked in a dialectic with Hatty which allows him to enter her story after it has been 
told in the usual train of chronological telling. It is this seemingly impossible relation which 
so succinctly offers a working paradigm of novelistic textual production drawn from a 
signifying system itself built upon this retrograde movement. 
By making reference to a preceding system, the narrative propels itself forward and 
makes reference to a retrograde movement of the subject which projects itself by means of a 
retarded identification which is never solved. 
.1N, 
The precedence of the real in the Lacanian system, as the point of the subjecvs 
confrontation with an endlessly retreating reality, signals this definition of the subject 
in terms of an object which has been lost, rather that towards a totality which it 
anticipates. (Rose: 1991,183) 
It is in our confrontation with this howling loss of our first object that we signify. In our 
desire to attain the other, we comfort ourselves in signifying compensation. This movement 
of one to other is operative on the level of signifier to signifying system and it is here that 
ghosts of the system may fluctuate as the entire operative system depends for its tensile 
coherence upon this structure which rolls back upon itself continuously as the retrieval of the 
signifier's treasure is in a backward motion. By passing through the oscillation from one to 
other which is the relation of pure signifier to signifier in the system via the movement of 
desire installed in speech, the subject becomes doubly split: split in its saying and split by its 
saying for "it is as a derivation of the signifying chain that the channel of desire flows" 
(Lacan: 1977,259). 
This is a retroversion effect by which the subject becomes at each stage what he was 
before and announces himself - he will have been - only in the future perfect tense. 
(Lacan: 1977,306) 
Lacan refers to this retrograde effect in the construction of the sentence unit for we cannot I know the destination of the full statement until the last word i8written/read or spoken/heard. 
It draws attention to this incessant rolling back upon oneself in the linguistic apparatus: that 
which would be 'present' may only project itself fully by referring backwards both spatially 
and temporally. 
The diachronic function of this anchoring point is to be found in the sentence even if 
the sentence completes its signification only with its last term, each term being 
anticipated in the construction of the others, and, inversely, sealing their meaning with 
its retroactive effect. (Lacan: 1977,303) 
This entry of one into other is an intertextual effect at work in the base of narrative 
construction and it correlates with the unending dialogue of "I" which is what Kristeva refers 
to as the subject-in-process: a moveable mosaic continually de-centred and criss-crossed by 
the other. This kaleidoscope of subjectivity is as variable as the place of the child looking 
through a window. Hatty helps Tom discover that there is more than one garden: "Through 
each colour of pane, you could see a different garden outside" (79). What is seen depends 
upon the positions of the viewer and the viewed in a reciprocal relation which swings from 
here to there as one transposes upon the other in an equation where each player is in a 
perpetual state of flux. Narrative production, by interlocking with the reader within, is always 
unsettled. It is a kinetic dialogue. 
"Time and Time Again" (161) 
The narrative of Tom's Midnight Garden is parallel to the re-play of the signifier as it re-visits 
itself in its projection which must ultimately lead it to transpose itself upon itself in the 
seemingly illogical sequence that is signification. Echoed words and mixed narratives result 
as each one enters the other in a transpositioning which is parallax telling. 
'You've bars across the bottom of your windows, ' said Tom, 'as if this were a nursery. ' 
And somewhere in his head the words seemed an echo of something he had once 
heard or said; and, indeed, the bars across the windows were like a remembrance of 
something once seen. (141) 
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This is the djj6 vu effect of the spoken as the utterance haunts itself in its own uttering as if 
the present is itself a ghost fluttering in the past. It is the cause of "the only real quarrel that 
ever took place between" Tom and Hatty as they are both unable to conceive of themselves as 
anything except fully present (104). Having passed through the deathliness of the 
signification, the characters within the text address each other through their "games and tales" 
(75). They are effectively inserted backwards into the narrative which tells their stories by 
traversing the zero point of authorship as they play a scriptible function for each other in a 
permutation which is at play at the level of the signifier in its back-and-forth motions. 
The subject of utterance, in relation to the subject of enunciation, plays the role of 
addressee with respect to the subject; it inserts the subject of enunciation within the 
writing system by making the latter pass through emptiness. 
(Kristeva: 1986 [1980], 46) 
In their mutual transpositioning, Tom and Hatty engage in an oscillation from one to other 
which forms the "dialogical dyad" described by Kristeva in'Word, Dialogue and Novel'(47). 
... the words spoken by Hatty made a little echo, and her voice and its echo filled the 
silence after Tonfs speaking, so that he was somehow comforted by the sound. (185) 
Tenses: Semantic Time 
'tense' n. (gram. ) any of the forms of a verb expressing the time of the action or the 
state of being. (Longman Modern English Dictiona! y) 
One day, hardly speaking aloud, Tom began a sentence... (103) 
Tom's Midnight Garden upsets the usual conception of time and consequently upsets the usual 
conventions of narrative time. If time cannot be relied upon to "march[ ] onwards in the way 
that it is supposed to go" (98), to flow in a "reasonable" and reliable manner, what must this 
mean for the tenses by which our grammatical system operates and by which it represents time 
in the semantic sense? The grandfather clock is "senselessly wrong" (13). 
Tom's Midnight Garden displays a mixture of tenses combined with story-telling 
technique, moving between preterite, present perfect, future conditional (25,102), and future 
perfect in an easy technical display of its own narrative interests. It is a text obsessed by the 
time it takes to tell and the space in which this telling is conducted: its temporal unfixings are 
parallel to its spatial fixations. The narrator's knowledge of geography moves between then 
and now as if this space is constant and it is only time which changes. "At last, however ... 
and now ... and here they were where the river curves in. .. " (183). The locus of the 
signifier which represents 'the Real' of topographical location is always constant whilst the 
subject's constitution moves back and forth, to and fro in irresistible relation to it. 
They had stopped talking and thinking - their legs and arms and bodies seemed to 
throw from side to side with the precise, untiring regularity of clock pendulums. .. (183) 
The point-de-capilon is the stable fixing point, albeit temporary, over which the subject 
oscillates configurations in its negotiation with it. 
The projection of the sentence in the future perfect tense indicates that at a point of 
future time an event will be in the past. "These holidays they would have built. .. 11 (8) 
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When we use the future perfect we are viewing the event from the future whilst actually 
stating it in the present. if, meanwhile, we write in this tense, the present in which we write 
and the present in which what we have written is read is always changing and itself subject to 
haunting by itself. 
This is a retroversion effect by which the subject becomes at each stage what he was 
before and announces himself - he will have been - only in the future perfect tense. 
(Lacan: 1977 306) 
The sentence can be seen to move further from itself in the use of future perfect tense, a tense 
favoured in the narration of Tom's adventures. The reader is given previews as we are told of 
events before Tom, the fir-tree falls in Chapter 6, "although Tom did not know this until much 
later. .. " (56). There is an omniscient non-sense at work here for what can "much later" mean in this context of a moveable mosaic of textual time pieces? 
Anti-Chronology of Telling 
As readers, we are given answers without questions in reference to the backward completion 
principle of the text. We are not informed of Tords "last question" which precedes our entry 
into Chapter 7. 
'Not unless you put the clock back, ' Uncle Alan said carelessly, in answer to Tonfs 
last question. (58) 
Time-slip in story narrative is matched by time-slip in the act of narration itself. The narrator 
informs us that, 
In following the course of Torn's historical researches and his reasoning, we have 
gone a little ahead upon the order of events - as Tom perceived them - in the garden. 
(113) 
The story is not chronological and draws attention to this upsetting of the 'normal' temporal 
progression of story-telling. It undoes itself in its own writing and intercuts itself with 
previous 'scenes' which the reader is then expected to inhabit like a ghost from the future time 
of the reading act. 
The tree-house in which he and Hatty quarrelled was not built until immediately after 
the episodes of the geese upon the lawn and the little girl in mourning... (114) 
The view from the window of the room in which there is "no Hatty" (147) shows an unfallen 
ivied fir tree: "He was looking only for Hatty, so he did not linger over this view, but later he 
had cause to remember it" (134). Time in the garden is "unreliable, confusing" (98) as it 
moves "forward to a tree's failing, and then back to before the fall; and then still farther back 
again, to a little girl's first arrival; and then forward again" (98). Torres 'last' visit to the 
garden, in Hatty's midsummer memory is out-of-synch with the rest of narrative time (56,211, 
212): ".. and Tom remembered the silence ... and the cry. .. " (212). The fir-tree is the 
constant in the upset chronology of episodic story-telling sequence. Story time is a 
configuration of present-past-future in the sentence completion factor itself as the subject 
approaches the utterance of itself as 'One' or "I", a number of apparatus operating on multiple 
time-levels all collapse together to present the pretence of a fully present subject known by the 
pronoun of its pronounced presence to itself. The stadium of re-constitution of the subject in 
the dialectical relation of the transmission of desire is the place of the subject in relation to the 
interlocuting lover. Hatty as an old woman is still a child within, the stadium of the subject is 
a place where the tale is never fully told. 
Two Scenes: Narrative Parallax 
Tom and Hatty live in parallel worlds, both exiled and living with their aunts; their 
experiences of isolation and desire to play is what allows their meeting at a sticking point in 
time. This correlates closely with the idea of the signifing chain as a confluence of signified 
and signifier in Saussure's diagram which is utilized by Lacan in his notion of the point de 
capiton (Lacan: 1993,261). The quilting-point of the subject is that where the signifier 
catches, however temporarily, against the signified to produce a staticity of affect. A 
generation of the framing apparatus is continually at work in the consitution of the ego so that 
the subject-in-process is the locus of transposition, a polyphony of voice which operates as a 
fugue. 
There is in effect no signifying chain that does not have, as if attached to the 
punctuation of each of its units, a whole articulation of relevant contexts suspended 
'vertically', as it were, from that point. (Lacan: 1977,154) 
Caught within the textual apparatus, Tom and Hatty are mechanisms which display 
the mechanism. Ghosts in the fictive structure, they haunt the storyline in which they are 
written and in which they represent a scriptible function. The characters rattle the chain which 
represents them. Tom does not leave a mark, "his blades left no cut or bruise upon the surface 
of the ice in travelling over it" (182). He is a non-scriptor, caught as a function in the story of 
an other whilst still operative in that which is being narrated. He is arrested in his relation 
with Hatty and cannot leave a mark behind him, be it auditory or visual. Yet he has an affect 
in her story-space. Hatty is inside the story, a function; Tom is a secondary technical function 
re-entering her narrative space. They inhabit different time zones yet can "keep[ ] time 
together, stroke for stroke". Hatty and Tom are "two skaters on one pair of skates" (18 1). 
Two scenes are activated here and it is in this respect that we can invoke the time 
mechanism of the hysteric as she lives her symptom through the chronology of a past trauma, 
a dialogic trace is set up in which the present becomes operative through the past. In Josef 
Breuer's account of the case of Anna 0., he accesses "a private diary kept by her mother" to 
confirm that she is actually living in an active past scene of trauma in the present of her 
treatment (Breuer and Freud: 1991,87). 
The Big Freeze: Arrested Signifying Chain 
'But I meant, is the river really frozen overT (177) 
The skating expedition of Tom and Hatty is out of time for they are skating over the surface of 
frozen river water: a surface which is suspended in its usually onward motion. The river of 
signification made up of signifiers is also completely arrested. Tom and Hatty move over the 
frozen signifying chain, buttoned in suspended glissement. There is no movement as it is 
temporarily arrested to allow a breakout to occur. 
Old men give advice to the young skating Hatty as she makes her mark upon the ice: 
... There! s already someone went through. .. "' (191). 'Going through' the door of the defrosted 
signifying chain brings deathliness as the subject truly fades beneath the shattered surface of 
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signification, i. e. the subject has gone to pieces, had become de-quilted, unbuttoned, 
unhinged: dead or mad. As the chain is arrested in its movement temporarily, it allows the 
O/other to pass through it; as it begins its incessant movement once more, those who have 
been seduced by the frozen surface, instead of playing on it, pay the price. This price is ftill 
access to the Other which is the end of desire and constitutes the dissolution of the subject: 
death. 
Going beneath the surface of the signifier - dying by going beneath the ice - presents 
the danger of breaking the symbolic boundary: as deathliness is written through the sign as its 
precondition. Tods wish to go back to the past in the past of the garden challenges the 
chronology of Hatty's dream sequence so that she may be "a little girl again ... waiting to spin her tales for him" (200). It is here at the close of the text that Tom is "in a panic to get out" 
(201) and it is here that he is caught again within the system like the birds beneath Abel's 
strawberry nets, his call to Hatty "sharp like a bird's warning" (202) as the subject is caught 
once more within the lure of the Oedipal, the law of the third term interrupts the two scenes 
activated here by desire. It is "reasonable" Uncle Alan who "ran forward and caught Tom" 
(202) to return him to the fully sliding glissement in which the knot of discourses which is the 
subject functions. 
The boy sobbed and fought as though he were being taken prisoner ... he began 
weeping softly now, but as though he would never stop. (202) 
Hatty too is caught in the system by an intrusion of the third term for it is as she is dreaming 
of her midsummer wedding that Tom is refused entry to the garden. She is reined in, her 
'course' on the ice wavers (193) as she re-encounters the intrusion of the third term which 
regulates her negotiation with the symbolic. These scenes of 'returly are places to which we 
are not admitted as readers but are active in the text itself. We do not visit Tom in his own 
family and Hatty as a married woman, these are scenes which are beyond the confines of the 
text yet these projections are poised in the place of the Black Sun which still shines although 
we may not see its light. Like the garden, it always there. 
You might look and see nothing, and you might think there wasn't a garden at all; but, 
all the time, of course, there is, waiting for you. (79-80) 
Hatty has her invisible friend with her whether or not others can see him, "she had a 
companion with her, even if they could not see him" (183). 
It is in the place of the Black Sun that Hatty and Tom are able to skate over the 
arrested flow of the signifying chain. This negotiation with a Black Sun is due to a new ego 
configuration in relation to 'the Real' and the shifting subject boundaries this constitutes as the 
whole signifying relation is altered. Without becoming mad, this alteration in the signifying 
relation can only be temporary and offer radical new possibilities of being in a creative 
encounter with the signifying system per se. 
Melancholy persons, with their despondent, secret insides, are potential exiles but also 
intellectuals, capable of dazzling, albeit abstract, constructions. (Kristeva: 1989,64) 
In their daring outbreak, Tom and Hatty break the confines of their own representation within 
the text which writes them. In other words, they re-write themselves as subjects. By sliding 
beneath the surface of the signified they find themselves slipping beneath the surface of that 
which anchors them. Yet they must be necessarily anchored in order to slip and it is this very 
anchoring which allows the means of escape. In every construction lies its own re- 
construction/deconstruction as its limits bar the excluded. The outlaw is what make the law 
operative: the outlaw upholds the law. The cries of Tom and Hatty are thin and high, 
compared to birds; free so that they might go through doors in the text, go "beyond the 
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garden" (120) and slide out from beneath the walls and confines of the territory into which 
they are written. 
Outbreak: Play and Laughter 
So, at once, their play began again in the garden, and went on as though the garden 
and their games need never end. (116) 
During their skating expedition on the river Ouse, Tom and Hatty notice the new fashion of 
figure-skating. An orange acts as the centre-pin in the middle of a figure-skating company. 
In one place an orange had been set centrally upon the ice, and four top-hatted, 
dignified gentlemen were describing a harmony of figures to it - from it - round it. 
(181) 
This physical object acts as the linchpin, the static point round which the subject revolves, the 
centre resting point in reference to which the pendulum swings, the tower of Ely in relation to 
which the traveller locates itself. Yet this linchpin is out-of-place, stolen by a street urchin 
and the skaters are set free in their movements upon the ice. Tom and Hatty's laughter at the 
theft of this pivot is euphoria at a de-centred dance. The theft and flight which follows relates 
to Cixous' use of the term voler as a feminine gesture in negotiation with linguistic access. 
She flies/steals. 
To fly/steal is woman's gesture, to steal into language to make it fly. 
(Cixous: 1996,96) 
In 'Women's Time, Kristeva notes the connection between the primary object relation and 
"the appearance of the first spatial references which induce the child's laugh and then induce 
the entire range of symbolic manifestations which lead eventually to sign syntax" (Kristeva: 
1981,15-16). 
As they laugh together, Tom and Hatty engage in a transitivism operative at the 
identification process in the mirror stage described by Lacan. It is this transitivism which is 
formative of the spatial identification by which the subject will project itself into the mirage of 
"I". In the case of Tom and Hatty, it is located specifically in their laughter: and Hatty 
laughed; and Tom laughed too, but no one except Hatty heard him" (183). 
Like Tom, Hatty laughed... (181) 
... and Hatty would laugh and Tom too. (117) 
Like Tom, Hatty laughed aloud at the impudence of the theft; but all the time she was 
looking around her sharply and a little nervously (18 1). 
It is Tom's invisible accompaniment which allows Hatty to break free of the text 
which binds her as she engages in an audacious adventure for a late-Victorian woman. In her 
feminine outbreak, Hatty is literally ahead of her time. By leaving the familiar restraint of 
story-time, she engages with subversion in textual terms. The place of feminine outbreak is 
inhabited by the child within the story, a place of never-ending possibility and configuration 
of the subject within the signifying system. 
'What do you see beyond the garden, Tom? ' Hatty whispered up to him, her curiosity 
having overcome her fears. (120) 
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The vision of freedom that Hatty and Tom gain by looking "beyond the garden" comes from 
pushing the boundary of what encloses them: opening a door. It is as Tom gazes freely about 
him atop the garden wall that "he was taken by a sudden joy" (119). It is this overpassing the 
limit andgoing beyond'that allows access to a never-ending tale. 
She opened doors for him. (77) 
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Negotiating Theories of Feminine Writing: Michile Roberts, In the Red Kitchen 
Negotiating Theories of FeminineWriting: Michile Roberts, In the Red Kitchen' 
Hysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences. (Breuer & Freud: 1991,58) 
... she, the outcast, 
has never ceased to hear the resonance of fore-language. She lets 
the other language speak - the language of 1,000 tongues which knows neither 
enclosure nor death. (Cixous: 1981,260) 
In the Red Kitchen is a text preoccupied by the act of feminine textual production. Its frame 
of reference includes psychoanalytical and post-structuralist theory in conjunction with new 
French feminism. Its referentiality is such that it engages with theory in a fictional domain, 
drawing upon its reader's awareness of the body of work which is pulled into the circuit of its 
telling. Within its own domain, it examines what it means for the feminine subject, as 
theoretical exile, to inhabit the symbolic. Evicted from the means of representation in her own 
right, it follows her wanderings as she becomes stranger to herself - separate from what names 
her - and explores her relationship with such estrangement. Rage, submission and hysteria are 
written through and underwrite her means of subversion before she is able to write in her own 
name, as if to write a name implies full possession and authority. She must face a double 
eviction, a double castration for she has had her nothing cut off. she has undergone negative 
castration. In his essay, 'Difference', Stephen Heath writes that, 
... the woman experiences the symbolic castration 
from a site elsewhere to the man: 
the penis has never been a part of her, the 'you are not the phallus' of castration with 
its process of being and having accords differently, difficultly for her; she passes from 
loss of an imaginary part of herself - the doubling, the partition - to the loss of an 
organ that can only be a superimposition on that other loss which it continues to 
figure... (Heath: 1978,68) 
This feminine castration is a lost loss: a wound without a mark. Her hurt cadt be seen: 
internal bruising with no display upon the body yet integral to it. A thing not of the body but a 
fleshly thing still. How may she then write T while side-stepping that fatal rigidity? How 
may this double loss be confronted in order to write a name upon it? She must open what has 
been invisibly sutured and yet remain whole, intact in her opening up: "Woman must put 
herself into the text" (Cixous: 1981 [1975], 245). 
Within this scenario, the script is engaged in an encounter with the invisible that is its 
own ghost, its condition for existing as such. Such absence is the insurance of the signifier's 
place, underwriting its meaning and supporting its attempt at stability in denial of its 
unconscious great beyond. When'she writes her story, her prehistoric existence remembered 
in the dark is ancient history. Hat, exiled from kingship, travels through time and black space 
to figure in another womatfs story as recollected echoes and interruptions. As the castration 
trauma becomes a mechanism which is replayed in every utterance, it is an active left-over of 
the signifier in its incisive path. 
This moment of cut is haunted by the form of a bloody scrap - the pound of flesh that 
life pays in order to turn it into the signifier of the signifiers, which it is impossible to 
restore, as such, to the imaginary body; it is the lost phallus of the embalmed Osiris. 
(Lacan: 1977,265) 
The feminine position in relation to desire is, therefore, complicated by the duality of her 
position, she occupies a place of superimposition, negotiating with the figure cast by a ghost- 
limb. She enters a locus of virtuality in her negotiation with the signifier. Doubled-up in her 
theoretical positioning, a woman writing may claim privilege through a loop-back into the 
system, a loop-hole in the Law which writes her as The Woman. Each woman's script reaches 
back and forth in the red kitchen to recoup a loss and negotiate a future in a narrative of her 
own making. 
.. my own past leaps back at me in flashes. Impossible to hold gleaming drops of 
water in my fingers; the past leaps away in a silver trail of silver; yet I need to go on 
trying to hold it ... I want to tell you my stories. (Roberts: 1991,17)2 
Her tactic for survival becomes a retrieval system: a projection of the recollected and 
fragmented past into the virtual space of the future. She negotiates the impossible loss of what 
she never had, what has written her in theory as missing from view. Writing becomes 
premonitionary, producing a script in the process of which she may become whole and rise 
again through her stories and "watch[ ] the past CbaDge into the future" (54). 
Narrative Diaspora: "I am an exiie... " (133) 
I sensed that there was a beyond, to which I did not have access, an unlimited place 
... A desire was seeking its home. (Cixous: 199 1,1) 
The feminine dispossession with which In the Red Kitchen concerns itself is offset by its 
representation of a proliferation of female authorship. In this sense, it seems to engage in a 
multiplication of the the phallic function from which the feminine is supposedly exiled. 
Within its covers, the stories of five women overlap so that many 'I's are established in one 
textual space. The story-tellers swarm like hungry worms crawling over the face of the dead 
father so that in the singular authority of saying T lies a simultaneous community and 
recognition of a radically split subject. Historically unwritten, banished from signification, 
there is no afterlife for posterity, no female history or testament for the dispossessed woman. 
She does not inherit after the father's death, her symbolic access is only operable through him, 
by his licence, in his name. She is displaced, scattered afar in her diaspora. King Hat laments, 
I am an exile, doomed to wander in the night, homeless, searching for something I 
sball never find. (133) 
The fortunes of the signifier lie walled up within the secretive tomb. Hat may not inherit 
Kingship. She is denied access to this afterlife through the flight of the signifier as she is 
excised from the record, deleted from history. 
I have been unwritten. Written out. Written off. Therefore I not even dead. I never 
was. I am non-existent. There is no 1. 
... I have lost the great male force that was once in me ... I am a spirit condemned to 
roam forever through the dark never to find a resting place ... I have lost the carved 
and painted house that sheltered my remains. (133) 
King Hat's beard as sign of virility has been removed, she loses what she didn't have in the 
first place. The feminine position is that of the castrated subject, her symbolic penis has been 
cut off. "the sign of my kingship has been broken off me" (132). She must turn grave-robber 
and desecrate the father's holy places by robbing the pyramid of its withheld treasure and use 
her knowledge for subverting the codes which bar her. She flies through the dark to find an 
amaneunsis: "She flies/steals. To fly/steal is woman's gesture, to steal into language to make 
it fly" (Cixous: 1989[1986]: 114-115). 
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The daughter's anger allows her to break the frame, the father's forme spills what it 
attempted to lock up tight. Flora escapes from Salpetriere by smashing through the 
representation that incarcerates and infantilizes women by placing them "inside a cot with 
bars" (121). 
... she's not mad, she's angry ... 
She leaps from her cot, through the black bars that 
frame her and try to hold her still, she smashes through the glass of the photograph... 
(130) 
She must negotiate with the symbolic order, inherit the paternal legacy and embrace the 
phallus by which she may name herself in her sub ection. This is the feminine double bluff 
required to survive - her subterfuge in submission. 
They think they have guessed our secret thoughts. How can they? We dolft speak. 
We just dance for them, which is all they want. They are delighted with our 
performance. Delighted daddies... (128) 
The daughter negotiates with the position of femininity as a survival tactic, a screen through 
which she may reach for the "stolen goods" that she may acquire from the symbolic. She 
becomes a raider of the ark of the 'A' in differance. In 'Womanliness as a Masquerade', 
Riviere writes that, 
Womanliness therefore could be assumed and worn as a mask, both to hide the 
possession of masculinity and to avert the reprisals expected if she was found to 
possess it - much as a thief will turn out his pockets and ask to be searched to prove 
that he has not the stolen goods. (Riviere: 1986 [1929], 38) 
Tomb of the Word: The Great Beyond 
Through the high gates we go. (72) 
Writing, I live; I enter that world beyond the false door of the tomb. .. (24) 
The dead man's family, now seen in public for the first time since his death, carry 
their distress into the shadows of the crescent-shaped colonnade just within the gates. 
(Barker and Gay: 1984,8) 
In the Red Kitchen offers a textual geography of superimposition, the text becomes itself a 
moving pastiche, a mosaic of bits-and-pieces in its representation of a feminine writing body. 
It employs the tactics of trickery required to find its a way around the maze of structuration 
that constitutes the writing T. In its enclosure of different narrative bodies, the novel 
functions like a Victorian necropolis. It lays out its stories within a space where they are kept 
carefully separate but lie so closely to each other that one may enter the other in a display of 
dissolution, a patterning of narrative scraps. Its subject is the writing subject, its body consists 
of excerpts from five different women's writing in the form of letters and journal entries in an 
interlocking of fictional autobiographies. The writing T presented here is one which passes 
through its own place, travelling through the designated framework of its telling. 'She7and'he 
are passed through as markers to enter 'you' as subject of narrative destination, as surely as the 
Egyptian Avenue leads to the Circle of Lebanon. The subject is caught up in a process of 
telling in what Lacan refers to as "the endless circularity of the dialectical process" (Lacan: 
1977: 105). She transcends her necessary interpellation through the decentring of narrativeT. 
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... she's everywhere, she exchanges, she is the desire-that-gives. .. She comes in, 
comes-in-between herself me and you, between the other me where one is infinitely 
more than one or more than one, without the fear of ever reaching a limit ... (Cixous: 1981 [1975], 263-4) 
From the resting place to the restless place where 'she' changes endlessly into new 
configurations/formations borne in spite of restriction, the text reaches through its narrative 
body whilst remaining contained in it. As readers, we move between its partitions, stepping 
over its story-coffins, picking a way between the repercussion of story elements as they are 
echoed within each woman's writing as if to write is a revisitation of an other woman's script, 
Ilan insistant memory that will keep breaking through" (54). The evolution of the writing "I" 
represented in the text is haunted by revertants. She speaks herself in an other's script whilst 
simultaneously kept firmly within her own written boundary, seff-contained. "I'm a whole, " 
says Hattie, "and I'm different parts" (17). This narrative dynamic is written by an escapist T 
which must necessarily always have its structure left in place to escape from. Implicit in its 
desiring articulation is a deathliness which takes the form of a radical de-centering of the 
subject. The text unwrites itself just as it is set down, implicit in its making is its unmaking: 
"it is precisely because desire is articulated that it is not articulable" (Lacan: 1977,302). 
The text confronts its own "great beyond" (69,97), using the narrative body as that 
which contains and thereby offers a converse armature upon which to transpose itself. It 
passes through whilst remaining complicit with the narrative enclosure. Turning itself inside 
out and opening up its writing space, it lifts the lid from within on its scriptible body. In a 
visceral turning out, this writing body may rise again through that which is always elsewhere 
in the trace of signification. Its parts may be gathered up in the textual afterlife to make a new 
beginning out of what has already ended. The text is itself a repository: a box of bones, a jar 
full of visceral organs, a cemetery stuffed with compartments for the dead labelled by the 
fictional scriptor's voice "in an attempt to classify and to keep separate bodies which were 
now dissolved into each other" (117). Roberts seems to be making a narrative out of theory 
when she portrays the feminine subject re-negotiating the symbolic with the result of 
remodelling the phallus as its transcendental signified. The paternal function is restored to a 
different wholeness as it passes through the redeeming fire of the fictional kitchen. Hat tells 
how, in the afterlife, "[a]ll the parts of my father will be held together ... His body will be 
made "new" (37). Hattie dreams that she feeds the fragmented body of her abusive uncle to 
the kitchen fire so that he may be reborn and made whole. 
He is the body, and he is the blood. I sort his dismembered limbs. Bit by bit I feed 
him into the red fire in the range. (137) 
It is in the place of the other to whom the narrative process is directed that the 
women's stories overlap: the reading other is the body their voices traverse and is the space 
where they overlap, echo and converge. The other is the medium who calls up these voices of 
a fictional past and into a 'present' heavily pregnant and split within its telling. This reading 
other is one which is operative both outside and inside the text as part of its story. Flora 
represents this reading other within the text, hers is the body which is traversed by the other 
women's narratives. 
I am a hollow stick the spirits blow messages down. I'm the speaking tube ... a corridor for others' voices ... I am the cave they enter. I don't belong to myself 
anymore; I don't know who that is. (92) 
By negotiating a text divided from within, the reader receives visitants from beyond 
the demarcated cells of its telling. It becomes a cartography of death, a mapping-out of the 
narrative body en-graved by the signifier as "[i]n the medium's body a death takes place" (94). 
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It is this very rigidity of black marking that is writing which allows a fluidity which is directly 
due to what is repressed in shaping a story. That which runs around the marked place keeps it 
in position, tethered to its own excluded unmarked 'great beyond' as the unconscious of the 
manifest text. Deathliness is seen to be implicit in the structure and function of the signifier 
even as it is an affirmation. Here is the grim other to whom every sentence we utter is 
directed and is the active climax to all desire. 
Seeing is Believing: Virtual topology 
doorways to that other invisible world (116) 
in the new house she hallucinated her old room... (Breuer and Freud: 1991,86) 
For the estranged feminine subject to signify is to negotiate an imaginary topology, one which 
has cast its shadow from the dominant discourse from which she is excluded. She enters 
"another house, a secret one twinned with this one, invisible mirror image" (25). Because she 
is made to bear the effects of a loss of that which she never possessed, she is required to 
hallucinate a presence made of absence. A virtual reality of the symbolic is therefore more 
directly inhabited by the feminine subject. (This is not to say that the phallic is any more'real' 
for the male subject but that he is more secure in his phantasy, more able to hallucinate full 
possession of the phallus due the presence of the culturally invested penis. ) This other 
dimension of the signifier, the absence which underpins its presence, may act as that which 
produces the signifier in its place. It is operable as that which runs around the mark in its 
location, it is "the part you carft see" beneath Flora's petticoats (1). Here is the capacity for 
passion without which the signifier would lie stone-dead without hope of the glorious after- 
life. The sign is always in expulsion of itself, traversed by "that other invisible world" so that 
in marking it always misses the mark. 
In his essay entitled 'Differance' (1968), Derrida refers to Hegel's comparison of the 
visual aspect of the letter 'A' to an Egyptian pyramid (Derrida: 1973,132). The letter 'A' 
comes to bear, through its graphic mark, the silent pronunciation of differance in which 
Derrida locates repercussions in the signing system as the signifier rises again by virtue of 
excess in a transfigurative gesture. "It is a tomb that (provided one knows how to decipher its 
legend) is not far from signaling the death of the king", writes Derrida (1973,132). Yet far 
from "signaling the death of the king", I would argue that the presence of such a structure is 
implicit to the point of reference which underpins it. In Derrida! s renunciation of the "master 
name" (159) lies an assumption of a presence which may only operate in relation to a concept 
of transcendence. 
In Roberts' text, King Hat of Egypt declares that 
The tomb is the first book; the house of life; the body that does not decay because it is 
written. Stone is cut into, cut out; this absence of stone, this concavity, this 
emptiness, yet means a fullness: the words appearing, their presence overcoming the 
absence of what they denote, filling emptiness with meaning, creating the world over 
and over again. Writing I live; I enter that world beyond the false door of the tomb... 
(24) 
In its visual presence, the sign - providing one knows how to decipher it - offers the promise 
of conceptualizing that which is absent. This is to enter the imaginary space of the sign itself, 
to enter the virtual space it offers through the reading process. In an extension of the 
metaphysical conceit which Derrida's use of letter 'A' presents us with, we may explore this 
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structure as one which offers a diagrammatical parallel to the ambivalent mechanism which 
provides the dynamic of the signing subject. Because the pyramid consists of a triadic 
structure which is simultaneously squared off, it offers a monumental metaphor of the Oedipal 
structuration which gives way to what Lacan refers to in his account of 'the mirror stage' as 
"quadrature" of the ego (Lacan: 1977,4). The triangular structure which holds the signifier in 
its place may be regarded as the repercussions of the Oedipal scenario which underwrites the 
subjecfs initiation into symbolic law. The framing of T is therefore tied implicitly to its 
simultaneous triangulation, its squared off structure offers a framing screen upon which to 
project the animated ghost that is the ego. 
Following the extended lines of the pyramidical apex through their own axis results in 
the virtual reality of a perfect mirror image, a gestalt space. It is by passing through the 
grounding of the signifier in its mark that its ghost is called up, raising it from the dead. By 
following the logic of the structure to its apex and following the rules of its constitution to the 
extreme, a virtual reality may be encountered. In this the ego passes through the screen of its 
very constitution like the little girl in Spielberg! s Poltergeist. By entering the mirror image, 
the 'other side! of the text is encountered in a virtual reality. Boundaries are transgressed 
whilst remaining within them, thereby inverting the speculative. The 'reality' of the material 
world is dislocated as the rigid ego formation in relation to the 'gestalt' as body-map of T is 
fragmented in the radically split subject. The wall of skin between self and world is in 
question as the formation of the subject is seen to be a continual negotiation process with the 
object of its projected observation. As Hattie decorates the house, she becomes aware of the 
enduring existence of the old house behind the new even though "[flhe house has had a skin 
graft, the clean membrane we've stretched over its walls" (54). The notion of breaking out of 
the frame is a repeated motif of In the Red Kitchen. The framing process of photographs, 
paintings, and printers' formes are counterpart to the structuration effect of the text as a square 
of mirror where the reading/writing subject may constitute itself. Writing her name for the 
first time, Flora discovers that "Flora is a small slate surrounded by wood" (19). Tammade 
to come to my name in the face of a "succession of phantasies that extends from a fragmented 
body-image to a form of its totality" (Lacan: 1977,4). Flora makes Hat/tie cross over from 
the'other side, called up by the ouija board. Operating as ghosts, HAT and HATTIE 
enter the fictional Victorian world in a two-way mirroring action, transgressing their own 
signified places within the text in which they are represented. They enter a place which is 
extra-textual to their own and yet constitutive of their stories, a place where they converge and 
act as echoes of each-other. The reader may look back through the future, anticipating later 
developments in the text due to adisturbance in the temporal relations of the narrative. 
The incestuous seduction of the daughter is repeatedly referred to in the narratives of 
which In the Red Kitchen consists. The identity of the subject which is properly constructed 
in relation to the incest taboo is here placed under a threat of dissolution as it is traversed by 
the structures which makeT. The narrative moves to accost the father, to "seize his arse with 
both hands, and draw him into me" (85). Crossing the prohibitive bar upon which the 
symbolic is laid is to unsettle the relationship between the signifier and the signified and to 
perpetrate a breakdown in the structuration of the subject's prehistory. Here the distinction is 
broken down between the structures that enable me to announce myself T and those by which 
T am named as subject within the embroiling meconnaissance of a seductive apparatus so that 
"I get confused forget which of us is which just darkness that has red in it" (115). A 
dissolution of the subject occurs, moving the borderlines that make me so that "I'm liquid 
darkness" (32). As a seven-year old child, Flora becomes "a dark fish swimming in dark 
water, released from [her] skin, free to be part of what was formerly outside [her]" (32). T 
become mapped out upon the grid in a 'quadrature' of being as a result of the specular 
encounter which brings me into the frame and Icts me out again on the understanding that its 
affect is carried within the ego as a perpetually constituting drama. In this way, it may be seen 
that every structure has its dissolution inherent in its being, buoying up its manifest content. 
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A Father's Love: "How great are his signs! " (Daniel 4: 3) 
Words mean life. The absence of words means death. (24) 
Thy rod and thy staff they comfort me. (Psalms 23: 4) 
The need for the rod of correction becomes apparent. It is the black mark which allows this 
Lazarus-type recuperation, a rising-again from the secret silent grave of the letter. It is the 
"[b]lack gloved fist" on which we must bite in our grief (2). The writing daughter must 
negotiate with the paternal phallus in order to recoup the mother and write her own story. To 
deny the phallus is be cut off, exorcised and excised from the symbolic, to surrender any 
possible transfiguration or reshaping through the sign. Erection brings with it possible 
resurrection. As the resurrection of the signifier is a perpetual enactment of the loss which 
preceded its advent, its passionate embrace is with death. Its sign of kingship is as a rod of 
power with dominion over death. Writing is a memorial and a sign of phallic power for it is 
the sign of Hat's kingship that is broken off when her signifier is under erasure. 
Now that my name has been hacked off the walls ... the sign of my kingship has been broken off me. 
I am lacking. I am a lack. I am nothing but a poor dead body that lacks the 
sign of life: I am female. (132) 
It is in negotiation with the phallus as transcendental signifier that feminine textual production 
must retrieve the mantle of meaning for itself so that a woman may be mistress of her own 
story. She must find a way out of the "liquid darkness" of the semiotic and bring to 
signification a new resurrection of the sign which is produced within the female body (32). 
Hat declares that, 
I shall dart forwards through hundreds of years, searching for a faithful scribe who 
will spell me right and let me rise. (133) 
Passing through the pyramid of the silent 'A' is a mystery, the encryptment of 
differance will allow it to rise again in an erectile tissue of secreted meaning that is written 
and may pass through the place of the other. 
When I swoop down through the darkness to re-enter my sepulchre and feast my eyes 
on its kingly splendours the air is made of spears and holds me back. The air resists 
and laughs at me. The air weaves a web of spikes across the entrance to my tomb and 
will not let mepass. (132) 
To break the bar of signifier is to enter 'the real' where "(t)here is real treasure. There are the 
real signs" (132). To pass through the screen which is the base of the signifier in its function 
is enter 'the real', to animate what is dead, to achieve the impossible reversal. This is equal to 
the symptom of the hysteric where the signifier has entered 'the real' through psychotic 
malfunction so that "[w]ords are trapped in all the corporeal images that captivate the subject" 
(Lacan: 1977,87). 
Roberts' text posits the maternal as privileged in its access to the pre-signified by 
looking through the enclosure which demarcates the subject. Hattie dreams that she views her 
unborn daughter on a hospital monitor, a ghost image in a war-zone, a pre-aborted foctus on 
T. V. Her image pre-dates her birth which never occurs, "[s]hreds of flesh, that's all my baby 
was" (73). 
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"FLASH - instant of time or dream without time; inordinately swollen atoms of a 
bond, a vision, a shiver, a yet formless, unnamable embryo. Epiphanies. Photos of 
what is not yet visible... (Kristeva. 1987 [1983], 234) 
She is alive only in the frame of medical representation, playing in the body of the other as an 
image projected upon a screen. It is the mother who looks beyond the tomb into an optics of 
virtuality, peeping through the opened wound of the gave ready to receive the loved one (4). 
Flora experiences her first sighting of King Hat by following her mother's gaze as she stands 
transfixed by gief 
Her eyes don't meet mine; they are clamped on some distant point in front. Beyond 
the grave. I follow the direction of her gaze... 
Then the earth drops away under me, opening up to let me in ... I swing down into the dark. (4) 
This break in the continuity of subjectivity constitutes a haunting by an other. Sightings occur 
due to the breakage of the body of the signifier as the bar between life and death is crossed. It 
is here that the clairvoyant reader-writer operates. She looks askance as she is beside herself 
with grief at separation from the stiff being lowered into the ground. It is the chief mourner 
who turns voyeur. Failing into the "[bjlack lips of earth parted" (3) like Alice down the rabbit 
hole, the subject confronts the deathly imperative which runs through her signifying status. 
She enters a realm of ghosts and encounters the past as it is implicit in her future. Hattie too 
finds herself "watching the past change into the future" (54). In her extreme separation from 
herself in trance, Flora watches herself in the second person: "[s]he is the point at which 
opposite charges, opposite impulses, spark and meet: life explodes into death, heat into cold, 
past into future" (94). 
Missing You: "lover, where have you gone? " (140) 
Still in my dreams I rage for him, stumbling after him... (140) 
The fact that the phallus is a signifier means that it is in the place of the Other that the 
subject has access to it. (Lacan: 1977,288) 
In Roberts' text, the loss of the loved one in story terms is made to designate the loss of the 
phallus as guarantor of meaning in textual terms. The paternal function must be maintained 
for without it "I'm nothing. I swing down into the dark" (4). Here is the dilemma for the 
feminine, for the symbolic may not be buried with the father but must fulfill its function 
through the daughter who has inherited his role as compositor. A re-negotiation needs to take 
place by which she may wear the "wide collar" (45) of the symbolic yet be unleashed from the 
place in which it writes her as 'Other': she must be tethered yet find freedom in her 
incarceration. It is necessary that T be en-graved so that T may be read and rise again. The 
"unwritten" Hat "seek[s] for a scribe who will write [her] name and let [her] live again ... 
who will spell me right and let me rise" (133). In her search for a memorial, Hat seeks to be 
re-membered in the place of the other as a locus for her reconstitution. The other becomes 
host, a body to ventriloquize, as she speaks through it in a reciprocal possession. Flora Milk 
complains that, 
No one who is not a medium knows what it costs to launch oneself between heaven 
and earth ... I am changed ... as I leave more and more of myself on the other side. A transfusion. I am increasingly a changeling. (92) 
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Writing here becomes a form of time-travel, a transcendence of the present. It is 
always somewhere other than implicit in its marking for it points backwards and forwards in 
the moveable 'now' of the reading contract, throwing itself continually beyond its own 
borderline. It is as a ghost from the future that Hattie King enters Flora's story as she is 
writing it (46). The future of the written haunts it as it is read for we read in anticipation. 
Lacan states that, 
... the sentence completes its signification only with its last term, each term being 
anticipated in the construction of the others, and, inversely, sealing their meaning by 
its retroactive effect. (Lacan: 1977,303) 
As we read the past in texts of the long-gone, we inhabit that region, raise it up and bring to it 
our own ghosts of the future as they inhabit the regions we have yet to reach. We are lodged 
within the narrative pulsions of the text, pushing us to its end. As we try to contain it, it 
contains us quite profoundly. We are in trance within the kitchen cupboard, bound within 
metaphor, echo chambers for the words of an other, "a corridor for others' voices" (92). 
In Hysterics: Place of the Reading Subject 
the symptom is itself structured like a language... (Lacan: 1977,59) 
The reader becomes the true hysteric of this text as our phantasy rises before us in all its 
rigidity in an encounter with metaphor and textual conceit. Here we confront our own desire 
as split subjects in negotiation with the text. Disconnected voices inhabit us like "faceless 
whisper[s] in the dark" (136) so that this alphabýt of desire spells us, makes us into receptacles 
of a tale, possessed by a voice not entirely our own. The subject cannot lay claim to owning 
all of what is or isn't said or written as the utterance always exceeds itself, becomes 
disconnected and activated on its own account. Words let loose becomes "real things in 
themselves" as they are assembled in reading into a meaningful body (24). The text is a 
corpus of signs where words are "bits of dead flesh and bone" (125). Here what is figured 
becomes 'real' as it is taken into the body of the reading subject: "There is the real treasure. 
There are the real signs ... which promise eternal life" (132). An elderly Flora Milk writes in her journal, "Why write it all down here? To make it real. To make the memory of this time 
real; should it pass" (86). 
Coming to life again in signs is taken to its extreme in the hysteric's symptom as the 
sign is made flesh in a materialization of the signifier as "a message passed in silence through 
flesh" (125). This is the place of the mystic threshold represented in In the Red Kitchen, the 
medium upon which is written a parallel time in narrative enclosure; a locus of recuperated 
'treasure'. A visceral exercise, writing is a way of "bringing back", it hurts the body of the 
writing subject in its production. This is the tomb that must be opened, the womb that must 
give birth, the medium who must materialize, the hysteric with her "body full of knowledge" 
(127) who must configure in gestures, the woman who must lend her kitchen to cook a dish of 
selected ingredients, the writer who must compose out of a lexicon Of negative differentiation. 
Making something out of nothing. Writing supplies a cordial to the missing missing phallus. 
Flora writes her painful journal in order to restore the loss of her loved ones. 
It hurts writing this ... I think I'm doing it to bring George back to me, to make Jo live again, to pick up my son's poor shattered body and mend it, to hold my husband 
in my arms and heal him. (141) 
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Recording the past entails reliving it in an inexorable narration. 
I will go on. I will force myself to write down what happened. I will go back in there, 
and remember. (120) 
The passed over is brought back before the subject in a pageant of ghostly masquerade which 
takes the dead and buried body of the past and re-orders it in the present, projecting its future 
life through the apex of its interpellation as "doorway[ I to that other invisible world": a virtual 
after-lifie (116). The coffin has a moveable lid, it is an open book. 
The tomb is the first book; the house of life; the body that does not decay because it is 
written ... this absence of stone, this concavity, this emptiness, yet means a fullness: 
the words appearing, their presence overcoming the absence of what they denote ... Writing, I live... (24) 
In our confrontation with the reading process, we are turned orthographers, we are 
become amanuenses for In the Red Kitchen is a text where we must "spell me right and let me 
rise" (133). Fascinated by its story-telling postures, the reader is mesmerised by the stories 
within. This is a text tied very firmly to narrative enclosure whilst breaking open the story 
into different narrative bodies belonging to different feminine subjects represented in its 
fiction. It constitutes a veritable display as it attempts to enact in its narrative construct what 
writes the subject in her splitting and thereby presents 
**'a process of becoming in which several histories intersect with one another. As 
subject for history, woman always occurs simultaneously in several places. 
(Cixous: 1981 [1976], 252) 
The different narratives are connected by common metaphors operable as one story constantly 
invades, dis-places, or superimposes the other in an evasion of proper story space. This text is 
a show-off, a shameless hussy made to display its knowledge and theoretical awareness so 
that, in the reading process, its "message passe[s] in silence through flesh" (125). Yet it is 
simultaneously coy, shy in its self-consciousness, hiding its centre by fraying into different 
threads. Folded upon itself in narration, it leaves an undiscovered area that is specifically in 
the locus of the reading body as it is invited to speculate around this hole, this postulated 
missing centre, in an exuberance of desire to uncover what is not not there at all. In chasing 
after its configurations, the reader behaves like Dr. William Preston as he records Hattie's 
gestures in Flora's body. 
He places me in different positions, lifting my arms, adjusting my leg, tipping my chin 
with his finger ... He opens the front of Hattie's robe to show her breasts, flicking the 
nipples to stiffen them ... her knees apart... (122) 
These are the postures of a story-teller. The text is left wide open, unhinged for speculation: 
a peep-show text, a hanky-panky narrative. In its postures, it turns on us for its openness is 
theoretically loaded. We are invited to play mystic, visionary, mother - whoring to it as we 
are inserted into its different narratives and styles, catering for every taste. In clambering to 
kiss the rod of the text, we embrace the absent but operative phallus that we may not lose our 
way in the textual maze, to maintain erection within its speaking tube. The phallus rises again 
over the flaccid flesh of the cadaverous sign so that the tomb may be broken open and the 
circuits of the body become a "corridor for others' voices" (92). This parallels the return of 
the repressed as it is written upon the body of the hysteric. "I must let my body shape words 
for me, " says Flora at Salpetriere, "My body full of knowledge" (127). The split subject is 
traversed by voices across the abyss of time, prc-occupied by the past made present. 
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The Textual Tease: Narrative seduction 
Her filthiness is in her skirts. (Lamentations 1.9) 
Flora Milk is a monster in silk skirts. She looks like a woman, but she's a devil 
underneath, the part you can't see. (1) 
To read is to be seduced by a narrative lure, this tease of a text never reveals all its secrets just 
as the medium never reveals all that is tucked under her skirts. Hidden beneath Flora's skirts, 
tucked in her "clean and exquisite" (49) underwear are her props. This is the "the part you 
caift see", what you don! t see if you are "so in love with her" because "[h]er trick is to charm 
you" (1). Invited to search Flora's pre-seance person, Minny Preston is moved to write to her 
mother in praise of Flora's bodily presence. 
... that soft breast! Shall I confess to you that the sight of her maidenly charms gave 
me no small pleasure. .? (49) 
Here is the dynamic of seduction inherent in the spectacle, the romance of encountering those 
ensnaring "black marks that mean something" which demarcate the other as locus of the 
subject's story/history (19). Entrapment is enacted in this textual seduction which inserts the 
reading body into that of the narrative. The miconnaissance of the produced subject in the 
specular relation may be extended to written misrecognition, projecting my self into the text. 
The story is only as successful as these "black marks that mean something" allow it to 
become, using ensnaring ink as a decoy (19). 
... the structure of all ideology, interpellating individuals as subjects in the name of a Unique and Absolute Subject is specula! y, i. e. a mirror-structure, and doubly 
speculary: this mirror duplication is constitutive of ideology and ensures its 
functioning. (Althusser: 1971,168) 
As we enter In the Red Kitchen, we are embroiled in a duplicity, a confidence trick. It 
is a text which opens to us in proportion to our theoretical knowledge. "She opens" (12) like 
the supine flesh of a desirable young medium entranced within an enclosing frame. Explorers, 
we are invited to poke our fingers into its secret places in an encounter with its theoretical 
display. We un-cover it, checking beneath its petticoats for tricks. Yet it is an entrapment, a 
lure into its constant referral to theories. It seems to lead to a history outside, to the 
biographical, to 'the real' of its fiction operating as a feminist chimera. We are invited to go 
all the way but the text pulls back. It appears to invite us to the centre of its enigma, to the 
beyond it represents in its storyline but supplies only a virtual beyond due to its theoretical 
display. Layer upon layer upon layer in orchestrated narrative movement, it holds us bound 
within its confines like the naughty girl in the cupboard. The text operates in the same manner 
as Flora Milk. As she is placed in a position of mesmeric surrender, dispossessed of her self, 
she is fully aware that in this very diaspora lies the power of spectacle as all who look upon 
her are in thrall, seduced by the appearance/place of seduction. In her subjection lies a 
strength, a privilege of access due to her 'unfinished' feminine state: what is traditionally the 
'weaker vessel' is strongest of all. In the darkness she soars: she grows big in the dark place. 
"As a child in the dark I'm powerful" (18). 
Most of her audiences are so in love with her, the ladies as much as the gentlemen, 
they forget to look sharp, anyway. (1) 
Through the restraint of representation comes liberation, enabling her to smash through "the 
heavy black bars that frame her and try to hold her still" (130). The black marks of ink tell a 
story of suppression in areas of gender, class and religion - but it is the very same black 
marking which produces a means of subversion in its repressed unconscious as discourse with 
which to counter so that "I live outside the edges of your paintings" (101). 
The "opening up of this dark continent" (145) may itself wield a power as that which 
constantly escapes the dominant power structure, stepping outside established borderlines in 
new configurations as the quest becomes more strategic. It is in its alliance to this perpetual 
inaccessible place that we are embroiled in the reading experience: a reciprocal relation. The 
text and its reader are lovers who two-time each other; as one presses forward, the text retreats 
and vice versa. It becomes a matter of double bluff, of "how well I can hide my meaning while 
at the same time revealing it" (127). It is this already complex state that the novel complicates 
still further as this is its very subject, an elusive text which reproduces from within in 
reiteration of its radically split process of production, representative of Spallung. The desire 
between text and reading other is encompassed by and represented in the act of writing. "I 
want to tell you my stories" writes Hattie (17). As narratives are directed towards the other as 
locus of the subject's tale, the reader is enticed by the lure of interpretative treasure, by this 
relation multiplied by its fictional representation within. Stories overlap as the writing 
women's experiences are directed to each other, they become other within their 'own' stories, 
placing the reader in the frustrating fictional position of subject, making the fantasy of this 
fiction our object of desire and ourselves infinitely split and knowing it. The reader becomes 
an hysterical configuration. This fictional affect is achieved as the phantasies called up in the 
reading process are "the secret words my watchers want to guess" (127). The textual doctor 
is putting us through our paces as we take up the postures necessary to react to the different 
tones, stories, and theoretical references. Con Davis writes that, 
Narratiods manifest content is a product of the unconscious discourse that is both the 
precondition of narration and the site of its appearance. This says essentially that the 
subject of narration ... will always be other that what is signified in narration, or what is signifiable as narration ... narrative interpretation, too, [is] a movement, a 
trajectory, a contingent effect, within the larger (unconscious) discourse of the Other. 
(Con Davis: 1983,854) 
To be caught up in this spatial play brings adjustments to the temporality of the text. 
It is here that "the past surrounds me and holds me, and my own past leaps back at me in 
flashes"(17). It is in the kinetics of Spallung represented as a split text that the reading other 
must insert itself in an encounter with the Other, i. e. their own unconscious locked in an 
inevitable transmissive relation with that of the text and its fictional representatives. It is here 
that T really fluctuates as what is represented as writing T in the story-line steps into the 
constitutive ego of the reading subject. 
What is realized in my history is not the past definite of what was, since it is no more, 
or even the present perfect of what has been in what I am, but the future anterior of 
what I shall have been for what I am in the process of becoming. (Lacan: 1977,86) 
Con Davis describes LacaWs model of narration as "a split process, a two-fold process that 
swings metronome-like ftom side to side between product and production (manifest text and 
unconscious discourse), back and forth" (Con Davis: 1983,857). As the metronome swings 
between manifest and unconscious text, the adventures of the inscribed T are located and 
contained in the narrative and the dissolution of the subject in "the air outside time in which 
I'm tossed" (93). A moving display is produced, an oscillation in the gap which is the area of 
enigma in the text as the dynamics of desire between subject and Other are inherent in what is 
narrated so that "[n]arration is structured like a (subject in) language" (Con Davis: 1983,853). 
As the writing women are traversed by stories simultaneously their own and not their 
own, the main bodies of their narratives are interrupted with inserts from a 'present' which is 
itself past as it is passed through in its writing movement. Hattie! s visit to Salp&ri&e is 
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described in a superimposition of images from childhood onwards in a parody of the 
psychoanalytic encounter so that parallel time runs through her (120-129). Klein writes of 
analysis that it 
... makes its way from adulthood to infancy, and through intermediate stages back to 
adulthood, in a recurrent to-and-fro movement according to the prevalent transference 
situation. (Klein: 1990,173) 
Ectoscopy of Telling 
The mirror stage is a drama ... which manufactures 
for the subject, caught up in the 
lure of spatial identification, the succession of phantasies that extends from a 
fragmented body-image to a form of its totality... (Lacan: 1977,4) 
The narrative becomes unwhole: a broken body, a story in bits-and-pieces, it occupies a 
paranoid-aggressive textual position. The "dismembered limbs" (137) of the paternal is a 
central metaphor for this fragmented body-image which prescribes what is a 'normal' 
developmental encounter with the ego-ideal in the reflective screen where the text is 
constituted. Before submitting herself to "the severest scrutiny science can provide! ... tfie 
penetrating gaze" of William Preston, Flora checks her image in the mirror held by her sister 
(62). 
She holds the looking glass for me, moving it up and down so that I can see myself in 
bits: neck, mouth, elbow, car. I'll do. (59-60) 
This dis-membering ofT in the mirrored encounter is analogous to that which occurs during a 
disturbance in ego formation in relation to the specular investment allied to the castrative 
function of the split constituted by such necessary identification with an imaged exterior. 
The subject is a corridor for the 'other world' to speak through, a servant to be 
summoned by a disembodied voice as the word is activated and set loose to rattle through the 
apparatus of the text-in-process. It operates in the pre-written of the written as the grid upon 
on whichT am mapped out. The maternal position is especially vulnerable for it is the place 
of a doubled-up split, a line of simultaneous weakness and strength: a place of danger yet with 
the potential to access the serniotic. Kristeva links this meeting point of body and the signifier 
in pregnancy. 
We live on that border, crossroads beings, crucified beings ... A mother is a 
continuous separation, a division of the very flesh. And consequently a division of 
language. (Kristeva: 1987 [19831,254) 
The novel is written around the scenario of pregnancy so that it represents a cemetery of 
mother's stories, positing textual production to be "full of mother's dead babies" (3). Hattie 
suffers miscarriage, Minny is pregnant and grieving the death of an infant, Hat wishes to birth 
herself through the use of another's body, Flora falls pregnant and is mother to many ghosts, 
including Hattie who she feels she has given birth to: "she's like a daughter: I've given birth to 
her, she's grown up and left me" (126). The relation between subject and other is broken 
down in this text. The body of the other subject speaks the voice of the child in its address to 
the mother as Minny's dead daughter speaks through Flora. Here is a mad cradle text whereT 
and 'you', 'me' and 'she' melt together in a dissolution of subjectivity. Flora's T is split from 
itself as 'she' fragments into third-person consciousness as the other speaks through her in 
during spiritual possession: "I see ... She is ... She jerks ... I watch ... " (94). This de- 
construction of T into second and third-person goes still further as the boundaries of the 
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subject break down so that T lose any sense of personal geography and may not be 
differentiated from what surrounds 'me. This constitutes a simultaneous powerful and 
powerless position for T am everywhere and yet T do not exist. 
... the edges of me dissolve ... There! s no solid Flora anymore, just ... a huge head bobbing on a neck grown suddenly thin and long, a stretching and tearing of guts and 
muscles. (91) 
Flora's mother's hands are like "two dead rabbits to be skinned and chopped" (121) and her 
words are spat out like "bits of dead flesh and bone" (125), the sound of Minny's dead baby 
crying is "butcher's meat on a hook" (91), Hattie! s T is in crisis when she cannot distinguish 
between the atoms that compose herself and what she calls "a chair, a table leg" (104). Minny 
dreams of a cannibalistic prehistory of Flora where she is "half woman, half beast" (112) 
gnawing on the flesh of Minny's "very own newborn babe! " (112) 
These are the images of castration, mutilation, dismemberment, dislocation, 
evisceration, devouring, bursting open of the body ... imagos of the fragmented body. (Lacan: 1977,11 - emphasis as original. ) 
It is in the face of such frightening phatasmagoria that the child learns to negotiate 'the 
real' mediated by a misrecognized unity: "I learn my own name, as something apart from 
myself, as something I can create in front of me ... One day it all falls into place" (19). This trauma of constitution is permanently re-played in all our relations as the mirror stage is a 
stadium in which the play in which T act is perpetually running. The price at which the 
subject buys its investment in ego projection by which to propel itself in the world brings with 
it a basis of paranoid dispersion. This constitutes the split consciousness that is inherent in 
linguistic application. Estrangement is caused by investment in the false image of unity due to 
necessary ego formation by which to projectT into history. 'Normal' paranoic aggressivity is 
the consequence of investment in a false image of unity necessary to social functioning. It is 
this level of ego investment that is affected by abject breakage. In the dangerous disruption of 
the liminalT lies the possibility of an altered topology: a moving mosaic of becoming. 
Abjection: Borderland 
My flesh is clothed with worms and clods of dust; my skin is broken and become 
loathsome. (Job 10: 19) 
... the narrative web is a thin film constantly threatened with bursting. For, when 
narrated identity is unbearable, when the boundary between subject and object is 
shaken, and when even the limit between inside and outside becomes uncertain, the 
narrative is what is challenged first. (Kristeva: 1982 [1980], 141) 
In narrative terms, In the Red Kitchen has no clean and proper body, its cells of telling exist as 
structures in transitional space. It is a story in bits-and-pieces which must pass through the 
fire of judgment to be re-membered. It presents the siYet-en-process as its story is told by an 
T in dissolution and recuperation. Its multiplication of the narrative act causes it to enter into 
the stories of others and to encounter the Other there in an attempt to regain that blissful union 
with the maternal phallus so that in writing'I' am quite literally beside myself. 
In its encounter with "those strange regions" (83), "those trackless wastes" (143), the 
text continually expulses itself in a frenzied attempt to maintain some decorum, some 
fastidious show, keeping its underwear as clean as Minny Preston's. Yet it is its very 
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preoccupation with structure which leads it to constantly dirty itself; pulling its orthopaedic; 
structure into new configurations requires an adjustment to be made to pulsions of its body 
proper. As Flora offers her body up for medical examination/possession by spirits in order to 
let the other side communicate through her as a speaking tube, she is in a position of 
vulnerability as her investment in her liminal subjecthood is under question. She also 
occupies an area of privileged access to the semiotic, playing in a dark place where she may 
forge herself anew, finding strength in the 'weaker vessel' as "the weaker sex" in its "very 
openness and availability" (143). The text seems to posit a privileged access through a 
radically split consciousness produced by crossing the corporeal threshold. The undoing ofT 
could be the making of me. 
Abjection is a resurrection that has gone through death (of the ego). 
(Kristeva: 1982 [1980], 15) 
The movement in the topology of a subject due to its geometric armour adopted in the 
specular relation is made manifest in textual terms by movement in the narrative casement. A 
hateful text is side-stepped, superimposed off-centre in order to write T in a resistance to 
received history. An embrace of the corpse of the paternal is essential in order to cross the 
threshold of his story so that she writes over his dead body. After dismemberment, he must be 
made anew, passing from the tomb to the kitchen, cold to hot. He must be written into the 
daughter's story which cannot be produced without accepting insertion into the symbolic order 
and adopting the "sign of kingship". The father is thereby contained by the daughter, she goes 
where he goes into the warm mother's body: "She is her father's sword. She belongs to him. 
One night she dreams that thus she can go where he goes: into the warm sweet mother. " (128) 
With reference to the intellectual woman, Riviere writes that 
... she identifies with the father; and then she uses the masculinity she thus obtains by putting it at the service of the mother. She becomes the father and takes his place; 
so she can 'restore! him to the mother. 
I ... I As the primal scene the talisman which both parents possess and which she lacks is 
the father's penis ... By depriving her father of it and possessing it herself she obtains the talisman... (Riviere: 1986 [1929]9 41-42 - emphasis as original) 
Horror of Undifferentiated Wholeness: The writer's fear of 'the real' 
In'A Sketch of the Past' (1939-40), Virginia Woolf explains her relationship with the writing 
process as one which posits an awareness of receptivity, 
... a token of some real thing behind appearances; and I make it real by putting it into 
words. It is only by putting it into words that I make it whole; this wholeness means 
that it has lost its power to hurt me; it gives me, perhaps by doing so I take away the 
pain, a great delight to put the severed parts together. Perhaps this is the strongest 
pleasure known to me. It is the rapture I get when in writing I seem to be discovering 
what belongs to what... (Woolf. 1989,8 1) 
The fetish that is language must be embraced in order to ward off the horror of fragmentation, 
a fear of being introjected into the other functioning as 'the real' and becoming swallowed up 
by its 'wholeness' so that T don't know where I begin or where T end. This writer's fear is a 
horror at not being able to mark out and differentiate, causing a process of 'making real' with 
words. Hattie's recipes, by which she learns what to include and exclude, are part of the same 
process as that which Flora struggles with when she re-gathers herself after spiritual 
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possession. Hattie's ghostly visitations where she reads the selected script on Flora's ouija 
board cause her to question her subjecthood as a "loose collection of atoms" (104). All these 
shiftings are connected with the act of writing. Hattie declares that, 
Through cooking I learned how much I was part of the world around me ... and how 
much I was separate from it. .. I imagined it must be the same with writing poetry: beginning with all the 
words in the world jumping inside in wonderful crystalline chaos, having to be sorted 
out, outside, into clumps and lines. (87) 
Hattie's recipes depend upon knowing "when to separate and when to merge" (87), a system of 
linguistic differentiation by which T measure myself out in misrecognized entirety: a false 
entity. Attracted by the "beautiful" lettering on the Milk family headstones, she contemplates 
"this air outside time in which I'm tossed" (93) in which all signification slides and falls into 
non-meaning as its boundaries are broken through and "dissolved into each other" (117). To 
be without a name is to be dead forever because "[w]ords mean life. The absence of words 
means death" (24). It is to enter the horror of the undifferentiated whole: to have truly passed 
away. 
The writer is a phobic who succeeds in metaphorizing in order to keep from being 
frightened to death; instead he comes to life again in signs. 
(Kristeva: 1982 [1980], 38) 
The very act of unitary illusion has its correlative repression, to structure is to exclude, to 
maintain the liminal boundary is to make demons out of the excluded in a system based on 
aggressive investment. The very presence of words denotes absence of 'the thine for it is a 
stand-in for 'the real'. Roberts' theoretical awareness is apparent in her lecture on 'The Place 
of Imagination' (1994): 
Language is founded upon absence. We dorft point with our fingers at the 
chair in the room beside us; we use a word as a pointer to designate the chair that is 
not there. 
Language erupts out of silence and splinters it. 
So when I write fiction I'm creating a presence. I'm depending on the 
materiality of words to conjure a show of that chair, that person ... This presence that fiction creates is crucially connected, I think, with absence, an absence that can be felt 
as insistantly material. (Roberts: 1994,18) 
The process of transmutation is represented in the themes and motifs of In the Red 
Kitchen. Its encompassing title refers to a volume of broken off bits of stories all gathered 
together to be made up andjoined by the reading act. Reading becomes a process of suture as 
it pieces together a ruptured text, its assemblage of parts become ingredients in a recipe 
written in the kitchen of a many-roomed text. 
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In Signifying Chains: Pauline Reage's Story of 0 
In Signifying Chains: Pauline Reage's Story of 0 
... desire is the furrow 
inscribed in the course; it is, as it were, the mark of the iron of 
the signifier on the shoulder of the speaking subject. (Lacan: 1977,265) 
There is a deception in amorous time (this deception is called: the love story). 
(Barthes: 1993,438) 
Story of 0 was written by Dominique Aury, a French journalist, translator and critic, and was 
first published in Paris in 1954. It was at first inception designed as a private trajectory 
between lovers. After writing it, Aury posted it chapter by chapter to her ]over, Jean Paulhan, 
an academic at the Academie Franýaise and a former editor of La Nouvelle Revue Franýaise. 
It was, he declared, "the most ardent love letter which any man has ever received" (Llewellyn 
Smith: 1994,12). In an interview with John de St. Jorre in The New Yorker in 1994, Aury 
confided her reasons for writing this text were deliberately seductive, "I couldrft paint. I 
couldn't write poetry. What could I do to make him sit up? " (Llewellyn Smith: 1994,12). In 
this sense, the text is a performative of itself, a delivery which is designed to provoke a 
physical response in the recipient to enslave him to his mistress. Its dispatch is written 
through with an epistolary suspense, its love story is one which is entirely schematic in its 
desire and as such exposes the devices of all naturalized discourse which seeks to conceal its 
mechanism. Linda S. Kauffman writes that, 
Since every letter writer is also a reader, epistolarity exposes the internal processes of 
the reading subject. What we call unique, transcendent passion is a compendium of 
the already read - already said -... (Kauffman: 1992, xxii) 
Its love story seems to undermine the expectations of love-story, offering physical torture 
instead of tenderness, promiscuity in the place of monogamy, repulsion where there should be 
reverence. In its revealing engagement with fictional conventions, it is indeed "most ardent" 
in its resistance. 
Until July 1994, Aury was concealed behind the pseudonym of Pauline Reage, using 
this name to hide behind like 0 behind the mask at end of her text. 0, a fashion photographer, 
is incarcerated in different locations and subjected to sadistic sexual practices until 'she' seems 
to be no more than a sexual practice. By the end of the text, she is reduced to a deaf/mute but 
ever-watchful owl. Yet her incarceration and subjection are fully agreeable to 0 and 
consented to by her in a text where she knows what to expect, moving in advance of her own 
narration, a "lucky captive" in a story of her own undoing (72). "[F]or nothing would be 
forcibly inflicted upon her" as a fictional character (109). O's apparent loss of agency may be 
the exercise and celebration of agency within an arena of a fictional subjection. In this, the 
text is drawing attention to its own supremely fictional premise through an artificial frame of 
reference. In its constructedness, it de-centres its central character and this de-centring is 
indeed its very storying. 
This section explores Sto! y of 0 in purely textual terms, as what it claims itself to be: 
a story of 0. The reading it offers sets out to examine the linguistic constraint at play in 
textual production, and to examine the control of and by signification through which we 
construct stories and by which we write ourselves as subjects. The projection of subjectivity 
in linguistic terms may be seen as central to this narrative in which desire is caught up for the 
writer and the reader. The figuring of the body is considered to be central to such a trajectory, 
not as a metaphysical counterpart to narrative pulsion and therefore peripheral in real terms 
but as absolutely inherent in linguistic control. By presenting deathliness in relation to 
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signification, the reading seeks to explore the tension existing in the configuration of T as a 
central result of the process of subjection by which we become subject. In this process of 
ambivalence, the subject may be regarded as ever-dying as it incessantly sloughs off the 
mortal coil of the signifier central to its constitutive presence. The construction of T may be 
seen to be relation to nothingness, the establishment of the subject is itself subject to the 
perpetual threat of its own dissolution. 
Master-Slave Dialectic 
Was the master who beat me himself very different from me? 
St. Augustine, Confessions of a Sinner. (St. Augustine: 1996,18) 
StoEy of 0 may be regarded as a literary enactment of Hegel's master-slave dialectic. It sets 
zero in relation to 1, nothingness in relation to being, like the body of 0 being possessed "now 
by one, now the other" (Reage: 1992,174)1 This text is written through with a conflation of 
the states of power and powerlessness. For T/one to exist, it must exist in relation to zero, to 
naught. The title of this text signifies nothing at the same time as it proclaims itself for it is a 
narrative written round an absence, an ambivalent construction around a sign that signifies 
nothing. It is indeed the story of the cipher for it has "no reality save in a closed circle" (68). 
The dictionary gives us this definition of the term'cipber': 
-a0, zero, naught 
- of no importance 
-a sign 
- method of transforming text to conceal its meaning by systematic substitution or 
transformation of its letters (to en-code) 
(Longman Modern English Dictionary) 
The Sto[y of 0 is the story of the adventures of the cipher: the story of nothing then or the 
story of the sign? It is also a narrative of transformative substitution rendered by the synthesis 
arising between being and nothingness. 
In this alternating state, the master and slave are locked in a dialectical relation: one's 
existence dependent upon the other. Her subjectivity set in relation to presence and absence, 
0 gives the key of her apartment to Sir Stephen and understands the nature of her state of 
bondage to be one of perpetual oscillation. 
Henceforth there would be no discontinuity, no gape, no dead time, no remission. He 
for whom one waits, because one awaits him, is already present, master already. (100) 
Presence is here instated by anti-presence whilst a pre-history runs through the present of the 
subject. In linguistic terms, the absence of the signifier is confirmed via a pre-tracing of its 
function so that the signifier is in advance of itself and already activated by its affect in the 
signified. Here is a backward-completion principle of the signifier's mark as it is privileged 
over the signified. In relation to "her only master in the strictest sense of the master-slave 
relationship" (81), 0 finds herself "an ecstatic slave" (160) and receives a "mark that will 
remain forever" (160). This textual intrusion into subjectivity is not an impress upon an 
already formed recipient but actually constituent of its subjectivity so that it comes to bear its 
subjection; it is the living apparition of its mark. 
The conflation of the master and the slave, the subject and its "single master" (65) 
may be regarded as having its base in the operative transitivism at the root of subject 
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constitution according to Lacanian topology. It is in this merging of self and other that the 
subject is first registered. The result of the tryst is the aggessive separation which must take 
place in order that T might wrench myself from the other. T is set in relation to the 
nothingness of the other then as T seek to dominate him. This is what, in 'Aggressivity in 
Psychoanalysis', Lacan terms "normal transitivism". 
The child who strikes another says that he has been struck; the child who sees another 
fall, cries. Similarly, it is by means of an identification with the other that he sees the 
whole gamut of reactions of bearing and display, whose structural ambivalence is 
already revealed in his behaviour, the slave being identified with the despot, the actor 
with the spectator, the seduced with the seducer. (Lacan: 1977 [19481,19) 
And of course the reader with the text. Lacan goes on to comment more upon this "structural 
crossroads" in ego formation. 
It is in this erotic relation, in which the human individual fixes upon himself an image 
that alienates him from himself, that are to be found the energy and the form on which 
this organization of the passions that he will call his ego are based. 
(Lacan: 1977 [1948], 19) 
Within this economy, the domination wish is due to the paranoic base of ego-formation. 
Lacan describes an affective aggressivity which is operative in the ego. This is a result which 
issues from the subject investing with narcissistic libido that which is before his eyes, a 
fetishized place of other as self. It is in this dialectic exchange which grows from the 
imaginary stage that the dynamic of the master-slave discourse is installed and which lends 
itself to the sado-masochistic economy of desire. The subject has come to be through an 
absolute state of alienation (due to the alienating function of the signifier to which we are 
subject) so that "you utterly belong to something which is apart from and outside yourself' 
(17). 
This is the affect of the alienating function of the signifter to which we are all subject 
and by which we are made subject. The subject is born, in this schema, through alienation by 
passing through the framing apparatus of the signifier. This framing process is itself a 
mechanism as coercive as the "barbarous apparatus" (138) by which 0 is tagged in the text, 
the metallic discs which pass through O's pierced flesh and bear the signifiers of her identity 
(137). 
On one side, gold inlay; on the other, nothing. 'On the blank side ... your name will be engraved, also your title, Sir Stephens first and last names, and beneath that, a 
device... (137) 
This is the device by which we know that we have this way passed, the mark in relation to 
which we circulate, one in relation to the other. I want to compare this with the power 
dynamic at play within narrative construction. Sto[y of 0 draws attention to a power 
mechanics of story-telling existing as coercion implicit in the process of negotiating this text 
which writes me. In reading, T submit to the mark of the signifier. 
Sto! y of 0 is one of those books which mark the reader - which do not leave him 
entirely, or at all, such as he was before: one of those books whose meaning is 
curiously bound up with the influence they exert ... (Paulhan: 1992,179) 
There is an irresistible erotics of seduction at play in textual encounter, a tantalization which 
marks the reading so that the reader is made to feel the impress of the text itself, to bear the 
chain of signification. Just as we enter the body of the text that is O's story, we are 
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simultaneously entered by the text. The body of the reader surrenders to the agency of the 
story: reader reception turned inside out. 
The story then is an 0, an enclosure, an enclave, a linguistic territory which lures the 
reader into a fictional captivity where once we enter we may languish in the cavity of its 
opened up body. "'Come, let me caress you, I want to tell you a story. ' [ ... ] she yielded, 'Tell me the story"' (152). Its invitation to enter is written upon an illusion of readerly agency. 
The text is a tease, it seduces us as we engage in a desire relation with the missing other: T 
enter the story of 0 then as another coupling in a text of couplings. In our love affair with the 
signifier, we are drawn back into nreconnaissance as it is played and replayed back in 
entrapment in the linguistic snare, the noose by which we hang in the symbolic. Here then are 
"those powerful ligatures, those hair-thin cables" which bind us Gulliver-style to the back-side 
of the signifier (85). 
As we enter the inner circle of the narrative, we engage with the omniscient mastery 
of the narrator and what the narrator 'knows'. We can see the functioning of this all-knowing 
mastery in the opening pages of this story. It oversees the opening by which we enter, enticed 
by what we do not know, intrigued by the unfolding of pages yet to come and in which warren 
of enigma we run in search of the crux of story in circuit upon circuit of never-ending 
jouissance. Here then are the lips of the story through which we pursue our desire through the 
opening of a text. What the narrator'knows' is repetitively referred to at the beginning of the 
text: "And then I know that. .. " (8), "1 don't know. .. " (8), "What I do know is that. .. " (9). The narrative T, usually absorbed into omnscience, occasionally gives itself presence. 
Referring to Rene, the narrator states that "during every violent scene I saw him" (118). The 
narrator is even able to inform us of the presence of O's lover when she is unaware and 
supplies the missing information in parenthesis: "0 did not have time to observe their faces or 
recognize whether her lover was there (he was)" (10). 0 is reduced to nothing but a perfect 
function, a character without agency in a narrative in which her representation is synonomous 
with her narrative function. In other words, Sto! y of 0, by stripping its main character of any 
pretensions of agency, may be regarded as drawing attention to all forms of narrative 
characterization and mechanics of linguistic entrapment which posit freedom of expression via 
the closed circuit of its system. Again and again, 0 is told what is to come in advance of 
narrative enactment, she is offered a premonition of what will become her through the 
performative of narrative; she thereby becomes her function. As 'she! is narrated, she is 
complicit with the text which writes her. She is told what is going to happen to her as she 
passes through the set 'scenes' of a story in which she is going to be a willing participant. By 
consenting to the proffered text, she is the proffered text, the subject of its sentence, a full 0. 
In the story of'she' here presented, 'she' is de-eentred in pronoun investment. There is 
utter confusion of'she'and'her'as one enters the other in a "transpierc[ing]" of pronouns (23). 
As she submits to the will of Sir Stephen and Rene-, to be what they wish her to be, she 
mimetically repeats the agreement after Sir Stephen, "repeating the phrases her lover dictated 
to her, dutifully substituting the pronouns: it was like a grammar exercise" (67). Here we may 
recall the meaning of the cipher - the function of 0- as it is simultaneously no-thing, a sign, 
and a substitutive process. 0 substitutes 'you' with T in a transpositioning of subjectivity. 
Here an intercourse of stand-ins, a place of the inter-said as she passes through the signifier 
into her signified place in the sentence. Lacan comments on the place of the 'inter-said'(inter- 
dit) as a 'between-two-subjects', "the very place in which the classical subject is divided and 
passes through the effects ofTading" (Lacan: 1977 [1960], 299). In her passing, the shades of 
deathliness are upon her as she passes out through the same door of her own be-coming. This 
is going Out through the In door. 
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Jouissance and deathliness: "In the name of the father 11 
For whom the Lord loveth he chasteneth... (Hebrews 12: 6) 
'Pleasure, we! ve got to move beyond that stage. We must make the tears flow. ' 
(The "other voice", 11) 
0 passes through pleasure to the suffering of jouissance as it is produced in relation to the 
master. She plays in this excess. Desire and its inherent deathliness are co-dependents in this 
equation. Lo, though she walk in the circuits of desire, the shadows of death shall be with her 
in her own footsteps... 
In the quasi-religious language of Story of 0 is instilled an crotics of submission to 
the all-encompassing body of the text. The simplicity of sentence-structure maintains the 
tensile arching of its textual body as it inter-cuts between two serniotic systems. It makes use 
of biblical spacing in its sentence-structuration through its repetitive employment of'and' as a 
connective tissue is woven between two systems of textuality. To convey outrage in the flesh, 
Sto! y of replicates western religious rhetoric which has conventionally sought to separate 
the undentifiable essence of T from bodily experience. In its parodic emulation, this narrative 
plays with a recognizable frame of reference by which the reader is placed upon a systemic 
crossroads so that the desire of the reading other body is set in relation to its own textual body. 
In coming to its language, we are nailed to its construct. In the name of the father we read. 
When 0 is chained up, her hands are "placed together "as when one prays" (22). When she 
performs fellatio on Rený, "[s]he received him as one receives a god, with thanksgiving heard 
his cry" (19). In this divine abjection, 0 passes through her signified place to a 'beyond' 
which is implictly tied to structure. In this way, she experiences jouissance. In 'God and the 
Jouissance of The Womatf, Lacan writes that, 
There is a jouissance proper to her, to this 'her' which does not exist and which 
signifies nothing. (Lacan: 1982 [1972-3], 145). 
In her sexual suffering, 0 is martyred, run through by "a long pin of words ... which 
penetrated the middle of her body" (65). "[G]ripped by a terrible pleasure" (140), she receives 
the mark of the stigmata on her "perforated flesh" (143). When Rerre, her "living God" (86) 
leaves her to languish, "[s]he felt like a pillar of salt, a statue of ash, bitter, useless and 
damned" (85). Her instruments of torture are nailed above her bed in "a pretty display, as 
harmonious as the wheel and the pincers in the pictures of St. Catherine's martyrdom, as the 
hammer and the nails, the crown of thorns and the lance and the scourges in the 
representations of the Passion" (147). 
Her deliverance comes through the signifier as it moves. The passion of the lord and 
master is the passion of the word. The 'living god' is instilled in the function of the 
transcendental signifier by which all else moves. These are the signifying chains which bind 
us hand and foot, these then are the "blessed chains which bore [0] away from herself' (45). 
In the extremity of bodily intrusion and symbolic subjection, identity is loosened so that 0 
vacates the place of her self in a "velvety [] anaesthetic" place of dissolution where her 
signified place is no longer collated with the system which is its premise. Lacan writes that, 
,. the signifier has an active function in determining the effects in which the 
signifiable appears as submitting to its mark, becoming through that passion the 
signified. (Lacan: 1982 [1958], 78) 
In their essay, 'Fantasy and the Origins of Sexuality', Laplanche and Pontalis, commenting on 
Ferenczi's use of the notion of a language of passion, state that 
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... this language of passion 
is the language of desire, necessarily marked by 
prohibition, a language of guilt and hatrcd, including the sense of annihilation linked 
with orgiastic pleasure. (Laplanche and Pontalis: 1986 [1964], 11) 
The function of deathliness in signifying and the trans-figuration that occurs thereby offers 
resurrection into the 'other world' by that which is signifiable. As 0 is released from her 
chained position in her cell, she makes an evangel ical-style crossing to the "other side": "she 
felt her chain being detached ... [she] felt herself being 
lifted and borne away (47). She has 
crossed the bar of the signifier's mark upon her flesh, traversing the function of the cut in the 
signifying chain. The risen sign upon the flesh is allied with the function of the phallus in 
Lacanian theory. In 'The Meaning of the Phallus', Lacan writes that "[flhe phallus is the 
privileged signifier of that mark where the share of the logos is wedded to the advent of 
desire" (Lacan: 1982 [19581,82). 
Deathliness is written through and through jouissance as the subject passes through 
the zero of becoming, face-to-face with its own annihilation in thepelit mort of orgasm. 
Beneath those stares, beneath those hands, beneath those sexes ... she sank, lost in delirious absence from herself which gave her unto love and loving, and may perhaps 
have brought her close to death and dying. She was - who? anyone at all, no-one, 
someone else... (37) 
Here is the zero-point of the subject as it passes back out through the constructed pleasures 
afforded by its fetishized body zones, the framed quadrature of the circuits in which it treads. 
These apertures in which the ego invests represent the in-out-in doors in which we lose our 
selves when we afford ourselves our sexual coming, what the text refers to as "pleasure! s 
critical point" (102). Here is the "little mechanism which makes the doll cry" (159). 
Body Map 
We have [] discovered that in examining the erotogenic zones that these regions of 
the skin merely show a special intensification of a kind of susceptibility to stimulus 
which is possessed in a certain degree by the whole cutaneous surface. 
(Freud: 1991 [1905], 339) 
... the epidermis outside and the membrane inside have to be sutured properly, the holes must coincide. (137) 
Pleasure and its attendant suffering is afforded in accordance with a body-surface map which 
is invested with libidinal and psychic significance. "[T]ender membranes" are trained to 
signify the affects of desire as it is translated into pleasure (12). This cutaneous map acts as 
an armature into which the ego is inserted as it is constituted. In The Ego and the Id, Freud 
states that the ego is "a bodily ego ... itself the projection of a surface" (Freud: 1991 [1923], 45 1). Here is the skin which keeps the subject in its place, its frame. This is not to say that T 
is contained here but rather that identity is negotiated through a compulsively replayed 
topological orientation. 
The body of'I'then is ultimately a constitutive topology, identity is shaped in the flesh 
and subject to the movement of signifier in its symbolic function. Bodily zones are not only 
imbued with physical/psychical pleasures but are actually constitutive of those 
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physical/psychical pleasures and thereby we have the circuitous nature of interpenetrative 
fetishes. The bodily map may be deciphered according to a recognizable code and lend itself 
to the geography by which we set sail in the course of desire: a cartography of'11. The body is 
unwritten in its confrontation with orgasm: it has been de-ciphered by entering in at the door 
of its zones and working backwards in their constitution. The erogenous zones of the body 
surface reveal themselves to be a tabulated map of desire. This self-perpetuated system in 
conjunction with a social apparatus may be seen to act as a coercive mechanism which seeks 
to control the body as system. As such, it renders the subject as a text to be written and 
subsequently read. The regions of the body to which Story of 0 is so attentive draw attention 
to the symbolic ordering of the flesh through the functions it comes to fulfill. The novel 
upsets the 'normal' use of such fleshly zones by depicting sexual practices abhorrent to 
'civilized' behaviour. Through mixing up different areas of the body as they are normally 'cut 
up' or partitioned, it questions normal ordering and regulatory practices by which we operate 
socially. 2 The intrusion of one by the other, the interpenetration of place with that which 
occupies it, points to a cutting-up mechanism within the narrative itself as the narrator 
constantly displaces its presence. By inserting itself as T in various places in the text, it 
stretches the very textual muscle which keeps it in place. It thereby tests the limits of its 
confined existence as textual presence by exercising control of the liminal edges of its own 
storyline. 
Sphinctral control is central to the subjection of 0. Her body is not her own nor 
"above all, any one of the orifices of [her] body" (16). Stretching rods are inserted into her 
anus "to keep that ring open and to stretch it. Thus was she spread, and spread wider and 
wider every day" (41). The leaking bodily fluids associated with such orifices are also thereby 
involved. Her tears flow into her open mouth (25), she pisses in front of Pierre the valet (45) 
"incapable of holding back the water which was squirting from her body" (44). Drawing on 
the work of Mary Douglas, Kristeva analyses the effects of sphinctral training as an exercise 
of where "archaic power of mastery and neglect, of differentiation of proper-clean and 
improper-dirty ... is impressed and exerted (Kristeva: 1982,72). 
In her consideration of the 
deterministic nature of external boundaries, Douglas writes that, 
... all margins are dangerous. If they are pulled this way or that the shape of fundamental experience is altered ... We should expect the orifices of the body to 
symbolise its specially vulnerable points. Matter issuing from them is marginal stuff 
of the most obvious kind. Spittal, blood, milk, urine, faeces or tears by simply issuing 
forth have traversed the boundary of the body. (Douglas: 1991,121). 
The orifices are the breakpoints of the body, the fault-line of textual outreach; they are the cut- 
off point of the whole and it is they which are invested with meaning so that their liminality is 
fetishized. Kristeva states that human attentions to defilement "shift the border [. ] that 
separates the body's territory from the signifying chain; they illustrate the boundary between 
semiotic authority and symbolic law" (Kristeva: 1982,73). Because these bodily holes are 
made to represent and carry a cultural code which shapes our desire, their very liminality 
constitutes a challenge to the symbolic via their biological imperative which draws attention to 
bodily function turning inside-out to the world. Their symbolic constitution is therefore 
dependent upon being crossed through with their own undoing in a domain which is 
constantly interruptive of cultural codes whilst implicitly reiterating them in meanings which 
are brought to bear upon such apertures. That the symbolic function of the flesh is constantly 
crossed through by a preceding archiac process, what Kristeva refers to as 'semiotic', is 
endemic to its establishment as meaningful flesh. It is a process which is never complete but 
ever and always in process and points to a potential solubility of the subject in negotiation 
with its own borders. Ritual repetition of behaviour with reference to these bodily zones 
seems to underline an iterable imperative in drawing the borderlines; of anatomical T. This 
iterability itself, whilst drawing attention to the fragility of constitutive processes, may also be 
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the source of pleasure due its exercise of power in the face of a constantly dcconstitutive 
threat. 
Body of Text: Transliminality and abjection 
Just like O's "open body" (8), Sto! y of 0 displays itself as it folds centre upon centre in its 
telling. It steps outside the confines of its own story as it offers alternative openings and 
endings to its textual body, thereby resisting resolution and closure. Its linguistic membrane 
ruptures as it engages in a telescopy of telling, encasing itself in circuits of narrative; it circles 
itself, wall around wall. In its beginning and ending, it proffers alternatives to the reader. 
Opening in the present it states that "[h]er lover one day takes her. .. " (5). A few pages on, the narrator states that "[a]nother version of the same beginning was simpler, more direct. .. " (7). It also writes beyond its own ending; after the coda it announces that "[flhere existed 
another ending to the story of 0" (175). The boundaries of liminal control and disruption 
which have been the focus of O's subjection extend then to the narrative. 
Well, here was the ending, right here, where she wasn't expecting it, and in the most 
unexpected of all imaginable forms ... (granting that this was indeed the ending and that there wasn't some other ending hidden behind it, or still a third ending hidden 
behind the second one). (68) 
There is a disruption even within the sentence construction of this text. Qualifying repetitions 
are used as if the text is circuiting and indeed short-circuiting itself in a display of rhetorical 
feedback. Anaphoric repetition is continually used and in its use the presence and fictive 
agency of narrative voice is emphatically underlined. 
"outraging, perhaps, perhaps outrageous" (75), "his lips to her welts, to all her welts" 
(28), "he loved her, still loved her" (86) "And then? And then. .. " (34), "she would 
swim in the nude when she swam" (145) "behind her and behind her" (115), "Much 
later, she was to remember, and when, much later, she remembered it. .. " (103) 
Here then are the telling circuits which hold us in place through the strictures of marking. We 
pass over these black marks seeking out the trace of the other just as Sir Stephen reads the 
marks upon O's body, the red weals that are "the mark of the other, the trace of the other's 
passage" (74). 
0 has no place to call her own, she exists in a trans-liminal text, subject to abject 
breakage. She is quite literally out of place here where there is no sense. For 0, the signifier 
is non-synchronic with the signified so that "(g)reen grass turned black, day ceased to be day, 
the night to be night" (85). There is a breakage of the subject by passing through the circuit of 
one's own story in which one functions as subject. In this textual scenario, the subject 
becomes object by passing back through its own structurations, turning its story inside out in a 
visceral exhibitionism of the textual body. The extremities which alter the body cause 
movement in the subject's constitution and therefore alter the relation with'the real'. 
There had been appalling couplings ... mouths which had inhaled her lips and tongue like flaccid, repulsive blood-sucking leeches, and tongues and sexes, bestial and 
gummy and clinging ... And if, despite all that ... If her abasement, her abjection 
were sweet to her? (86) 
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The abject breakage of the body links with re-configurations of subjectivity in an evasion of 
proper body-space. Such topographical re-negotiations offer different frames in which to 
represent'l'. In Powers of Horror, Kristeva writes that, 
... the abject appears in order to uphold "I" within the Other ... It takes the ego back to its source on the abominable limits from which, in order to be, the ego has broken 
away Abjection is a resurrection that has gone through death (of the ego). 
(Kristeva: 1982,15) 
Here we may be, in Kristeva's terminology, 'strangers to ourselves' in a state of dis-possession 
ofT. The text tells its story of a diaspora ofT, an exile and estrangement fantasy where 0 is 
"shaken by the place and the time" with "no night to offset the day" (99). Like a character in a 
story, "perhaps [j she wasn't existing at all" (68). Such trans-liminal movement in circuits of 
telling draws attention to the function of the cut in signification and the presence of 
deconstitution as a necessary threat to subjecthood. The sign is crossed through with 
deathliness: I say T only in the circuit of the shadow of death, the habitation of the owl. 
I am like an owl... (Psalms 102: 6) 
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Visions and Prayers: Linguistic Incarnation and Performative Paradigm 
Dylan Thomas, 'Vision and Prayer' 
Visions and Prayers: Linguistic Incarnation and Performative Paradigm 
Dylan Thomas, 'Vision and Prayer" 
This section takes Dylan Thomas' poem 'Vision and Prayer' as the main focus of its attention 
but its ideas will also comment upon the body of Thomas' poetic production as references to 
Thomas' poetry are woven in. It makes use of psychoanalytical and post-structuralist theory in 
order to dialectically engage with the location of the subject, the performativity of the signifier 
and linguistic enactment. It also raises questions about the nature of authority as it operates 
critically, and what the position of the author is in relation to textual production. It examines 
how that position becomes fetishized through the act of critical attention. In considering how 
the interpretative act may actively off-centre the text, it is argued that the writcr/reader may 
occupy an hysterical position as the supposed boundaries between author and reader become 
unsettled and permeable in an encounter with the text itself. This leads to questions about the 
mechanics of operative metaphor and the body in relation to the signifying act. It seeks to 
question the readily accepted post-modern notion of a radically divided signifier and signified 
by considering that one can never be free of the ghost of the other in relation to 'the Real'. 
Through this postulation, it is possible to argue for a new relation between these two 
components without becoming grounded in essentialism and notions of the authenticity of 'the 
Word' as originary source. By paying attention to the audio-visual aspects of the signifier and 
the performative element of language, Thomas' poem 'Vision and Prayer' is used as a 
paradigm for the writing/reading process. 
Textual Address 
Who 
Are you. .? (Thomas: 1984,129ý 
As the arena of a speaking/praying T, 'Vision and Prayer' is a text which examines the 
location of the interlocuting subject and its implicated other to whom/which the performative 
of the text is addressed and in which T is written as function. T has no more identity than 
'you' "who is born in the next room", its prayer is offered "in the name of' those who remain 
un-named. The revelation of name is associated with an all-consuming fire where T will be 
undone, annihilated as "he burns me his name" in an incorporative identity. This points to a 
problematic mechanics at work in textual address as the positionality of the speaking/praying 
T, whilst seeming to provide the anchored authoritative impetus of the text, is actively 
undercut in its very function. The centrality of incantatory T is no centrality at all as the 
affect of this fictive authority is dissolution in its established place. Linguistic authority is 
dissolved, placed "[b]ehind the wall" of the text it produces as voice. The transmission of the 
text dis-places the T which is its condition of transmission. It side-steps itself through 
establishing itself. This links with the Kristevan concept of abjection as place of repudiation 
necessary to the functioning of the symbolic. In Powers of Horror, Kristeva writes: 
I expel mysel I spit mysel out. I abject mysel within the same motion through 
which "I" claim to establish mysel (Kristeva: 1982,3 - emphasis as original. ) 
The T is wholly dependent upon the other represented in the place to which T projects itself. 
In 'Vision and Prayer', T is relative to the place of the second and third person. All action in 
the first person is in reaction to this locus of other. "I must lie still as stone" in relation to the 
partitioned other in the next room. Far from being anterior to T however, the other is 
guarantor of its address, indeed the other is inherent in the structuration of T. It is the fulcrum 
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in relation to which T travel endlessly. There is then an interlocation of positions operative 
here in the superimposition of the interlocuting T and the other to whom speech is addressed 
in the spoken performative, of the text. Both positions are written as tensional functions in 
relation to this locus of interchangeability. 
Location of T: Alterity in Subject 
The problematic location of T results in an alterity in subject position. As what Lacan would 
term the "alienating destination" of the subject's speech, it is the place of the o/Other which 
actually generates the energy of the signifier's movement. This is a dynamic process. There is 
3 a kinetic mechanism at play. For it is 'you' which exists as the destination of operative desire: 
in Lacanian theory, the other exists in the place of the objet a, the fantasied object of desire, 
the locus of a treasure which always eludes the subject in its linguistic trajectory. This 
radically upsets the manifest power relation of the poetic address here which would seem to 
privilege the speaking T over the powerless passive second person contained within the 
rhetorical space of the interlocutor, incarcerated in the text. Yet within the boundaries of the 
text, it is the other which occupies the position of an unstoppable power where "[tlhe world 
wind[s] home". 
The text is built upon the premise of the entry of the one into the place of the other, it 
acts as an arena of transpositioning. This points forward to an intertextuality operative at the 
level of pronominal signifier. By intertextuality I do not mean a simple study of source text 
but refer to the Kristevan notion of an intrusion of one sign system into another at the level of 
the signifier to which she refers in Revolution in Poetic Language. There she says that: 
If one grants that every signifying practice is a field of transpositions of various 
signifying sytems (an intertextuality), one then understands that its 'place' of 
enunciation and its denoted 'object' are never single, complete and identical to 
themselves, but always plural, shattered, capable of being tabulated. 
(Kristeva in Moi: 1996,111) 
Dissolution of authority/author as concept 
I am nothing but a literary oddity. .. (Fhomas in Fitzgibbon: 1966,62) 
in the very establishment of the place of the signifier, a slippage occurs, splitting the locus of 
signifier and rendering it open to otherness; it is passed through by the trace of the excluded, 
haunted by the ghost of what lies beyond its boundary and becomes radically strange to itself 
Its transcribed place as cypher is opened up like an "exhaling tomb". Yet this all depends 
upon maintaining its established place, creating an inherent structural tension. This might 
parallel non-conformist preaching stances where the authorized place of the preaching T 
becomes subject to the invocation of the mighty Other passing through it at the very height of 
its vocal power, displaying powerlessness at the heart of its power: this is the apex of religious 
rhetoric, the "spiral of ascension" to which the signifier in performance can aspire. Here we 
might examine authorial slippage as a place where the radical affect of the signifier in its 
practice may undermine its 'intendeduse in the written/read/spoken text. I mention 'intention' 
because of the great attention paid in the past to deciphering Thomas' work, interpreting it, 
looking for meaning which can after all only be the reader's own, set to sea as we are in an 
elusive ocean of word-play and rhetorical high-tide, navigating with a storm of desire in our 
textual negotiation. In the dissolution of located voice, the transgression of T operative in 
'Vision and Prayer' is a dissolution of the author concept at its height. Whose work could be 
more allied to their literary life story - anecdote after anecdote - than that of Dylan Thomas, 
the "Rimbaud of Cwmdonkin Drive"? The telling of stories, the spinning "whinnying" yarns 
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around a point which becomes more and more blurred with every addition to the web of 
telling so that the tissue of textuality draws attention to the falsity of a pernicious concept: the 
point of origin. All in search of an impossible lacuna, the objet a of critical desire: the 'real' 
Dylan Thomas. 
The author is then operative only as a phantasy of the reader, a named place of 
fetishized investment: a fictional locus -a pivot point - around which is concocted a projection 
of readerly desire. The signifiers 'Dylan Thomas' have themselves entered a "spiral of 
ascension" : "in the name of' Dylan Thomas we look for the vision, attempt to locate his 
"colour of saying" (82). 
Dissolution of the Subject 
Is I the place that I occupy as the subject of a signifier concentric or excentric, in 
relation to the place I occupy as subject of the signified? - that is the question. 
(Lacan: 1977,165) 
The annihilation of the speaking/reading/writing T is through the relation with the other for 
this relation is one of a virtual space, a projected theatre in which the hologrammatical text 
plays to a captive audience of the subject for it is the reading subject who actively produces 
this hologram. Here we see a geometrical dimension of the text as it is refracted through the 
screen of the subject: its other. In this mechanism it is clear that a reciprocity of place of 
subject and other is operative which is at the root of primary narcissism described by Freud. 4 
A confusion of one and other is at play in the 'normal' constitution of the social subject. In 
his exposition of the 'mirror stage', Lacan describes the "normal transitivism" operative 
between infants, he relates how when one child falls the other cries, for instance. Elsewhere 
he states that it is by means of identification with the other that there occurs a "structural 
ambivalence" in the subject's behaviour (Lacan: 1977,19). 1 suggest that it is this same 
process at work here textually as the subject is annihilated under the gaze of the other as T is 
textually subsumed in the apex of the other, dissolved in its "high noon". Here is a radical 
deconstitution of subject at the very moment of its performativity. One enters the other and 
undoes itself in a projected textual dimensionality where on one hand "I am found" and on the 
other "I am lost in the blinding one. " 
There occurs a transmutation of the text in the reading or interpretative process: its 
boundaries become radically unsettled as the narcissistic relation between subject and object is 
enacted through the transmission of the word, there is a transitivism operative between one 
and other. ' I am not I in my encounter with the text! In his study of 'The Reading Process' 
(1972), Wolfgang Iser states that, 
If reading removes the subject-object division that constitutes all perception, it 
follows that the reader will be 'occupied' by the thoughts of the author, and these in 
their turn will cause the drawing of new 'boundaries. ' Text and reader no longer 
confront each other as object and subject, but instead the 'division' takes place within 
the reader himself. (Iser: 1988,226) 
Here in the "kingdom come" of the subject, split in its reading process, there is a reiterative 
compulsion in the organism in the face of chaos which is related to the mechanics of the death 
drive. I activate the death drive as I read, due to my compulsive wish to repeat and obtain 
mastery in the face of an overarching fear of the chaos into which I may slip. As I read, I die 
in a place where "[d]eath is all metaphors" (65). 
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Activating the death drive as I read: "I die" 
It is in effect as a desire for death that [the subject] affirms himself for others 
... and no being is ever evoked 
for him except among the shadows of death. 
To say that this mortal meaning reveals in speech a centre exterior to 
language is more than a metaphor; it manifests a structure. (Lacan: 1977,105) 
The death drive operates in the irresistible iteration of the signifier as the subject returns to 
itself as misrecognized unifiedT. This is the function of the cut operative within the text for 
without the death drive/threat of the cut the text remains unactivated, unenergized and is 
merely pre-text. Fully entering the Other, according to the Lacanian scheme, is death itself. 
To enter the Other as destination of the locus of the subject's desire is full satisfaction in an 
ironic in-corporation which is annihilatory; Lacan refers to this asjouissance in 'God and the 
Jouissance of The Womad (Lacan: 1982,147). There he describes a motion of moving 
beyond the other to enter the plane of the Other, a pleasure-pain so intense as to subsume the 
subject as it enters fully into the locus of Other in an orgiastic displacement: an annihilation of 
the subject in the "kingdom come" of its complete satisfaction. Here then is "the happening of 
saints to their vision! " A place where "the whole pain flows open and I die". Here where "I 
am found ... Now I am lost. " This is what Freud in Beyond the Pleasure Principle refers to as "[t]he backward path that leads to complete satisfaction" (Freud: 1991a, 249) as the speech act 
always retroactively seeks to locate the signifier in its recuperative interpellation: a journey 
from A ----- >B and back again in an endless navigation back and forth. 6 This might be 
referred to as a process of recovery of wholeness: a mechanism of the "common lazarus" in 
negotiation with the text for it is in the process of the "interpreted" that the virtual reality of 
textuality is entered. 
Virtual Dimensionality of the Text : "burning ciphers on the round of space" (20) 
The virtual space of the text is afforded by use of extended metaphor at work within an arena 
of rhetoric. Dylan Thomas' use of extended metaphor leads us as readers into the room of the 
text, a dimension of virtuality. "In [his] craft or sullen art" (120), he plies all the tools of his 
intricate trade to "hack this rumpus of shapes" [xJ. The topology of the text is an apotheosis 
of its metaphor. 
Breuer and Freud, in their collaborative work on hysteria, noted the spatio-temporal 
dynamics of thought and inherent relation to metaphor. In his 'Theoretical Contribution' to 
Studies on Hysteria, Breuer states that: 
All our thinking tends to be accompanied by spatial metaphor and aided by spatial 
ideas, and we talk in spatial metaphors. (Breuer: 1991 [1895], 307) 
The two scenes of metaphor correlate with the two scenes of the hysteric transposing upon 
each other. The place of the imaginary in ego formation is due to the topology of metaphor 
and leads to the organism's performance of its very own body: its flesh shaped by the 
symbolic as it is pre-figured in the imaginary upon which it is overlaid. The divided reading 
subject might be seen to inhabit a place of hysteria in reading. In his correspondence to Fliess 
Freud comments that: 
The mechanism of poetry [creative writing) is the same as that of hysterical 
phantasies... (Freud: 1966 [1897], 256) 
If we link this two scene scenario to the hallucination of the metaphor that the reader lives 
through, we might compare this to a 'hypnoid state! of reading as, in its encounter with text, 
the subject is asked to retroactively work through the reading memory in order to activate the 
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signifier therein. Just as the hysteric has her symptoms imprinted into her body so the reader 
may wear the body of the textual-imposter, might assume a different armour for the signifier 
is undeniably material in its affects. 
The spatio-temporal arena of the performativity of metaphor is itself written in the 
typographical response of the reading body. There are only a few active terms in'Vision and 
Prayer', it relies instead upon formations of words in an uncertainty of semantic meaning; 
words and phrases are used as formulaic through associative repetition. Here where there is 
no narrative but that of sight and sound and a few operative terms by which to tie its 
movement, the text is anchored only by the interpretative response which fills the lacuna with 
its dynamic of desire. The topology of the text instead is one of superimposition, one scene 
overlaid by the other. Lacan refers to a polyphony of text, a vertical suspension of semantic 
space where "all discourse is aligned along several staves of a score" in fugue-like formation 
(Lacan: 1977,154). The reader is required to inhabit the space of extended metaphor, 
subjected to its temporal dictates in an extension of textual space into the reading activating 
body, the enfleshing of the signifier "[flind[s] meat on bones" (59). The text we enter into is a 
"spinning place" of saying where, like Thomas, we are "at the mercy of words" (Letter cited 
by Wain: 1972,12). 
This represents a challenge to grammar as Thomas' overdetermined metaphoric 
dimension draws upon an anti-space in the Western philosophical tradition. It is by negative 
referencing that the text draws attention to the rules it is asking the reader to recognize that it 
is breaking. The dis-assembly of grammatical structuration, excision of punctuation, invented 
or compounded vocabulary, etc. all rely upon knowledge of structure proper, i. e. are 
dependent upon the rules which they deviate from. Cradled by the armature of tradition, the 
text is what it is not. It is the negative reference by which the text functions and from which it 
infers the structure of the grammar it is inverting; it is therefore subject to the shadow of a 
structure by which it functions. It is crossed by the shadow of authority and situates itself in a 
position of resistance to that authority although it may never be in a position of 
exteriority/anteriority to such. This is the function of the Other to which it is addressed 
working through its very grammatical structure in order to enter and support its semantic 
space. This supports the very few active terms in the text where all is rhetorical space 
invented by grammatical twist and turn of phrase. 
Space of Text: Locus of desire 
It is the world of words which creates the world of things. (Lacan: 1977,64) 
In this text we enter to be seduced by rhetoric, we engage with a mapped geometry of saying. 
The means by which the text presents itself, its display upon the page, reveals its process 
which provides us with a material correlative of the virtual sphere of the text itself The 
printed words arranged upon the page display an obsession with location, the allocated visual 
location of the words mirror the position of the T as performative. The subject is constituted 
in this interrelativity of signifiers, composing meaning there in this clash of black upon white, 
inserting itself in the spaces between. As we negotiate this visual display of verbosity, we 
engage with and enter the seducing structure of the text, losing ourselves in the "centre of 
dark" we are interred within its graphic location. Here is the material affect of the signifier -a 
metaphysical presence - as its topology is represented physically in black marking, an en- 
gravement which brings forth invisceration in the place of the reading subject in its activating 
role. Its patterns summon up interpretative ghosts: the visual affect of the written signifier 
brings forth apparitions in the place of the read ing/1 istening T. "There they were, " says 
Thomas, "seemingly lifeless, made only of black and white, but out of them came love and 
terror and pity and pain and wonder. .. " (Letter cited by Wain: 1972,12). Split in its functions, the signifier gives up the ghost of the signified in the performance of its audio- 
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visual images: the spoken and the written, the vision and the prayer. As the screen of the ego 
ideal absorbs the object into the ego, the text becomes introjected through the flesh of the 
reading subject mouthing its words and therefore assumed through the reading process. It is 
en-fleshed, it assumptive of the armature of the reading other: its destined focus. The 
destination of the signifier exists not as a given but as an activation: a performativity. 
Although writing with reference to narration, Barthes makes the point in S/Z that "the message 
is parametrically linked with its performance; there is no question of an utterance on the one 
hand and on the other its uttering" (Barthes: 1992,213). 
Bodily Performance of the Word 
There is then a bodily performance of the word. The assumption of the signifier is directly 
due to the relation between the visual and the auditory affects of the signifier as primal term in 
the phenomenology of the subj eCt. 7 
The symbolic field is occupied by a single object from which it derives its unity 
This object is the human body. (Barthes: 1992,214-5) 
By way of comparison, in a letter to Pamela Hansford Johnson written in early November, 
1933 Thomas states that: 
Every idea, intuitive or intellectual, can be imaged and translated in terms of the body, 
its flesh, skin, blood, sinews, veins, glands, organs, cells, or senses. 
Through my small bonebound island I have learnt all that I know ... All I 
write is inseperable from the island. (Fitzgibbon: 1966,48 - spelling as original. ) 
The relation between the performative T and the primacy of the signifier in the 
constitution of the subject is operative in the space of twelve short stanzas entitled collectively 
'Vision and Prayer'. In these rooms of writing the structuration process of textual production 
is set in direct relation to the topology of the writing body. To state, as Thomas did, that 
words have a "real life" of their own might seem to cut across post-modern theory, to 
contradict the non-essentialist stance and to somehow magically imbue'the Word' as originary 
source, an incantatory In principio from which we may never escape the perfect marriage of 
signifier and signified. Yet this linguistic carnality draws attention to the performativity of the 
word from whence it draws its naturalized affect. If, as Freud and later Lacan posit, language 
is a stand-in, a metaphoric substitute in the face of primal loss, it is a comfort which needs 
reiteration to afford the powerless elocutor the illusion of mastery in the face of abject 
fragmentation. " By entering the symbolic, the organism becomes subject to an over-arching 
illusion of unity, projecting itself into the statue of T by which it operates in the world. Yet 
this "I in my intricate image stride[s] on two levels" (30) for in the face of reiterated symbolic 
substitution lies a fear of fragmentation. 
This illusion of unity, in which the human subject is always looking forward to self- 
mastery, entails a constant danger of sliding back into the chaos from which he 
started. .. (Lacan: 1953,15) 
This points to a fragility at subject ego base due to narcissistic investment and transitivism 
from which it is necessary to emerge and establish a boundary ofT but this boundary is, of 
course, never absolute and always and ever haunted by otherness and strangeness. 
It is by looking back over its shoulder into the howling face of chaos - to a place 
where I "back to black silence melt and mourn" - that the subject propels itself forward via the 
anticipatory mirage of virtual dimensions of the material signifier written in its skin. As a 
correlative, it is by rolling back upon itself that the text moves forward in a recuperative 
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movement as the reader activates the referent due to a retrograde affect. This self-projection is 
a desperately reiterated action, what Freud, in Beyond the Pleasure Principl , termed "the 
compulsion to repeat". Through compulsive reiteration, the body comes to bear the signifier 
as it masquerades its naturalized affect as originary to itself. Its very own name is written in 
the flesh in a magical calling forth of (what can only be a fictional) essence in a fraudulent 
christening of "no one now or no one to be". 
Speech is in fact a gift of language, and language is not immaterial. It is a subtle 
body, but body it is. Words are trapped in all the corporeal images that captivate the 
subject... (Lacan: 1997,87) 
Here is the 'vision and prayer' of the symbolic. 'The Word' as a performative induces vision 
through its grammatical and semantic transmission in space. The performance of the poetic 
mystic, the "bard on a raised hearth" (80) is a position which plays upon this misplaced 
congenital linguistics offering its transmission of lingual affect via its own trajectory flung 
into the "exhaling tomb" of primal loss. 
Audio-Visual Apparitions 
The affects of the signifier are split into the audio and visual spheres, "the noise, that is, that 
they make in the air and the ear, the contours in which they lie on the page and the mind, their 
colours and density" as Thomas wrote in a letter to the mysterious Mr. Klopper in May 1946 
(Fitzgibbon: 1966,289). It is an amalgamation of visual image and acoustic image which 
constitutes the dimensions of the signifier as a sign. These two scenes of the signifier 
transpose one upon the other; even if separated, one still carries the ghost of the other. This 
then traverses the signified as concept casting its long shadow like a thorn in the side of 
conceptual space so that the signified itself is actually subject to the trace of the signifier. 
This leads us to consider the affect of the signifier in'the real': the referent may be constituted 
in the reiterated performance of the signifier in its audio-visual aspects. The membrane 
between imaginary and real may only be "thin as a wren's bone" after all. Yet this 
signified/referent is a labile apparition as signifier performance, although impulsive, is not 
identical to itself however much it may seek to be so for it is in the arena of its own 
performance that the signifier eludes its as-signed place, slipping up in any fallacious 
'intention! it may carry. 
The actual relay of the audio-visual performative is subject to continual shift in each 
and every new performance as no performance can be identical to the last, although it may 
seek to be so. Each new return cannot be to exactly the same location from where it came and 
hence no new performance can set off from the same place, each performance in seeking to 
exactly replicate the last actually de-centres itself in its own irresistible mission. The 
movement in the signifier is therefore in direct relation to the amount of stress laid upon 
replication. Intoning the prayer as a set formula of words does indeed, if continually repeated, 
render up its vision. By reiterating prayer, we "turn the corner of prayer". In reiteration then 
lies modulation, reconfiguring the signifier in its very usage. The textual is therefore actually 
constitutively dependent upon the last performance/intonat ion because without this back- 
referencing, it falls into a chaos of unmeaning and becomes un-spelled. 
Here it links with the Naclardglichkeit (affectual deferral) of Freud and Lacan's 
reworked notion of this in the retroactivity of the signifier in its spoken arc of desire which 
returns its utterance to the subject like an echo of the future. Nachlr6glichkeit brings in the 
dimension of two interpoised scenes in a mechanics of transpositioning which might lead us 
back into the dimensions of metaphorical space. 
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Within this textual economy, the signifier becomes revertant, "like a wanderer [white/ 
With the dewj come back" (15 1 ): here then is the atavistic memory of the signifier in its role 
as transmittor. The black marks of the signifier cast a long shadow which shifts them out of 
their graphic place as they transcend their locus into the apparition of the performative 
process, bringing reconfiguration by "bearing the ghost" in the "interpreted". Here is the 
trans-figuration of the signifier: a linguistic incarnation rendered byVision and Prayer. 
Textual Boundary 
Within these walls of words, this spin of spelling provides the geography of grammar by 
which T and 'you' traverse the textual boundary. Herein this economy of division into subject 
and object we read: now the one, now the other of discourse as we know it. Thomas' poetic 
texts upset the location of signs: signifiers traverse each-other, transpose, transposition, echo, 
and recall one another; they become operative through back and forward referencing through 
the entirety of Thomas' work to produce formulaic phraseology. The texts become an arena of 
linguistic display and metaphoric conceit: words slip and skip into non-sense. There is a 
slippage of place as one word wriggles into the other in an exchange at the level of the 
signifier run through and through by the shadows and traces of meaning which pass through it: 
subject itself to "all places ways mazes passages quarters and graves" of the signifier's 
movement. This uncertainty of signifier function results in a moveable locus of the signified, 
dis-located in a "spuming cyclone" of meaning where thin walls tumble together in a linguistic 
space which challenges the grammar which writes it into place. There is a textual puncturn 
operative as the skin of the signifier is broken open "and the dark run over [its] ghost". (It has 
"cros't the bar" of its constitution. ) The signified is activated within the altered geometry of 
the sign as it is crucified upon the rack of its own configuration to resurrect itself in endless 
unhinged play behind "the spelling wall" (84). 
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Diana: Her True Story: Post-Modern Transgressions in Identity 
Diana: Her True Story: Post-modern Transgressions in Identity' 
This section considers the life and death of Diana, Princess of Wales from a theoretical 
perspective. It makes use of post-structuralist and psychoanalytical theory in order to examine 
representations of Diana as a fctish point for cultural investment, a collective phantasy around 
which absence and melancholia oscillates for the post-modern subject. Andrew Morton's 
book Diana: Her True Sto! y is referred to in order to concentrate upon her identity as a locus 
of textuality. The section considers the act of telling as central to such identity so that the 
destination of the story of self is fully implicated in recognition by the reading other. It moves 
on to comment upon Diana as intertext, a text which we all write and then re-write in 
negotiation with a never-ending loop of desire. This results in a complex textual web where 
any idea of'true story' must be radically lost. The idea of biography as an'authorized version' 
of an other will be questioned and with it what it might mean to be the ghost haunting the 
storyline of another purporting to tell the true story of one's self. 
The section then moves on to comment upon the function of the scriptor in relation to 
the textual production and the intersection of the reading T as it is implicated in the dialectics 
of desire set up within the dimensions of text and seeks to insert itself into the textual body. 
What are normally considered the private processes of ego configuration and individual 
identity are here in direct relation to the textual process as it is perpetuated in the public sphere 
so that a radical transgression in identity is implicated in the telling of one! s own 'true story. 
It is in the enforced closure of such a tale that has not been perceived to reach its end that a 
severe withdrawal and mourning process may occur which manifests itself as a grief that will 
not "go quietly". The section then comments upon this as a negotiation with deathliness as it 
is encountered in the narrative process on a large scale. It argues that the story of the life and 
death of Diana represents an ironic metanarrative for a post-modern arena. 
Telling Stories 
In Diana: Her True Sto , Andrew Morton presents the reader with the story of a subject 
complicit in its process of telling. It is a very public narrative, purporting to be the "true 
story" of Diana, Princess of Wales and uses closeness to the source with which to secure its 
claim to truthfulness. It is seminal in its function as Diana's 'coming out' document, 
positioning itself as near as possible to being Diana's autobiography. Morton informs us that 
"[flo all intents and purposes it was her autobiography, [her] personal testament. .. " (Morton: 1998,11). 2 Morton's text then presents itself as biographical with hybridic elements of 
autobiography as it is written, in the first instance, to echo Dianaýs words sotto voce and, in its 
revised form, inserts Diana's words into the main body of the text. The edition of 1998 is 
prefaced by a section entitled'In Her Own Wordsand is a selection of excerpts from the taped 
interviews given by Diana to Morton in 1991-2. We are assured by the publisher that "fflhe 
words are all Diana's" (25). This engages the reader in an edification via a direct reading 
position and is the means by which MortoWs text is able to reify itself as being indeed a "true 
story". This "true story" is, however, one which draws attention to its own textual positioning 
by returning to the scene of itself six years later in a situation of textual dija vu in order to tell 
a story even 'more true' than before by stretching itself beyond the confines of the living 
subject represented in its first edition. This is a "true story" which speaks beyond the liminal 
bounds of the lived positionality of the subject acting as its guarantor. It is indeed Diana's 
absence rather than her presence which anchors this text. 
What does it mean to narrate an other? Morton's position is written into place via the 
manoeuvres of the text he is supposedly in control of, resulting in a slippage of the writing T 
in. relation to the written T with which it is locked in a dialectical encounter. Morton's 
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seduction is clear as he engages with the object of his text : "She could be wilful, exasperating 
... her penetrating cornflower-blue eyes seduced with a glance. Her language knew no boundaries ... She was endlessly fascinating. . ." 
(294). His function is one of a conduit of 
"true words" straight frorn'the source'. He tells us that "I was asked to become the conduit of 
her true story" (14). He is the amanuensis of her telling, the text a locus of displaced voice as 
the "story in its pages came from her lips. .. " (11). He sexualizes this process when he refers 
to "the fear that Buckingham Palace would discover her identity as the 'Deep Throat' of my 
book" (17). This draws attention to the erotics of textual representation as it projects its 
presence in a fantasized encounter with its object of desire via a clandestine writing process in 
danger of being discovered. 3 In the pressure point presented by this textual production, the 
author shared his object of desire with millions of readers in a lucrative situation for the writer 
and publisher. 
By maintaining a credence due to the authority of "her words", Mortorfs is an 
authorized version which seeks to find its truth in the word, identity in a fixity of linguistic 
utterance as it transcribes Diana's tape-recorded voice. Whilst postulating as 'true, it covers 
its tracks as a fabrication; by speaking with 'her words, it conceals itself as a story. Morton! s 
text speaks with a doubled-back voice, feeding back to itself the presence based on absence by 
which it defines its presence as structure. Diana's 'story' then presents us with a post-modern 
theoretical dilemma. As it has been popularly understood, Diana: Her True Sto presents a 
narrative of a subject caught within a royal "gilded cage" and communicates the inmate's 
traumatic experiences via the textual trajectory, thereby allowing her to affirm herself as a 
subject. Whilst she was "voiceless and powerless", telling her story empowered her as a 
feminine subject and performed a step in her self-development which enabled her to later 
present us with "strong woman" therapeutic rhetoric: "[flor the first time in her royal life she 
felt empowered" (15). In its operation, this story is in a long line of stories of feminist 
awakenings which locate the act of telling as central to identity in order to be recognized by 
the other as affirming destination of the story of self This is what Rosalind Coward refers to 
in Female Desire (1984) as'The True Story of How I Became My Own Person'. This process 
of telling where the narrative acts as a correlative of the evolving subject is theoretically 
problematic in its non-questioning of the fully present subjectivity (of the teller) which is the 
projected locus towards which its telling is directed. 4 Diana: Her True Sto[Y positions itself 
within this tradition of empowering narrative yet, whilst paying homage to its subject and 
registering her presence beyond the visual and unspeaking icon, it simultaneously and 
unintentionally draws attention to her implicit non-presence in a complex web of telling and 
re-telling. There is then an oscillation between tangible and intangible in relation to its object 
and furthermore this is carried through its scriptible function as it implicates the reading other 
in its process. The reading other to whom the narrative directs itself is caught in its seductive 
web woven around a collective fantasy, a fetish point of intangible desire made solid by its 
biographical status. Each addition to its web ironically further obscures what it wishes to 
reveal as it seeks to position itself as 'more true' (and thereby more saleable) than the last 
account. 
Doubled-back Identity 
The metatext called 'Diana' is a text we all write and which then loops back in a rhetorical 
feedback situation to masquerade as originary to itself. "Her true story" is then no thing but a 
tissue of telling, a textual fabrication in which representation plays a central role for identity 
so that, through the proliferation of her story, Diana was no longer able to step outside the 
story 'Diana' and started "believing in herself' (166) as represented in her storyline. Morton 
reports that "[o]n one occasion Diana was so moved by the poignancy of her own story that 
she confessed to weeping tears of sorrow" (19). 
Diana inhabits two spaces in her textual positioning. There is the reading Diana and 
the represented Diana: the enunciating cognitive subject and the subject represented in the 
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enunciation through which what Lacan refers to as "the alienating function of the I" is 
displayed (Lacan: 1977,6). This situation is, however, made more complex by being doubled 
back through Morton's text where Diana reads and comments on the text of herself, and her 
splittings into representer and represented are then absorbed back into Morton's text, thereby 
putting this doubleness into a pressure-point of proliferated feedback. Diana is legion: we 
move from the one and 'true' Diana to a situation of infinite splitting. This is supported by 
Diana's repeated reference to herself in the third person and her insertion of her own name into 
her utterances as if she is talking of an alias operating as a separate locus under that name. 
Morton describes her reaction to telling her story as one of extreme relief, a "form of 
confession" (15), a cathartic exercise. 
... her words spilled out of her, almost without 
interruption and with her barely 
pausing for breath. It was a great release. (14) 
This cathartic outpouring, described as an empowering but "draining process" (16), bears a 
striking resemblance to the narratives of female hysterics analysed by Breuer and Freud at the 
end of the last century. Josef Breuer's analysis of'Friulein Anna 0. ' echoes eerily through 
Mortorfs account of Diana's therapy by a Dr. David Mitchell who "came to see her every 
evening and asked her to recount the events of that day" (148). 5 The emphasis is on narrative 
recapitulation in relation to a posited future stability of identity. In wholeness and integration 
lies the promise of being true to oneself. 
True Stories : Tangible and Intangible Problematics 
The notion of a "true story" presents us with an enticing but inherently contradictory narrative 
scenario. By promising to reveal Diana's "true nature" (21) through a textual process, it makes 
a fallacious claim. In seeking to establish ourselves as written subjects in history, we actively 
off-centre and exceed our written place which is therefore an ironic location as it becomes 
non-identical in its fixity so that T becomes displaced by its very denotative marking. Here 
then is an anti-location which seeks to make tangible what can only ever be an intangible and 
unquantifiable quality, i. e. identity. To be a subject of one's own auto/biographical narrative 
is to make an identity out of that which seeks to 'subject' in power terms what cannot be 
identified. That which resists its place is what is ironically the attention of the spectre of 
meaning haunting the structure in linguistic terms. The text then becomes veiled and as such 
operates as an irresistible enigma. Speaking of Diana, Morton refers to "the invisible veil 
which separated her" (152). In his analysis of desire as it is operative in the constitution of the 
subject's utterance, Lacan draws an analogy to a feminine positioning in symbolic terms, 
Such is the woman concealed behind her veil: it is the absence of the penis which 
turns her into the phallus, the object of desire. (Lacan: 1977,322) 
This indefinable location is that which activates desire: we are seduced by an absence which is 
covered up and lures us with trickery. Morton makes this comment with reference to Diana's 
development as a woman outside the royal marriage: 
Since her separation she had slowly, cautiously - perhaps even unconsciously - 
performed a kind of striptease, unpeeling the veils of convention which had 
surrounded her. (264) 
It is this concealment which entices the reader/viewer so that a perpetual fascination wields 
power over the reading subject in a reciprocal mechanics of power operating through the 
representative act. The concealed becomes an area of fetish over which readerly desire 
flickers in an incessant quest to close over the gap and seize the'naked' but impossible truth as 
it peeps out from behind its imposture, the truth which is nowhere present but operative only 
as an anti-presence or a masquerade. 
Representation = Absence 
I had shrunk into nothing ... I had shrunk to nothing. (59) 
Darling, I think I'm about to disappear... 
(Diana's comment to Charles before fainting on 1985 Canadian tour. 159) 
In its negotiation with the intangible, the Diana text is constructed around a central absence 
and offers itself for later re-construction by the reader. The story of the royal T becomes the 
story of the other, subject to the other's power in which arena it is re-constituted and received 
as truth made tangible by reference to its speaking source, originary to its performative 
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utterance. Here is the place where Diana might "dissolve like a Dispirin and disappear. 
What is patently a falsehood masquerades as a fully present consciousness behind the 
separating veils of the represented conspiring to crown itself queen there. 
As a fetishized locus for cultural investment, Diana has functioned both as text and 
proliferator of texts. Her multiple respresentations, in every imaginable form and medium, 
point to how she came to function as a collective phantasy around which absence and 
melancholia oscillate for the post-modern reader, the consumer of her text/s. Representation 
implies the absence of the 'real thing, in psychoanalytical terms it is a substitute, a 'stand-in' 
for what is radically lost to the subject and therefore constitutes the subject's melancholy 
positioning. Representation acts as the means by which the subject seeks to redeem itself by 
inhabiting the posture of mastery in the face of irredeemable grief. Freud's formulation of this 
through his grandson's famous cotton-reel game is given in Bpyond the Pleasure Prinýiple. 
Through a repetitive game, the infant is made "master of the situation" (1991 [1920], 227). 
The infant's fort-da' forms a substitute and is uttered in relation to the first loss he 
experiences, that of maternal absence. It is this scenario which posits a useful analogy to the 
real absence of Diana for her admirers in an untiring metonymic negotiation. 
The Economy of Narration and Deathliness 
'Diana, Princess of Wales' stands a graceful 9" tall and is decorated by band in 
precious platinum. 
... If I do not wish to keep 'Diana, Princess of Wales', I may return her and owe 
nothing. 
(Advertisement by Compton & Woodhouse in association with Coalport 
English bone cbina. ) 
In relation to her actual death, the representation fetish circulating around Diana may easily be 
seen to operate through post-funereal products and souvenirs, tying post-modern grief to post- 
modern capitalist logic in a carefully orchestrated display of mourning to the tune of supply 
and demand. Here we may see the economic dynamic ofTalse consciousness'. 
In theoretical terms, the integral relation of representation to absence of 'the object' 
points to a deathliness operative in narrative mechanics. The act of telling spins around a 
central axis of nothingness, the reiterated copy it makes is in relation to this 'active' absence. 
In Butler's terms, these are copies without an original where 'the original' is "nothing more 
than a parody of the idea of the natural and the original" (Butler: 1990,31 - emphasis as 
original). The result of this for Lyotard is that "[t]he social subject seems to dissolve in this 
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dissemination of language games" (1984,40). This absence-presence dynamic is manifestly 
apparent in the textuality of Diana as identity becomes what its representation predicts in a 
reverse scenario which subverts any postulation of authorized versions of T. This is 
illustrative of the implosion of representation into the lived real. "Darling, I think I'm about to 
disappear" in the textual process (58). The more it writes 'me', the less T am. 
This points to a textual area of mourning operative in every text and which Diana's 
life and death story presents in the most manifest and large-scale form so that it may serve an 
heuristic function as paradigm of this narrative mechanic as it is understood in 
psychoanalytical theory. Prior to the actual death of Diana, she was already dying as we told 
and re-told her story, the theoretical basis of which translates readily into 'the real'. Diana 
complained of "shrinking into nothing" (59), a metaphysical conceit of which we may read the 
imprint in her negotiations with bodily space and trysts with self-worth via the ravages of 
bulimia and self-harm. One may come to bodily harm by not fitting the narrative framework 
as armature of being. Playing the starring role in an "untrue story", the subject is alienated 
from self-identity and due to necessary organic paralogic is then required to believe in the 
story of self in order to function: "She knew in her heart that in order to survive she had to re- 
discover the real Diana Spencer. .. " (166). It is, in an appropriation of Lyotard's terms, "[t]his ultimate synthesis which constitutes the legitimate subject" (Lyotard: 1984,33). 
Morton's narrative acts as the aesthetic object which promises to reveal the sub ect j 
and because of this, in its function as narrative proper, it is unable to pay tribute to anything 
but itself in order to maintain its biographical boundary. The narrative of a subject refuses to 
allude to the abyss of nothingness over which it stretches as it attempts to compensate for the 
'real thine. The biographical text is the most absolute example of this formative mechanic of 
narrative; it stands in for the 'real' person, it lays itself down as the means by which the reader 
'knows'the subject described, thereby positing displacement as truth. The more 'authorized' or 
official the form the more pronounced is its displacement. My argument here is that 
biographical narrative is run through and through by the shadows of death, indeed deathliness 
is its foundational premise. Morton declares of his text that "[s]he may be gone, but her words 
are with us for ever ... [t]he testimony which follows is her life story as she wanted to tell it. Her words are now all we have of her, her testament, the nearest we will now ever get to her 
autobiography" (22). It is precisely because of the shadow of death cast over its function that 
it is able to signify, that it is able to mean, it is this by which the text is able to 'be. This is 
then an implicitly referential process; as statement postulates itself as presence, it implies and 
recalls linguistic negativity and the psychic devastation of grief It is due to absence that 
representation takes its place: the object is then installed in an anti-locus. This process draws 
attention to our conceptions of the 'original' and 'true' as they are proliferated in accounts of 
Diana. Her designated place becomes fragmented into one of multiple proliferation, 'she' is no 
thing but a text without an original, a self which comes to believe in itself as text, i. e. a 
radically alienating and poignant investment in the performative power of representation in all 
its multitudinous forms. With reference to media coverage, Diana states, as if speaking of 
another person, that "Diana was listening and reading every line" (61). 
Intertexual Incest 
In her life Diana was a complex web... (294) 
Diana operates as an intertextual icon, continually written into place by multiple effects of 
representation; a text we all read/write and then re-write in negotiation with a never-ending 
loop of desire, thereby allowing slippage in the sign system which writes her. She is indeed 
queen of our intertextual hearts, albeit an ironic one. In her 1967 essay, 'Word, Dialogue and 
Novel', Kristeva states that, 
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[A]ny text is constructed as a mosaic of quotations; any text is the absorption and 
transformation of another. The notion of intertextuality replaces that of 
intersubjectivity... (Kristeva: 1986 [1980], 37 - emphasis as original. ) 
This results in a complex narrative web where any idea of 'true story' must be radically lost. 
The narrative becomes unstable in its very continuation of perceived stability and reiterated 
formulation of itself in such terms. 
In our reading positions in relation to popular culture, we contribute to a textuality 
which is then absorbed back into the'true story' of someone else, in a schematics of incestuous 
feedback, thereby creating a complex web of congested textuality which is operative as fetish. 
In his formulation of fetish in relation to gender theory, Robert Stoller notes that "fetish is a 
thing that has become a story" (Stoller: 1985,126). There is then an aesthetics of fetish in this 
story of Diana as the body of the text is incessantly and incestuously fed back to itself The 
'normal' limits of texuality are transgressed by the intertextual transpositioning which 
challenges normative narrative patterning by reiterative allusion and proliferation, thereby 
altering the signing system. Kristeva locates this as an incestuous mechanism when she states 
that language is a fetishistic substitution (Kristeva: 1982,37). We may invoke Barthes' idea of 
the 'stubborn after image! of other texts operative in our encounters with texts and haunting 
our readings so that we "become the prisoner of someone else's words and even of [our] own" 
as a useful means by which to allude to the reader's inhabitation of the text of Diana (Barthes: 
1993,37). The reader exists as a ghost in the machinery of her story-line, encountering their 
own dissolution in the effects of the feedback of their own desire there so that the search for 
'trutlY and meaning becomes an inherent struggle with identity for the reading subject because 
"fflhis T which approaches the text is already itself a plurality of other texts" (Barthes: 1990, 
10). When this scenario is enacted on a large scale as it was in the case of Diana, its abrupt 
end results in massive withdrawal so that those who wrote the text are faced with the reversal 
of its affects through a violent un-writing. The bereaved reading/writing subject then 
encounters the real effects of the intangible it sought to keep at bay, i. e. a full frontal 
confrontation with loss. 
The transformative element of intertexuality is again invoked by Kristeva in 
Revolution in Poetic Languag (1974) where she formulates intertexuality as a process of 
transpositioning in order to communicate it as "the passage from one signing system to 
another [which] demands a new articulation of the thetic - of enunciative and denotative 
positionality" (Kristeva: 1986 [1984], 111). It is due to such transpositional action that the 
thetic is modified and the represented 'P transgressed in reading, criss-crossed by what may be 
termed a'mosaic'of references. This is not to posit a place ofT in prior denotation but thatT 
is actually constituted by such movement which continually threatens to undo its presence or 
identity. Diana refers to herself continually in "her own words" using the third person 
pronoun, undercutting herself in her utterance and questioning, albeit unintentionally, the 
liminality of identity. The source itself exhibits its splitting. With reference to her therapy, 
she speaks of what "the Diana that was still very much there" had decided, claiming an agency 
in her split-off state (46). 7 She states that "I was 'a problem' and they had registered Diana as 
a problem" (47); at this time, she says that "what Diana thought waswt going to come into it - 
yet" (51). This split voice is continued in Diana's narration of her supernatural premonitions 
when a small voice inside her head tells her about her future: "And a voice said to me inside: 
'You won't be Queen but you'll have a tough role"' (36). "From day one, " she states, "I always 
knew I would never be the next Queen. No-one said that to me -I just knew it" (65). She 
claims to have inhabited another time and space as a nun and says that she experienced a 
premonition of her father's death (31). 8 She also foretells the death of Charles' horse Allibar, 
pronouncing that he would fall dead with a heart attack. Morton reports that in true 
performative fashion the horse collapsed "within seconds of her uttering those words" (124). 
Diana also claimed to experience a lot of djjtývu with respect to places and people (69). 
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There is an evacuation of time and space in these common-place expressions of the 
supernatural, what psychoanalysis refers to as paramnesia. Here is a dis-iointed identity 
which is at odds with its own textual place, expressing an off-centring in what Diana refers to 
as "the set-up" (65). It is important to associate the amount of slippage in thetic identity with 
the rigidity of the "cage" so that the off-centring of T is in reciprocal relation to the amount of 
pressure applied to it through the textualizing process proliferating itself "everywhere, 
everywhere, the system, and the media" (65). The subject of enunciation is then caught up in 
"the set-up" of the text, has indeed been set up by a linguistic exchange mechanism which 
iterates T as non-reducible to tangible totality. 
Speaking after her divorce, Diana stated that "[flrom now on I am going to own 
myself and be true to myself. I no longer want to live someone else's idea of what and who I 
should be. I am going to be me" (Cited by Morton, 264). This acts as an ironic declaration by 
a subject so implicitly written into its place as Diana. 'I am going to be me' is a paradoxical 
statement which exhibits the split between the enunciating subject and the subject of its 
enunciation, between the cognitive T and the subjected T of linguistic mechanics. The T is 
indeed rendered powerless in this 'set-up' at the very moment of its agency. Diana's 
postulation draws attention to a double space of identity as it is textualized with an attendant 
reference to process. It engages with the futurity of 'me' as destination of trajectory of T so 
that intentionality is expressed only as a masquerade of 'full presence. 
Desire & Textual Subversion 
In the proliferation of the story of Diana, one of the effects of her constant representation has 
been to off-centre the very notion of her definitive story. The transgression of her identity is 
set in direct reciprocal relation to how 'true' the story pertains to be, i. e. the harder it tries, the 
more it off-centres itself : in its authorized establishment lies its dis-establishment. In the 
readerly encounter there is an activated function of scriptor imploded into the text. This 
implosion takes place in relation to textual production as it intersects the reading T which is 
intimately implicated due to its desiring agency. In the dialectics of desire set up within the 
structural dimensionality of the text, the T seeks to insert itself in the textual body: "I felt I 
knew her personally. " What are normally considered the private processes of ego 
configuration and personal identity are here in direct relation to a textual process as it is 
perpetuated in the public sphere so that a radical transgression of the category of what we 
refer to as identity is implicit to telling one's own 'true story'or that of an other. 
The private/public transgressions of the liminality of identity are nowhere more 
evident than in contestations over Diana's body which constitutes an area of obvious debate in 
relation to questions of ownership, power and discourse. She has been bodily fixed at 
different times of her life, pinned down by the flesh rendered docile in its endless constitution 
via representation for mass consumption. For Foucault, "[a] body is docile which may be 
subjected, used, transformed and improved" (Foucault: 1977 [1975], 136). Hers was the sexy 
body of the fiancee in a flimsy skirt, hers was the thin body of the disappearing wife due to the 
protestations of anorexia/bulima, hers was the body pregnant with the nation's heir apparent. 
Later bodily manifestations included the body-guarded body, the muscled and'strong woman' 
body, and finally the dead body publicly mourned and incessantly photographed though 
separated by a wall of lead. In these bodily presentations, 'she! is everywhere and nowhere at 
the same time: her fascination assured by never being fully present to the viewer, thereby 
maintaining the distance required by the fetishist. 
In the receptive/reading process, the reader desires full but impossible possession of 
the other there represented, activating a phantasy of erotic fullness in the act of receiving the 
autobiographic text. She is "the venerated icon, the projection of millions of fantasies, hopes 
and dreams" (294). This desire is installed in relation to a central point of negativity, an 
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absence or loss which is related to deathliness in the Lacanian scheme which in a continuation 
of Freudian theory overlays nothingness by the symbolic. The rituals of mourning are then 
implicitly tied to symbolic loss. To continue this Lacanian analogy, when this loss became 
actualized in the death of Diana, there was an almighty crash between the imaginary and the 
real in millions of subjectivities. The radical diaspora of a desperately dispossessed identity 
reverberated through the investments of millions of bereaved subjectivities. 
Mastery and Submission : Tales of Power 
As the destination of a million and more fantasies, this royal pin-up girl of men, women and 
children offered a never-to-be-attained romantic liaison. Her fascination worked through 
distance, her enigmatic promise relied precisely on its impossible attainment. Her attraction 
was a lure, sometimes synthesized by media attention, whilst at other times, she was directly 
involved in offering herself up as an invitation in a carefully staged seduction bid aimed at the 
entanglement of "the people" in love with her image. When Diana became involved with 
Dodi Fayed, she teased reporters with forthcoming revelations, allowing herself to be 
photographed kissing Dodi on board his yacht, 'Jonikal. This romance served a voyeuristic 
and vicarious pleasure for those who would never attain closeness with their idol: it positioned 
itself as a "true romance", the'real thing'. Here we are offered the last great love story of this 
century. "As whirlwind romances go, this was a tornado" says Morton (279). Dodi informed 
his ex-wife Suzanne Gregard that "Diana and I are having a romance, a true romance" (278). 
Diana had at last entered the charmed circle of a real-life scenario of romance that she had so 
often read about. 
The teenage Diana had been an avid consumer of Barbara Cartland's fiction. Morton 
tells us that "Diana was a great fan of the romantic novels of her step-grandmother Barbara 
Cartland, who brought copies of her latest books for Diana when she visited Althorp House" 
(Photo caption, 96-7). Cartland! s fiction offers the reader a world of fantasy circuiting around 
power, an area where mastery and submission is eroticised, where the virginal (aristocratic) 
heroine is overwhelmed by the absolute power of the (aristocratic) hero. A photograph 
published in the Morton text shows a young Diana on the sofa surrounded by a plentiful 
supply of Cartland novels. A Touch of Love, a novel published in 1978 and contemporary 
with Diana's teenage years, gives us the following typical scene between hero and heroine: 
... he made the hearth-rug seem almost a dais from which he reigned supreme and she 
was nothing but a supplicant coming before him almost on her knees. 
(Cartland: 1978,74) 
It is significant to note that Cartland's heroines all have recourse to supernatural premonitions 
and interventions in the narrative much like the'Princess of Hearts' herself It might also be 
contiguous in rhetorical terms that Cartland was herself referred to as the'Queen of Hearts' in 
a C. B. S. television interview in April, 1977. It would seem that elements of this fictive 
textuality were absorbed into the life text of Lady Diana to surface in her negotiations as 
Princess. 
In her interview with Morton, Diana relates the fantasy that "my husband would look 
after me. He would be a father figure" (61). During Charles and Diana's courtship, Diana was 
required to refer to Prince Charles as 'Sir' and when asked to marry him, answered 'Yes please' 
(106,36). Morton comments, 
She was his willing puppy who came to heel when he whistled ... He called 
her 
Diana, she addressed him as'Sit' (121) 
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Here then is an inequality in interpellation. She comes to her name, she is Diana, the 
performative designation of that signifier whilst Charles is designated by a title which renders 
him immobile in a staticity of absolute mastery and wields linguistic power over her. She is 
subject to his will, subjectified by his hailing of her; in an Althusserian framework, she is 
made subject by being made subject. Althusser states that 
... all ideology is centred, [] the Absolute Subject occupies the unique place of the Centre, and interpellates around it the infinity of individuals into subjects in a double 
mirror-connexion such that it subjects the subjects to the Subject... 
(Althusser: 1971,168 - emphasis as original. ) 
It is important to remember that Diana entered this structure as a desiring pro-royalist, a 
willing participant in what the Archbishop of Canterbury referred to as "the stuff of which 
fairytales are made" (132). When the fairytale fell apart and the husband did not look after 
her, Diana twisted feminist rhetoric to romantic textual seenario to make a linguistic amalgam 
with which to re-negotiate her identity as a "queen in people's hearts", thereby transferring the 
rhetoric of romance onto her royal role. In her BBC Panorama interview (November 1995), 
she stated that "someone's got to go out there and love people and show it" (261). In a 
narcissistic investment with self-image, Diana cared for people and was shown to care for 
people by photographic evidence in a self-absorbed projection of failed romance onto 'the 
people! enlisted to supplement her own lack in a failed marriage. 
In the classic scenario of romance fiction, there is an evacuation of identity in the 
jouissant encounter of one and other so that two subjectivities merge in a fantasised situation 
of perfect blissful union. Lacan refers tojouissance as an intense and excessive pleasure/pain 
associated with sexual coming and religious mysticism (Lacan: 1982 [1972-3]). In A Touch 
of Loy , the heroine experiences "an ecstasy and a rapture that was indescribable sweep through her body. It was so vivid, so intense that it was partly a sharp pain" (158). Cartland 
goes on to associate this with the "very essence of love" which results in an ultimate out-of- 
body experience for the united couple (158). The undoing/dissolution of T is here so intense 
that it evacuates identity and translates into the bodily location by which we orientate 
ourselves in time and space. In his study of the structure of romance, Northrop Frye identifies 
its "structural core [as] the individual loss or confusion or break in the continuity of identity". 
(Frye: 1976,104) Here is a romantic diaspora. of dispossessed identity which Diana had 
textual recourse to, writing herself into the heroine's place so that textuality might be said to 
have had its effects in her lived bodily experience? 
In this self-dissolution there is a transgressional ambivalence of the economic affects 
of one and other in a dynamic scenario in which one is the object of the other as it is 
subjectified through the dialectical power of synthesis in a Hegelian framework. Lacan relates 
this to a process of 'normal transitivism' through which the organism orders itself according to 
its bodily image. It is in its encounter with the other that it learns to place itself spatially and 
learns whereT begin and end. Lacan reveals this as an "erotic relation" between the organism 
and the other (Lacan: 1977,19), a process which leaves a deep "structural ambivalence" in the 
subject. 
... by means of an identification with the other he sees the whole gamut of bearing 
and display, whose structural ambivalence is clearly revealed in his behaviour, the 
slave being identified with the despot, the actor with the spectator, the seduced with 
the seducer. (Lacan: 1977,19) 
Here is an erotics of aggressivity related to primary narcissism in the subject base, i. e. in the 
constitution of its ego. This structural ambivalence may be traced through the Hegelian 
dialectic with which Lacan was working with reference to the constitution of the subject in the 
power mechanics of one and other: master-slave, captor-captive, hunter-hunted, torturer and 
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tortured. There is a kinetics of T here in this crossroads of identity so that one is no longer 
aware of where one ends and the other begins. Morton describes Diana's love-hate 
relationship with her home at Kensington Palace "as hostages are said to do with their captors" 
(237). The place where she felt most trapped was also the place of which she said, "I feel 
secure here" (237). In her analysis of torture, Elaine Scarry explains this as the 
"objectification of the prisoner's world dissolution" and refers to the room in which pain is 
experienced as "a magnification of the body [and] simultaneously a miniaturization of the 
world" (Searry: 1985,38). In this power dynamic, we encounter the blurred boundaries 
between subject and object, T and other, the story and the teller as it is negotiated through the 
body. Diana's identity was synthesized and drawn from such yet simultaneously she was 
"held captive by her public image" (202). The liminal boundaries of identity have been 
broken down in this scenario, the category T is transgressed; as subject borders are crossed 
over continually, an oscillation in identification occurs which has its affects most readily 
around real bodily space. Morton tells that, 
Nowhere was this ambiguous relationship more apparent than with her personal 
bodyguards. They were at once her gaolers and her friends. (25 1) 
Hers was a body under seige, a disputed territory. Her acronym P. O. W. was commented upon 
by her ftiends "as meaning 'prisoner of war... (202). During her courtship by Charles, she 
complained of "the virtual seige she was living under" (118 - my emphasis. ) 
Transgressing the Liminal Boundaries of IdentitY 
I always felt different -I felt I was in the wrong shefl. (72) 
To say we were hoping for a boy is to say to a daughter that she has let you down. 
(Orbach- 1978,170) 
Diana complained of being in the wrong body. In her own Spencer life script, she and her 
brother Charles would speculate as young children about whether or not either of them would 
have existed if their deformed brother John had lived: their lives were crossed through by the 
shadow of death. Diana's own birth was accompanied by the patriarchal-aristocratic 
imperative for a son and heir so that she was indeed in the wrong body. 
In Diana's young mind her brother's gravestone, with its simple 'In Loving Memory' 
epitaph, was a permanent reminder that, as she later recalled: 'I was the girl who was 
supposed to be a boy. ' (79) 
It was a bodily disphoria which was to reverberate in her adult life, replayed in her absorption 
by the system in which she found herself, disappearing within the royal framework she 
referred to as a'cage'. 
The extent of Diana's self-alienation caused her to attack her own liminal boundaries 
of being through bulimia and self-harm. By making "score marks on her body" (140), she 
attempted to communicate the incommunicable, to signify bodily the pain of a fragmented 
identity at odds with the constant bombardment of texts it was being offered. Morton tells us 
that she "slashed at" her wrists with a razor blade, cut herself with the serrated edge of a 
lemon slicer and cut her chest and thighs with a penknife (140). Through breaking the skin 
and self-induced vomiting and perhaps her later fixation with colonic irrigation, Diana 
negotiated the limits of her corporeal frame. In Kristevan theories of the abject, the clean and 
proper self is maintained by a perpetual ousting of the repellant pollutant as that which 
threatens the perceived unity of the organism (Kristeva: 1982 [1980]). Within this theoretical 
framework, it is possible to interpret Diana's bodily negotiations as a means of maintaining 
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and controlling boundaries in what became popularly referred to as "the war of the Wales". 
Her battles in the face of dissolution became a means of identifying where the territory of 
'Diana' began and ended. 
As the container of the viscera of being, the skin is integral to our imago in the primal 
relation and therefore implicit to the constitution of the ego. It is through the surface of the 
body that the organism comes to feel and invest in its boundaries. In The Ego and the Id 
(1923), Freud states specifically that the "[tjhe ego is first and foremost a bodily ego" and that 
furthermore "[i]t may thus be regarded as a mental projection of the surface of the body. .. " (Freud: 1986,451). There is then a special relation between the cutaneous surface of the 
organism and its ego formation which has its beginnings in the primal relation between the 
maternal-figuring body and that of the infant who learns its limits through those of another. 
Acting in response to the maternal absence in her own life, Diana claimed that "I hug my 
children to death" (71). Disturbances in the primal relation have been linked to the psychical 
structuring that manifests its affects in self-harm and in anorexia nervosa and bulimia. To 
break the skin in textual terms is to cross the bar of the signifier into the signified and to tangle 
with 'the Real' in an encounter with that which cannot be signified. This would link the 
signifier to implicit presence which is only achieved through death or psychosis. This is 
because signification depends upon absence in order to properly 'stand in'. To achieve whole 
presence to itself, signification would need to invert the very precondition for meaning, 
turning itself inside out in a literal invisceration. Here is a place where text and body collide 
in a serniotics of carnality tied up in what Jean Laplanche refers to as "a sack of skin" which is 
the ego (Laplanche: 1976 [1970] 81). Speaking of her persona as the Princess of Wales, 
Diana states that "it took me six years to get comfortable in this skin" (49). When Diana 
became more comfortable in "this skin", her 'special touch' was often commented upon. She 
was seen to be a tactile human being rather than an 'untouchable' member of the royal family. 
The Broken Body - The Text in bits-and-pieces 
It is a point to remember that of all the ironies about Diana, perhaps the greatest was 
this -a girl given the name of the ancient goddess of hunting was, in the end, the most 
hunted person of the modern age. 
(Charles Spencer's funeral address, 6 September 1997 cited by Morton, 293) 
In his funeral speech, Charles Spencer referred to the classical myth of Diana with reference 
to the relentless media hunt surrounding his sister. It was, he said, ironic that a woman named 
after the Roman goddess of hunting was herself hunted to death. In the ancient Greek myth, 
Acteon looked upon the nakedness of the bathing goddess Artemis and was subsequently torn 
apart by his own hounds. As ancient myths of disintegration are re-played across the 
spectrum of rhetoric and popular myth-making media, Diana turns vengeance on herself In 
our modern version, it is Diana who is made to pay the price of the voyeur as the tale is turned 
back upon itself in an incestuous recoil of the narrative. She is herself violently punished and 
torn apart for being looked upon. Reports of her fate were scattered amongst newspapers 
across the world, each releasing different fragments for their readers' delectation thereby 
satisfying the narcissistic-aggressive impulses of mass spectacle. It can be seen here that 
theoretical postulations of our psychical constitution are implicitly tied to observations of 
social contract and power dynamic in a theory of civilized disease. Freudian theory posits that 
unpleasure is central to pleasure, that it is the threat of undoing that acts as agency to meaning. 
Fragmentation is then necessary to wholeness as that violence in relation to which the text 
holds together as a serniotic device. The 'wholeness' of the representation falls under the 
shadow of the stress applied to it so that the narrative functioning as the containing skin of the 
text which is named and synonymous in reading withDiana' may unperform itself through its 
very proliferation. The dead and dying body of Diana is incessantly picked over in attempts to 
make sense of a story without an end. In the post-mortems we perform on Diana's story, we 
enter her textual body after death. 'O 
The broken and dying body of Diana ruptured the skin of the vessel of popular 
investment. Her damaged body in the wreckage of the car accident became embroiled in a 
mass fantasy of the kind imagined by J. G. Ballard's Crash (1973). Her death became 
eroticised and photographed in a blaze of voyeurism as attempts to piece together the last 
movements of that dying body become an inter-national speculation of pornographic 
proportions. The woman who inspired books entitled Her Life in Pictures became as 
photographed in death as in life as her dead body became a phantasmatic object of voyeuristic 
desire. The photographs taken of the funeral procession and of the coffin bear witness to this 
last desperate attempt to fully possess the object through the gaze of the lens. 
In its unfinished state of premature ending, there is an open aperture in the Diana text 
acting as a gaping wound we enter and re-enter repeatedly in order to promulgate there our 
own desires and griefs. It acts as an arena in which our own negotiations with'Thanatos' and 
unpleasure may reverberate with regard to the broken maternal in the shape of a story cut 
short so that we may never know its end or obtain its 'truth'. As a fetish point where the body 
is transgressed, we phantasize over her dead body. There has been a voyeuristic interest in 
Diana's 'last words' and macabre fascination over the existence of the 'last photographs' 
allegedly sold to a German magazine. The paparazzi pursuing the princess to death were 
condemned yet, through world-wide television coverage of the funeral, we were able to watch 
photographs of photographs being taken of a coffin-veiled body accompanied by a macabre 
applause echoing along The Mall. This body was still performing even in death. 
In relation to Dianaýs narrative, we find ourselves installed on a collision course with 
theoretical positioning. Her story may be seen to interlock with the functioning of 
psychoanalytical theories of 'deathliness' as an encounter with 'the real'. Its result is seen in an 
outbreak of mass hysteria in which grief is expressed in the public space. Newspapers 
proclaimed this country to be a 'Cry-baby Britain' as the national body was perceived to be 
'sicle, displaying its ailments of bereavement to be filmed and re-played across the world. In a 
text turned inside-out, we became voyeurs to our own displays of'sufferine, playing 'Diana' to 
ourselves through blinking television monitors. In a supremely post-modern scenario, it is 
possible to locate the undoing of post-modernism in theoretical terms as the human looks for a 
narrative on a grand scale, seeking to supply the ending to its desperate diaspora. 
Enforced Closure and Grief 
It is in the enforced closure of such a tale that has not been perceived to reach its end that a 
severe withdrawal and mourning process may occur which manifests itself as a grief that will 
not "go quietly". So many people were affected by the death of Diana that there was a nation- 
wide need for counselling due to re-awakened griefs. Doctors spoke of'the Diana Syndrome' 
(294). With reference to theories of the post-modern, this would either seem to open up a very 
real divide between reality and theory here or work to illustrate operative textuality as a 
textual rhetoric which had found its way into mass consciousness. Whichever way we turn, 
this scenario offers us a very different position from Lyotard's conjecture that we no longer 
mourn for grand narrative when he states that "[m]ost people have lost the nostalgia for the 
lost narrative" (Lyotard: 1997 [1984], 41). This is a negotiation with deathliness as it is 
encountered in the narrative process on a large scale. There is then an argument that the story 
of the life and death of Diana, itself a post-modern phenonemon, represents an ironic locus 
where post-modernism 'catches' against itself. 
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Ironic Metanarrative 
'Born a Princess, died a Saint' 
(Slogan on T-shirts printed to coincide with Diana's funeral. ) 
For as long as there are poets, playwrights, and men with hearts to break, tales will be 
told of the princess who died across the water and returned home to be crowned a 
queen, the queen of all our hearts. (295) 
If this story of 'Diana' provides us with an ironic metanarrative for a post-modern arena, it is 
exemplary of the fact that post-modernism cannot rid itself of the metanarrative. Far from 
eradicating the metanarrative, post-modernism relies upon its operative concept for its very 
existence. In its very post-modernity, the 'Diana' text refers us back to the metanarrative 
through its return to the archi-apparatus operative in such established forms as christianity and 
the monarchy, embracing what Morton refers to as "the monarchy of our dreams and 
fantasies" (308). " Much as the aesthetic object of narrative relies upon the referential 
positionality of fragmentation and deathliness in order to define itself as complete and 
circulating in 'the real', so the post-modern through its very proliferation of narrative position 
and transgressive moves in the area of identity takes its pleasure in "new games" which pay 
homage to metanarrative through their very dynamic. 
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AFTERWORDS 
Afterwords 
This study of psycho-analysis and textual production has attempted to examine the 
mechanisms of critical encounter in relation to the psychoanalytical text and the literary text. 
It analyses the literary text through the activating texts of psycho-analysis and likewise applies 
the tools of literary criticism to psycho-analysis itself In doing so, it draws attention to the 
linguistic re-iteration which exists between the two disciplines and the cross-filtering of 
rhetorical space that occurs. Theories offered by psycho-analysis are considered to be flexible 
and activating, a living and full presence which has its parallel in the reading act which occurs 
in engaged critical practice as it is employed in textual analysis. 
The early texts of psycho-analysis receive close attention in the first part of the thesis. 
This is to draw out the beginnings of a new critical practice which may be seen to be close to 
that of literary critical practice, especially when we take into consideration the attention paid 
by Breuer and Freud to metaphor and literary references. The interpretative act is central to 
both practices and the space in which such interpretative response takes place may be seen to 
occupy a new positioning with regard to the textual object of the subject's scrutiny: a 
responsive inter-position. That early psycho-analysis was developed in conjunction with 
contemporary theoretical problems presented by the phenomenon of hysteria gives an 
interesting picture of linguistic theory and analysis in practice and offers an especially rich 
area of metaphorical interplay in the texts themselves. The constant re-writing and re- 
presentations to which this area of psychoanalytical history has been subjected adds yet 
another dimension of textual interest, drawing attention as it does to the evaluative procedures 
at play in interpretation. The historical distortions which may come to bear upon an 'original' 
text reveal cultural mythology whilst simultaneously pressing us to question the 'true' and 
'original'. 
What may be seen to be a definitely historically located theory may be the result of a 
number of acculturative and interpretative conjunctures, an over-determination in textual 
terms to apply Freud's terminology used with reference to the hysterical symptom. Psycho- 
analysis is not therefore regarded as an ossified monolith or meta-narration, not a method to be 
applied but an evolutionary enactment in which texts may be seen to interact. That Josef 
Breuer should regard "every theory [as] a temporary structure" is illustrative of this critical 
awareness at the beginnings of psycho-analysis itself and imperative and integral to its very 
beginnings (Sulloway: 1992,88). The interventions of Lacan and Kristeva are drawn upon in 
the textual readings of Part Two to illustrate this mechanism of activation in a post-modern 
setting. 
The second part of the thesis is composed of different textual readings, each section is 
discrete yet closely interlinks with other sections due to the parameters within which such 
readings are activated. Each reading may be considered to be integral to its 'setting'. The 
various texts treated include realist narrative, the strict form of pattern poetry, cultural texts, 
'feminist' fiction, the children's novel, and what is widely considered to be pornographic 
material. The various figures of these texts become meta-tropic as they traverse the 
boundaries of their own enclosure: the child, the bereaved mother, the daughter, princess and 
pervert wander in and out of each text and into the next whilst haunted by the last. These texts 
cross-reference each other thematically and in their activation of and by psycho-analytical 
texts whilst, it may be argued, displaying a parallel relation with hysterical positioning in their 
textual mechanism. As such, they may be regarded to be distinctly post-modern literary 
products and offer an interesting area for the re-modulations offered by theoretical encounter. 
Here post-modernism itself may be seen to have forerunning attachment to a doctor's concerns 
at the end of the nineteenth-century, illustrating the radical nature of Breuer and Freud's 
theorization of hysterical phenomena. Occupying a position of critical hindsight, the post- 
modern critic might be seen to operate as a ghost from the future in the texts of the past. 
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It is considered that such textual readings offer a new strategy of critical practice, a 
new reading practice which is an holistic coalition of psychoanalytical and literary analyses. 
If, in critical reception, it is accepted that the critic occupies the same position as the analyst, 
we are faced with a textual parallel of the psychoanalytical concept of counter-transference as 
the textual space may be seen to be one of a transferential intertext. Such a space might be 
constituted by a projection between reading and writing subjects. This space of the 
transference as it figures as intertext presents us with an intellectual transpositioning which 
layers the critical response into separate spheres in which the critic is engaged with reading as 
a re-writing of the text as object of desire. In so doing, the critic actively occupies an 
hysterical position, negotiating with a condition seconde as it is interposed in the reading 
process. The interpretative act is an interlude of textual haunting where the critic enters the 
text as ghost and is a reciprocal host to that of the text itself, thereby occupying a place of 
double haunting. 'Full' interpretation usually leads to an exorcism of such possession, a 
critical settlement which seeks to fully possess what cannot be fully possessed. It seems that 
the object of critical desire is to materialize what eludes us in reading. The critical reader 
might therefore be seen to be caught in an engagement with what Lacan terms the objet a as 
the locus of critical desire, the phantom of the phantasy of a 'real' text. The readings offered 
here seek to escape such established critical practice. They present themselves as interactive 
arenas, thereby emphasizing the topological dimensionality of the textual so that the tropes 
and metaphors of writing may be seen to be inhabited by the desiring reader/writer. Such 
practice offers a challenge to the established literary acquisition of psychoanalysis as a 
formulaic tool with which to prise open texts. It also seeks to escape from what have become 
mythical and monolithic aspects of psychoanalysis in literary practice as it is incessantly 
applied with respect to various set dramas such as the Oedipal crisis. Instead the readings here 
seek to present an activating space between texts, an 'in-between' critical space. This space 
must be different from that afforded by either the text or the reader separately, it is rather a 
place of activated marks rendered up through the desiring process. That there is an operative 
dialectics of the reading process is recognized in and by psychoanalysis. This space offers the 
reader a 'door to the Mothers, as an entrance to an unknown and wonderful realm - made by 
us yet unknown to us -a mystery in our own mechanism, and carried in our mechanics of 
relativity as reading and writing organisms. In this space lies a somatics of the textual. The 
textual readings presented here then seek to display the mechanism behind the therapeutic 
practices of psychoanalysis and ally them with critical analyses applied in textual encounters. 
It is hoped that the thesis demonstrates the flexibility and interaction which may occur 
between theory and the text of its scrutiny, between theoretical text and literary text, which 
activates intertextual connections. The textual analyses offered are motivated not by the 
application of a stronghold of theory but a reading in conjunction with theory where the 
psychoanalytical is also treated as a text in a virtual encounter which opens up the space of 
critical practice. The form in which this study is written, split into two different locations or 
mirroring parts which are themselves composed of multiple sections, might be considered as 
illustrative of the split state of the reading and writing subject. In its presentation of its own 
somatic wholeness as a text via a number of conspiring and determining connective tissues 
and nodules of textuality, it balances between wholeness and fragmentation in its own 
argumentative functioning. It is hoped that by writing in such a format, the thesis mirrors its 
subject matter and enacts the shifting wholeness which may be attained in order to project 
subjectivity as presence. To write T in the sentences of critical position is considered to be an 
ironic positioning of wholeness made possible only by the constantly reiterated threat of 
fragmentation as a necessary dynamic in any composition. 
... the interest the subject takes in his own split is bound up with that which determines it... (Lacan: 1994 [1973], 83) 
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NOTES 
Notes 
Introduction 
Jones notes that the first use of the term 'psycho-analysis' was in a paper by Freud 
published in French, 30 March 1896 and in German, 15 May 1896. Both papers were 
submitted at the same time and were identitical in content (Jones: 1953,269). 
2. Freud's description of Nachlr6glichkeit maybe found in a footnote to 'From the history of 
an infantile neurosis ("The Wolfman")'(1918 [1914]). SEXVII, 45. It is interesting that, 
in an addition to Freud's footnote, Strachey refers to Freud's forerunning formulations of 
Nacht . reYglichkeit in relation to retention hysteria in Studies on Hysteria. 
The Parameters of Interpretation: "[Flulfilling the law of the pendulum" 
1. In 1890, Bertha Pappenheim published her second collection of short stories for children 
entitled In der Trodelbude (in the Second-Hand Shop). A second edition was published 
in 1894. (Published under the pseudonym P. Berthold. ) 
2. We do not, for instance, lift Nelly Dean from the pages of Wuthering Hdghts to promote 
her as primary story-teller. To do so would displace Emily BrontU from authorship of the 
text and would constitute a methodological error because it fails to demarcate 
representation from the act of representing. Because NellY Dean is represented as a 
representer does not endow her with the agency to represent. 
3. It has been suggested that Breuces deep involvement with his patient was due to a 
counter-transference whereby many of the traumas of his patient reflected those of his 
own early life and that this caused a feed-back situation existing as a psychical dialectic 
between himself and his young patient. The transference phenomenon was, of course, 
then unrecognized and it was not until the termination of treatment that the erotics of the 
therapeutic situation became apparent. For a full account of this hypotheses see Pollock, 
George H. (1968). This bears resemblance to Ernest Jones' account of the relation 
between Breuer and Pappenheim where he states that "[i]t would seem that Breuer had 
developed what we should nowadays call a strong counter-transference to his interesting 
patient" (Jones: 1953,246). For an account of the relationship between the doctor and his 
patient, see HirschmUller: 1989,126-13 1. 
4. See James Strachey's 'General Preface [1966] to the Standard Edition 1: A 
5. Frank Sulloway comments upon this mythmaking around the figure of Freud. (Sulloway 
5-8) Erik H. Erikson writes of Freud as "a man who grew to be a myth before our eyes" 
(Erikson: 1957,77). 
6.1 principally refer here to accounts by Freud (1925 [1924]) and by Jones (1953). 
7. For accounts which run contrary to this, see Ellenberger: 1972,439,554. Ellenburger 
makes reference to several contemporary accounts of the occasion as they were reported in 
Viennese and German medical journals. 
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8. It is interesting that in the account of his own aetiology, Freud employs the same phrase. 
In An Autobiographical Study, Freud includes an account of anti-semitic feeling projected 
against him at university and writes that "at an early age I was made familiar with the fate 
of being in the Opposition... " (SE XX, 9) 
9. See Jones 255 and Sulloway 42. Sulloway states that Freud continued to attend meetings 
and records exist of his having been present at the Society of Physicians on 13 May, 1887 
and 21 October, 1887, and 3 February, 1888. On 16 February 1887, his name was 
proposed for membership and he was duly elected to the society. He remained a member 
until the outbreak of war in 1938. In terms of continued academic activity, he continued 
to present papers until 1904 and his University lectures continued until 1917. 
10. See Jones 252-5 for another view of these events. Jones does point out, in his 
interpretation of Freud's account, that "[o]ne might gather from his remarks that he ceased 
attending medical meetings ever after, but that was very far from being so. " It is therefore 
odd that after a period of nearly forty years Freud's emotions were still so agitated about 
the poor reception of this early paper. 
11. There have been few studies carried out exclusively on Breuer. The most exhaustive and 
valuable research has been carried out by Albrecht HirschmUller (1989 [1978]). 
Recuperative work has also been done by Henri Ellenberger (1970 & 1972) and Paul 
Cranefield (1958 & 1970). It is significant that there is no work available on or by Breuer 
existing in current print, the only exception being the co-authored Studies on Hysteria. 
12. Records of their early friendship may be found in Jones (1953) and Hirschmuller: 1989, 
133-135. The close and intimate relationship between the two men may also be traced 
through Freud's letters to Martha Bernays. See Letters 55-6,87,103-105 116,118,127, 
215. See also Freud's letters to Breuer: Ibid., 231-233 & 236. Freud's letter to Breuer of 
3 May 1889 greets him as a "Dearest Friend and best loved of Men! " (236) 
13. Bertha Pappenheirn was also part of this rather incestuous circle of middle-class 
acquaintance where doctors and patients, friends and family were mixed up together. 
Bertha was friends with Martha Bernays, Freud's fiancee and reference is made to her in 
letters between the engaged couple. In his letter of 13 July 1883, Freud writes of a 
conversation with Breuer and there he says that "your friend Bertha Pappenheim also 
cropped up. .. " (Freud: 1961,56) There is another interesting and pertinent link between Martha Bernays and Bertha Pappenheim. In 1880, after the death of Martha's father, her 
mother Emmeline appointed Bertha's father as legal guardian of her children. This would 
link Bertha's trauma at the death of her father to Freud's future wife's loss of her guardian 
and the implicit loss of her own father. (This account is given in Appignanesi and 
Forrester: 1992,80-8 1. They give no reference to source material, however. ) 
14. See Masson: 1985,294, letter of 16 January 1898 and 296, letter of 22 January 1898 
where reference is made to debts to Breuer, "(2,300 florins, I would estimate)". For 
interesting details re. the ensuing "distressing disagreement" between the two men over 6s debt, see Freud's letters to Fleiss: 18 October 1893 & 16 January 1898. (Masson: 
1985,59,60n, 294 & 296) 
15. Jones makes a tentative suggestion that Breuer might have been instrumental in procuring 
for Freud the work of translating John Stuart Mill's The Subjection of Women. Jones 
suggests that Breuer may have passed Freud's name to Franz Brentano who then suggested 
it to Theodor Gomperz, editor of Mill's collected writings in German. (Jones: 1953,61-2) 
16. See principally HirschmUller (1989 [1978]). Also Ellenberger (1970), Cranefield (1970), 
and Sulloway (1992 [1979]). 
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17. For accounts of Breuer's research, see HirschmUller 1989,54-76 and Jones: 1953,244. 
Breuer's research on the inner labyrinth of the ear was later plagiarized by Robert B5rdny 
in his award-winning work on the inner ear and its role in the equilibrium function. (1914) 
When this was discovered in 1916, B5rgny admitted having forgotten to cite Breuer's 1874 
paper yet Breuer himself went on to make light of the incident and actually supported 
Barany in the proceedings brought against him by the University of Vienna. 
(HirschmHer: 1989,75-76. Also Sulloway: 1992,52) 
18. HirschmUller traces the influence of French neuropathology on both Breuer and Freud. 
(Hirschmaller: 1989,148-151) 
19. Ernest Jones describes the relation as being that of father and son. Interestingly, he reports 
that the father turns against the son, rejecting him and cutting off support. (Jones- 1953, 
338) 
20. Jones writes, "In just these years Freud was in his most revolutionary stage, both 
intellectually and emotionally. The boycotting to which he was subjected induced in him 
a response of defiant rebelliousness. And when he was most in need of a companion with 
whom to share this, the one man who had the intellectual knowledge for the purpose and 
who had been the one to start him on his path only damped his ardour and withdrew from 
the fight. " (Jones: 1953,281) 
21. See Masson-1985,56: 29 September 1893; 86: 22 June 1894; 175: 1 March 1896; 181: 16 
April 1896; 415-6: 20 May 1900; also 170 & 200. Reference may also be made to letter 
of Hanna Breuer to Ernest Jones reproduced in Borch-Jacobsen: 1996,106-110. 
22. His break with Pappenheim was not so clean. His continued involvment is evidenced by 
documents of Bellevue Sanatorium in Kreutzlingen to which Pappenheim was removed 
after a relapse in her recovery (Hirschmiiller 105-7). In a letter to Dr. Robert Binswanger 
of 27 August 1882, however, Recha Pappenheim details Breuer's refusal of further 
involvement in her daughter's treatment. She writes that "I should also have to accept a 
doctor in Vienna, since Dr. Breuer is unable to take over the treatment. " (Hirschnf6fler 
304). 
23. For references to their collaboration, see Breuer & Freud: 1991 [1893/5]. Re. 'Frau Emmy 
von N., pp. 110-11,122,136,139,161,165. Re. 'Frau Cýcilie M., pp. 33-4 where 
Strachey remarks on the joint treatment, pp. 25 1. In addition to this Freud records in a note 
that Cacilie is troubled by a hallucination in which "her two doctors - Breuer and I- were 
hanging on two trees next to each other in the garden. " (255n. ) 
24. Dianne Hunter actually misconstrues this comment to the extent that the element of 
sexuality in a case of hysteria becomes something to do with sexual attractiveness. She 
states that, "Although Breuer states that Bertha Pappenheim was 'astonishingly 
underdeveloped' sexually, every commentator has remarked upon her physical attractions. " (Hunter: 1983,471) This reading is itself astonishing in its facile supposition 
and misappropriation in the interests of a crude feminist interpretation. 
25. See also Freud, On the Histo! y of the Psycho-Analytic Movement (1915). (SE XIV II- 
12) 
26. Freud and Jones' version of events is refuted by Hirschm@ler who refers to Freud's 
version of events as "an interpretative reconstruction. With increasing lapse of time after 
the events, this reconstruction became more and more consolidated and condensed. .. " (Hirschmýller: 1989,127) The pseudocyesis story is wholly disputed by Borch-Jacobsen 
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who states that "there is every reason to believe that it is sheer invention. " (Borch- 
Jacobsen: 1996,33-44) Borch-Jacobsen takes issue with Jones' account which claims that 
"[c]onfirmation of this account may be found in a then unpublished contemporary letter 
Freud wrote to Martha which contains substantially the same story. " (Jones: 1953,247) 
Borch-Jacobsen reproduces this letter which, although it alludes to the relationship 
between Breuer and his patient, does not contain the same story. The letter which Borch- 
Jacobsen reproduces is translated by Peter Swales and is slightly different from the Paul 
Masson translation cited by John Forrester (Forrester: 1994,19). This letter was to have 
been published as an appendix to the Masson edited Freud-Fliess letters but was later 
omitted. Borch Jacobsen is strong in his condemnation of Freud, "he's lucky Breuer 
didn't sue for defamation of character. A good lawyer, in two minutes flat, would have 
ripped Freud's malicious 'reconstructions' to shreds" (Borch-Jacobsen: 1996,43). That 
this nebulus area remains fascinating to Freud scholars in its elusivity is borne out by the 
recent publication by John Forrester and Laura Cameron in the International Journal of 
Psycho-Analysis of a previously unpublished letter from Freud to Sir Arthur Tansley, 
written in 1932. (Forrester and Cameron: 1999). The letter makes reference to the 'Anna 
0. ' case and is compared by Forrester and Cameron to the Zweig letter, also of 1932. Its 
formulation of "a cure with a defect" provides the chief interest of their interpretation. 
The publication of these letters also raises questions around the access to early material 
from the Freud archives. 
The Hen and the Hawk: Breuer's 'Theoretical' contribution to Studies on Hysteria 
(1895) and its influence on psycho-therapeutic theory 
1. All subsequent unattributed references appearing in parenthesis in this section are to the 
1991 Penguin edition of Breuer and Freud, Studies on Hysteria. 
2. It should be borne in mind that Breuer is writing to Freud's new close friend after a 
difficult time in his relationship with Freud which later led to an estrangement between 
them. 
3. This exchange is also commented upon by Jones: 1953,266n. 
4. Freud is here referring to the publication of Pierre Janet's Automatisme psychologiqu in 
1889 followed by another study in 1892 which replicates some of Breuees findings. 
5. Evidence of this may be seen in Freud's letters to Fliess. Also see PFL 8,57. 
6. It is interesting that Freud makes a direct comparison between the possession of money 
and the hysterical symptom in his case history of 'Fiiulein Elisabeth von R. ' (Breuer and 
Freud: 1991,248). 
7. It is interesting to compare Freud's use of this metaphor borrowed from Goethe's Faust, 
Part II, Act 1. In his letter to Stefan Zweig, he writes that Breuer did not have the courage 
to open the 'door to the Mothers'. (Freud to Zweig, 2 June 1932. Freud: 1960,408-9) 
Continuing this psychoanalytic tradition, Lacan echoes this allusive metaphor when in Ecrits he speaks of "[flhe return to the shades" (Lacan: 1977,123). 
The first appearance of the 'unconscious' as a term occurs in Breuer's case history of 
'FrHulein Anna 0. ' It is, however, attributed to Freud by Strachey in his notes. The 
grounds for this attribution are not known. 
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9. This is a danger of feminist acquisitions of the Lacanian phallus. 
10. Freud makes reference to the excavation of the trauma beneath archeological layers in his 
case history of 'Elisabeth von R. ' He writes that "[t]his procedure was one of clearing 
away the pathogenic psychical material layer by layer, and we liked to compare it with the 
technique of excavating a buried city" (Breuer and Freud: 1991,206). 
11. We may compare Lacarf s reference to the jouissance of St. Theresa in 'God and the 
Jouissance of The Womarf. Freud, in his contribution, also refers to religious mystics and 
erotic fantasies of nuns in analysis but does not make direct reference to St. Theresa. 
12. Freud employed electro-therapy in his treatment of 'Elisabeth von R. ' He writes that, "I 
reserved to myself treatment of her legs with high tension electric currents, in order to be 
able to keep in touch with her ... she seemed to take quite a liking to the painful shocks 
produced by the high tension apparatus" (Breuer and Freud: 1991,205). 
13. My use of the term'discharge' is used in the same sense as Breuer and Freud used it and is 
employed to denote freed energy. It is not used in the strict sense correct to electrical 
systems where it denotes an undesired leakage of energy. 
14. Without wishing to complicate such a scenario at this point, it is necessary to point out 
that this third form of energy which acts as a trigger to discharge may also act in an 
inhibiting manner in order to maintain the system. Its trigger is one of discharge or 
inhibition in accordance with its regulating function. It may return the released energy to 
its quiescent state if the organism is in any way threatened with self-dissolution, i. e. 
overload of the system. When a certain threshold has been exceeded, the same trigger 
may be involved in returning the energy to a manageable state via an avalanche effect. At 
all times, this triggering energy is working in the interests of the system as a whole and its 
function is strictly tied to this context. In the electrical circuit, a correlative mechanism 
may be found in the regulating function of the zenor diode in its facilitation of a split 
system by allowing a reverse polarity system should a certain limit be exceeded. The 
inhibiting function of the trigger is explored in relation to the Lacanian concept of 
jouissance later in this section. 
15. Here we may make another analogy with electrical phenomena in the function of the 
capacitor in the electrical circuit. Capacitors serve the function of a reserve in the 
electrical system, they have been charged and release stored energy when called upon to 
do so in what is a self-regulating scenario. This is a complicated picture due to 
peculiarities of the resistor with respect to AC and DC current, however. 
16. Lacan speaks of short-circuiting and feedback affects in the normal configuration of the 
ego in its relation with desire and illustrates this with his 'Che voui? ' graphs (Lacan: 1977, 
307). 
17. Strachey notes that Freud comments, near the beginning of'On the History of the Psycho- 
Analytic Movement' (1914) (aE XIV, 3/ PFL 15) on his name here in brackets. Freud 
states that although Breuer attributed this concept to him, the idea actually occurred to 
both of them simultaneously (Breuer and Freud: 1991,282n). 
18. Hirschmdiler offers a useful extrapolation of Breuer's theory of hypnoid hysteria. 
(Hirschm6ller: 1989,166-167). 
19. Freud gives an account of this episode in An Autobiogaphical Study (1925 [1924]). 
Upon waking, the patient "threw her arms round my neck. The unexpected entrance of a 
servant relieved us from a painful discussion, but from that time onwards there was a tacit 
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understanding between us that hypnotic treatment should be discontinued. I was modest 
enough not to attribute the event to my own irresistable attraction, and I felt that I had now 
grasped the nature of the mysterious element that was at work behind hypnotism" (SE XX 
27). Jones comments on the episode by comparing Freud favourably against Breuer: 
"Unlike the seared Breuer on a similar occasion, Freud regarded the problem as one of 
general scientific interest" (Jones: 1953,267). 
20. If we take this into account together with the influence of English philosophy on Freud, 
evidence of which may be found in his early monograph On Aphasia (189 1), and Freud's 
formulation of the concept of regression drawn from Hughlings Jackson's notion of 
regression in his work on aphasia, then we may trace back the aetiology of Freud's 
technique ofTree association' to one in which a number of converging associative theories 
meet in what constitutes a state of overdetermination for a new psychotherapeutic therapy. 
21. Freud and Martha Bernays became engaged on 17 June 1882. Freud was then 26 years 
old and Martha 21. They married in 1886, the same year in which Freud set up in private 
practice in Vienna. 
22. Writing to Martha in 1885, Freud reminds her of the origins of his 'Little Princess' 
nickname for her: I said that roses and pearls fall from your lips as with the Princess in 
the fairy tale and that one is left wondering only whether it is goodness or intelligence that 
has the upper hand with you. This is how you acquired the name of Little Princess" 
(Freud: 1961,202). 
"In the new house she hallucinated her old room": Hysterical Topology and the 
Phantasy of Gender 
1. This section is to be published in modified form as a paper of the same title in American 
Imago. Forthcoming. 
2. The hysteric's absorption of object into the self in face of loss is in direct correlation to the 
compensatory hallucination of the phantom limb. The loss of the limb must be a "sudden 
loss" according to Schilder and it is often hallucinated "rigid" (Schilder: 1935,63-4). 
Here we may compare Anna O. 's rigid arm operative as a transposition of the genital in the 
face of trauma caused by the loss of her adored father. 
3. James Strachey relates that Freud "with his fingers on an open copy of the book" told him 
of a hiatus in Breuer's text (Breuer and Freud: 1991,95). This gap in the text constitutes 
an interesting and controversial area of Freudian myth-making surrounding Breuer's 
reaction to the mechanism of transference in his treatment of Bertha Pappenheim. As 
such, this hiatus provides a fascinating area of fetish around which different stories spin, 
operating as an investment area for the'fathering' of psychoanalysis. 
4. It has been noted by Sulloway that Freud's teacher Carl Claus wote a critical review of 
Haekel's theory in the same year that Freud enrolled in Claus's 'General Biology and 
Darwinism'. "It seems more than likely that Haekel's theory, which aroused much 
attention at the time, was a subject of lively discussion in that course" (Sulloway: 1992, 
262). 
Freud comments on the backward recollection of the hysteric in a footnote to his case 
history of Trau Emmy von N. ' He states here that "when one is resolving a current 
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hysterical delirium, the patient's communications are given in a reverse chronological 
order. .. " (Breuer and Freud: 1991,134). 
6. In his case history in Studies on Hysteria (1895), Breuer refers a diary kept in 1881 by 
Recha Pappenheim which "confirmed beyond a doubt the occurrence of the underlying 
events" as the result of re-living the previous year day by day (Breuer and Freud: 1991, 
87). 
7. See Benvenuto and Kennedy for their commentary on Lacan's use of the term 'instance' 
in this context (Benvenuto and Kennedy: 1986,107). 
8. Here it might be interesting to note the attention paid to orifices and bodily boundaries in 
sado-masochistic 'scenes'. In this power-play between one and other, it seems that there is 
a direct link between primary narcissism, biology and bodily image operative as a sexual 
imperative. 
9. There may, of course, be more than two scenes but there is always, even in the multiple 
scheme, the need for the one to transpose upon the other and therefore the idea of a 
condition seconde remains accurate. 
10. This structuration is, of course, also operative through the maternal function as it carries 
the paternal imperative operative within it as an inherited structural ghost or symbolic 
trace. 
11. In their 'Preliminary Communication' of 1893 which prepared the ground for their Studies 
on Hysteria, Breuer and Freud state that "the psychical trauma - or more precisely the 
memory of the trauma - acts like a foreign body which long after its entry must continue to 
be regarded as an agent that is still at work. .. " (Breuer and Freud: 1991,56-7). 
12. The desire of the transsexual, of often articulated as annexed to being in the wrong body 
seems to offer a countermove to this scheme where it might be perceived that bodily 
mapping issues unproblematically in accordance with desire. It is important to remember 
that Schilder is, in fact, referring to a body image. The desolate gender disphoria 
experienced by the transsexual may therefore support this theory because it is strong 
enough to overcome 'the real' of the flesh so much so that the transsexual often refers to 
their former existence as being that of another person now deceased. 
13. In Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia, Kristeva describes melancholics as dazzling 
creators (Kristeva 1989,64). She links the depressed subject position with a skewed time 
sense and radical dislocation which may constitute a challenge to the oedipal. 
Melancholia and depression are explored by Kristeva in relation to denial of negation of 
the maternal object in order to enter the symbolic. The depressed or melancholic subject 
is therefore in a position of exile whilst operating within the symbolic and occupies a 
place balanced upon an edge of danger and creative brilliance. 
"I have no story to tell! ": Maternal Rage in Susan Hill's The Woman in Black 
1. Susan Hill's novel The Woman in Black was first published in 1983. It marked her return 
to writing after a retirement of several years, a biographical detail which may correlate 
with the retentive scriptible function of the text's main character. The novel is set in the 
early twentieth-century but it tells a secondary story set in the mid-Victorian period. We 
are told the story in the form of a first person narrative by a retired solicitor, Arthur Kipps. 
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Having been repeatedly asked by his step-children from his second marriage to tell a 
Christmas Eve ghost story, he finds himself unable to oblige due to a past trauma induced 
by a 'real' and malevalent haunting to which he was subjected as a young man. He insists 
that "I have no story to tell! " (Hill 19) He withdraws from the happy seasonal gathering 
but finds himself suffering from the affects of the memory of his terrifying experience. He 
resolves to cathartically exorcise this ghost of memory by writing his story down on the 
condition that no-one may read it during his lifetime. He begins his 'real' ghost story by 
recollecting how, as a young solictor, he was dispatched from London to the distant 
market-town of Crythin Gifford to attend the funeral and organize the posthumous affairs 
of a Mrs. Alice Drablow of Eel Marsh House. It is during the funeral that Arthur first 
sights the woman in black. During his stay at the isolated Eel Marsh House, he discovers 
a series of letters by which he is able to uncover the identity of the woman in black as Mrs. 
Drablow's sister, Jennet Humfrye. He discovers that Jennet was exiled from her family 
for giving birth to an illegitimate son. The infant was subsequently adopted by her 
childless sister, against Jennet's wishes. The boy was killed in an accident and Jennet, 
wracked by grief and anger, died a slow death from wasting disease. Arthur is then 
subjected to an aggressive haunting by the woman in black whose overwhelming grief and 
anger at the double loss of her son causes her to wreak her revenge upon all who see her. 
During the excesses of emotion experienced by Arthur, he regresses to childhood 
experience and eventually becomes ill due to the traumatic stress he suffers. Upon his 
return to London, Arthur marries his fiancee Stella and they soon have a baby son. Jennet 
Humfrye takes her revenge upon Arthur for his happiness by appearing to him during a 
family outing, causing the death of his wife and child in a violent accident so that her story 
can be seen to have 'real' repercussions in Arthur's life story. 
This section has been published as a paper of the same title in Intertexts 4.1 (2000): 74-88. 
2. All subsequent unattributed page references in this section are to the 1984 Penguin edition 
of The Woman in Black. 
3. In Violet Hunt's short story, 'The Prayer' (1895), the excessive and all-encompassing 
grief of a woman for her dead husband causes her to pray for his return from the dead 
"My God, my God, he's mine - give him back to me! " (Dalby 265) She is later 
described as "like a lady - in black - (Dalby 273). 
4. These 'other stories' may refer to those internal to the primary narration of Kipps or to 
those intertextual references to other stories which are properly external to The Woman in 
Black but contained by it and activated within its arena. 
"Through a door": Retroactive Narrative in Philippa Pearce's Tom's Midnight Garden 
1. Tom's Midnight Garden is a novel for children written in 1958 by Philippa Pearce. It tells 
the story of a boy called Tom, aged about nine or ten years old. He is temporarily sent 
away from his parents, his brother Peter, and his own small garden because his brother has 
measles and is in quarantine. Tom is sent to stay with his aunt and uncle in a large house 
divided into flats with a concrete back yard. At the top of the house lives old Mrs. 
Bartholomew, the landlady. During his sleepless nights, his curiosity is drawn by the 
sound of the grandfather clock in the ball striking extra hours after midnight. It is during 
his midnight exploration that he opens the back door and walks out into a large Victorian 
garden existing in a different time. It is this place that he enters after midnight each night 
and there meets a little girl called Hatty. They play together in this place of extra-time and 
Tom notices that Hatty varies in age from an infant to a nubile young woman. Later in the 
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story, Tom meets old Mrs. Bartholomew and finds that she is Hatty gown into an old 
woman and that he has been entering the scenes of her dreams night after night. 
This section has been published as a paper of the same title in Versus 77/78 (1977): 145- 
160. 
2. All subsequent unattributed page references in this section are to the 1984 Penguin edition 
of Philippa Pearce, Tom's Midnight Garde . 
Harold and Maude. Dir. Hal Ashby. Paramount, 197 1. 
This film presents the story of Harold, a young man aged about sixteen years old, who has 
a love affair with Maude, a woman in her seventies. A tragi-comedy, the film is 
interspersed with fantasy sequences of Harold's preoccupation with death and funerals. 
Harold grows up through his affair with Maude and comes to terms with her death. 
Negotiating Theories of Feminine Writing: Michile Roberts, In the Red Kitchen 
MichMe Roberts' novel In the Red Kitchen was first published in 1990. Its narrative is 
based on the interlinking stories of five female characters who are located in three 
different time dimensions: ancient Egypt, Victorian England, and modern-day London. 
Each of the character's stories haunt each other and meet through the medium spirit of 
Flora Milk who acts as an amanuensis to their different voices. She becomes involved 
with the middle-class household of Dr. William Preston and his wife Minny with whom 
she stays as a protdgd and subject of Dr. Preston's research. During an illicit affair with 
the doctor, he takes her on a trip to Paris and attempts to incarcerate her at the SalpetriEre 
under the dictates of Charcot. Flora's story is further complicated by intruding into that of 
the modern character named Hattie who lives in Flora's house after her death and sights 
the young Flora in the kitchen. In a complicated scenario, their stories are then crossed 
through with that of King Hat, an Egyptian woman king whose power was seized upon 
discovery of her sex. Hat is seeking a scribe to tell her story and write her name in 
history. The story is one which has some basis in historical presentations and thereby 
questions the boundary between fact and fiction in representational accounts. King Hat 
appears to be based upon Queen Hatasu, daughter of Thothmes the First. After her father's 
death, Hatasu assumed an unprecedented position for a woman as ruler of Ancient Egypt. 
She is shown in her portrait bust wearing an artificial beard as a sign of her power. In his 
study of Ancient Egypt, Rawlinson tells us that she "was a woman of great energy and of a 
masculine mind" and that "the ambition of Queen Hatasu was to hand her name down to 
posterity as a constructor of buildings" (Rawlinson: 1897,173). Of great interest to our 
reading of Roberts'text is his report that 
[a] curious anomaly appears in some of her inscriptions where masculine and feminine 
forms are inextricably mixed up; though spoken of consistently as 'the kine and not 
'the queen', yet the personal and possessive pronouns which refer to her are feminine 
for the most part, while sometimes such perplexing expressions occur as 'His 
Majesty herself. (Rawlinson: 1897,178). 
Upon her death, her name was erased from many of her monuments. The character of 
Flora Milk also has historical precedent. In an author's note with which she prefaces the 
text, Roberts states that Flora Milk is based upon the life of the young Victorian medium 
Florence Cook. The names used in Roberts' novel coincide with those found in Florence 
Cook's life story. Roberts also makes reference to Elaine Showalter, The Female Malady 
(1985) as a source text. Her novel weaves a narrative which draws upon feminist 
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psychoanalytical theory, using many of the motifs and metaphors found in new French 
feminist theory with reference to feminine signification. This intermingling of historical 
account, feminist and psyclioanalytical theory with narrative construction draws into 
question the formation of categorising structure. It also has the curious effect of closing 
down the possible interpretations of what should a supremely open text. It should be 
stressed that the reading offered here of Roberts' In the Red Kitchen is an experimental 
textual response with a strong stylistic aspect. 
2. All subsequent unattributed page references in this section are to the 1991 Minerva edition 
of Michýle Roberts, In the Red Kitchen. 
In Signifying Chains: Pauline Weage's Story of 0 
1. All subsequent unattributed page references in this section are to the 1992 Corgi edition of 
Pauline Reage, Sto! y of 0. 
2. Freud comments on the'civilized' regulation of apertures and use or prohibition of mucus 
membranes as sexual orifices in Three Essavs on the Theo! y of Sexualit . We might 
compare the narrator's observation that O's "mouth was the same pink as the pink flesh of 
her open sex" (155) with Freud's comments on the use of the mouth for sexual purposes 
(Freud: 1991 [1905], 295). 
Visions and Prayers: Incarnation and Performative Paradigm. Dylan Thomas, 'Vision 
and Prayer' 
1. This section is to be published as a paper entitled 'Visions and Prayers: Linguistic 
incarnation and performative paradigm in the poetry of Dylan Thomas'. The Swansea 
Review. Forthcoming. 
2. All subsequent quotations are from 'Vision and Prayer' unless stated otherwise. Those 
followed only by a page number refer to the 1984 Dent edition of Thomas' Collected 
Poems: 1934 -1952. 
3. In relation to 'Vision and Prayer', we may conceive of the shapes of the verses as a mobile 
structuration as its limits transpose upon its body. Its twelve stanza formation in relation 
to its strict visual patterning welds form and content in poetic dialogue. Jakobson states 
that "[d]esign and instance are correlative concepts. The verse design determines the 
invariant features of verse instances and sets up the limits of variations" (Jakobson: 1988, 
44). 
4. Freud's 1914 paper 'On Narcissism: An Introduction' (SE_XIV) was reworked in 1915/17 
to include the object as prefiguring the subject in'Mourning and Melancholia' (5E XIV). 
This was then drawn upon by Lacan to support aggressivity in ego constitution and 
transitivism via the image of the other supplying the entrapment by which the organism 
models its own visual projection into the lure of a unified T via the mirror stage. In this 
scenario, aggressivity is therefore endemic to the subject base. 
5. Read in this way, the resulting fragmentary movement in the liminal edges of the text may 
relate to the surrealist effects of Thomas' poetry so often commented upon. 
lba 
6. Lacan describes this process in 'The subversion of the subject and the dialectic of the 
desire' as one of retroactivity in the transmission of the signifier. 
7. This process is explored by Lacan in The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis 
in his discussion of Merleau-Ponty's The Visible and the Invisible (1964). There he states 
that "the regulation of form, [] is governed, not only by the subject's eye, but by his 
expectations, his movements, his grip, his muscular and visceral emotion - in short, his 
constitutive presence" (Lacan: 1994,7 1). 
8. Freud describes this comforting process of compensation for loss in Bgyond the Pleýsure 
Principl . There he illustrates the process by presenting us with an account of his 
grandson's cotton-reel game. By enacting his mother's absence, the infant is ritually 
empowering itself through representation even though that representation is built upon a 
radical loss (Freud: 1991,225-6). 
9. The Freudian notion of Nachtriiglichkeit, literally 'afterwardsness', describes a process 
whereby the second scene of trauma activates the primary scene of trauma which has 
hitherto been dormant. For Freud's account of this deferral of affect, see his footnote to 
'The Wolf Man' case history (aE XVII, 45). 
Diana: Her True Sto : Post-Modern Transgressions in Identity 
1. This section has been published as a paper of the same title in the Journal of Gender 
Studies. 8.2 (1999): 323-337. 
2. All subsequent unattributed page references are to Andrew Morton (1998) Diana: Her 
True Story - In Her Own Words. (London, Michael O'Mara Books). 
3. It also politicizes the textual cover-up over which Diana and Morton conspired. 'Deep 
Throat' was the name given to the anonymous press informant who blew the whistle on the 
'Watergate' furore in the U. S. A. 
4. The telling is, of course, also directed towards the reading other who acts as activating 
destination of the'true story' ofT. This presents us with a scenario of multiple splittingin 
the narrative scenario which is not recognized by the feminist project of self-presence. 
The text is split three ways between the locus of T telling the story, the fully-collated 'me' 
towards which it projects itself, and'you' acting as the locus of the reading other. Diana's 
text is split still ftirther by being channelled through a mediating 'you' towards which 
Diana's taped utterances were directed for interpretation. 
5. Speaking with reference to his treatment of Anna 0., Breuer states that "I would visit her 
in the evening ... and I then relieved her of the whole stock of imaginative products 
which she had accumulated since my last visit. " He refers to her accounts as "evening 
narratives" (Breuer & Freud: 1991 [1895], 83). 
6. Diana used these words during her April 1993 speech at the International Eating Disorders 
93 Conference in London. Although she did not speak in the first person, she said that she 
had her information "on very good authority". Susie Orbach, who became Diana's 
therapist, was also a speaker at the conference. 
7. It might again be useful hereto invoke details from Breuer's case history of'Fiýulein Anna 
0. ' in order to exemplify this rhetoric of psychical disintegration and its absorption into 
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thetic signing. Breuer refers to his patient's split-off state where she would complain of 
"having two selves" and the intrusion of different psychical states into one another. "[A] 
clear-sighted and calm observer sat, as she put it, in a corner of her brain and looked on at 
all the mad business" (Breuer & Freud, 1991 [1895], 77 & 101). 
8. It is interesting that this perceived capacity for sixth sense or premonition is now being 
transferred to Diana's 'living image', Prince William. Morton tells that the night his 
mother died, William was reported to have said ... I knew something was wrong, I kept 
waking up all night"' (286). 
9. This romantic diaspora of identity might also correlate with the real post-colonial concerns 
of Diana's last love affair. There was political concern that Diana's possible filture father- 
in-law would not hold a British passport whilst the future king might be related to non- 
christian half-brothers or sisters. Her'truc romance' therefore posed a radical challenge to 
the constitutional identity of British monarchy. 
10. It is ironic that, after utilizing the concept of a unified subject tailored to political agency 
as the most powerful means of mass subjection, the transgression of T becomes licenced 
by state ownership as it is mobilised in power dynamics over the dead legal subject 
recognized by the social apparatus. The state wields its power over the dead body as the 
legal procedures pertaining to lifeless flesh become activated in the act of post-mortem. 
As Diana's body was already regarded as state-owned in the most manifest form, the knife 
was applied to the identity of the body politic as represented in the body of a princess. 
The overt results of this were seen in the political repercussions of the death for the 
status of the royal family and in interventions of state over monarchy in the funeral 
arrangements of "the people's princess" as Downing Street became involved in 
negotiations between the Spencers and the Windsors. 
11. We may read this texual imperative in the media's rush to deify Diana afler her death, 
paying homage in the received forms, thereby feeding old cultural reference back into the 
apparatus whilst simultaneously producing good saleable copy to be sold to 'the people! 
for reiteration. 
I b5,. 
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